

JOURNAL **OF** POLITICAL SCIENCE

BULLETIN OF YEREVAN UNIVERSITY

VOLUME 1 - ISSUE 2 - SEPTEMBER 2022



[YEREVAN STATE
UNIVERSITY]
PUBLISHING HOUSE

ISSN P-2738-294X
E-2738-2796

YEREVAN STATE UNIVERSITY

**Journal of Political Science:
Bulletin of Yerevan University**

JOPS

VOLUME 1 - ISSUE 2 - September 2022



**[YEREVAN STATE
UNIVERSITY]**
PUBLISHING HOUSE

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University

The Bulletin of Yerevan University is a four-month bulletin of social sciences has been published since 1967 in Yerevan. Since 2010, the Political Science Series of the Bulletin are published as special issues. It is published three times a year.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is the leading journal of contemporary political research, which is focused on the political science analysis of institutions, processes, political systems and regimes in the countries of the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions. Articles published in the Journal of Political Science are theoretically innovative and methodologically diverse and includes a variety of intellectual approaches.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** publishes balanced scientific approaches by scholars from all over the world and in all fields of political science, including Armenian politics, comparative politics, international relations and geopolitics, political theory and methodology, political education and socialization.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is a peer-reviewed journal that publishes original results of fundamental and applied research of theoretical and practical significance in the field of political science, informing the domestic, regional and international political science community about the latest results of political science research. Manuscripts in all areas and methodologies of political research are welcome for consideration. The Journal is open to comparative research and especially welcomes those manuscripts that are based on interdisciplinary approaches to political science issues.

The ***Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (JOPS)*** is a public platform for the consolidation and structuring of the Armenian and regional political science network, ensuring the integration of Armenian and regional political science into international political science, contributing to the development of university political science education in Armenia and the region. In each issue, scientific articles are published in the public domain.

Correspondence: Please visit the JOPS website for journal information and instructions for submitting manuscripts, <https://journals.ysu.am/index.php/j-pol-sci/about/submissions>.

Subscriptions and advertising

In the volume subscription year 2022, Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University (ISSN (Print) 2738-294X; (online) 2738-2796) is published in May, September and December by Publishing House of Yerevan State University (Yerevan); <https://journals.ysu.am/index.php/j-pol-sci>

Disclaimer: The authors, editors, and publisher will not accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made in this publication. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed in the Republic of Armenia.



Publishing House of YSU is a member of CrossRef.



JOPS

Editor in Chief

Ashot Aleksanyan, Professor, Doctor of Sciences Degree in Political Science, Head of the Chair of Political Science, Yerevan State University; Friedrich Schiller University Jena, E-mail: ashalex@ysu.am

Managing Editor

Magda Arsenyan, PhD in Political Science, Lecturer, Public Administration Academy of the RA, E-mail: magdaarsenyan@yahoo.com

Editorial Board

Alexander Markarov, Professor, Doctor of Sciences Degree in Political Science, Chair of Political Science, Yerevan State University, E-mail: amarkarov@ysu.am

Anna Khvorostyankina, Associate Professor, PhD in Law, Brusov State University, E-mail: anna.v.khv@gmail.com

Artur Martirosyan, PhD in Political Science, Deputy Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of the Republic of Armenia, E-mail: artur.martirosyan79@gmail.com

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Associate Professor, PhD in Political Science, Research Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Yerevan State University, E-mail: arusyak.aleksanyan@ysu.am

Christiane Lemke-Dämpfling, Prof. Dr., Institute for Political Science, Leibniz University Hannover, E-mail: lemkeipw@uni-hannover.de

Daniel L. Feldman, Prof. Dr., John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, E-mail: dfeldman@jjay.cuny.edu

Hamazasp Danielyan, PhD in Political Science, E-mail: hdanielyan@ysu.am

Khalid Khayati, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, E-mail: khalid.khayati@liu.se

Lilit Stepanyan, PhD in Political Science, Member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, E-mail: lilitstepanyan2019@gmail.com

Narek Galstyan, Associate Professor, PhD in Political Science, Chair of Political Science, Yerevan State University, E-mail: nsgalstyan@ysu.am

Nikolai Veremeev, Associate Professor, PhD (Political sciences), Head of Department of Political Science, Belarus State Economic University, E-mail: kp@bseu.by

Olaf Leïße, Prof. Dr., Head of the subdivision European Studies, Institute for Political Science, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, E-mail: olaf.leisse@uni-jena.de

Oksana Krayevska, Associate Professor, Dr., Faculty of International Relations, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, E-mail: oksana.krayevska@lnu.edu.ua

Ria Laenen, PhD, Associate Professor, Leuven International and European Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, E-mail: ria.laenen@kuleuven.be

Ruben Elamiryan, Associate Professor, PhD in Political Science, Head of the Chair of World Politics and International Relations, Russian-Armenian University, Yerevan, E-mail: ruben.elamiryan@rau.am

Simon Clarke, Associate Professor in Political Science, PhD, British University in Egypt, E-mail: simon.clarke@bue.edu.eg

Tatevik Sargsyan, PhD in Political Science, California State University, Northridge, E-mail: tasargsyan@yahoo.com

Tigran Mkrtchyan, PhD in Political Science, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia to the Hellenic Republic, E-mail: tigranes.mkrtchyan@gmail.com

Todor Georgiev Galounov, Prof. Dr., Department of political science, sociology and cultural studies, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, E-mail: t.galounov@ts.uni-vt.bg

Vache Kalashyan, Associate Professor, PhD in Political Science, Chair of Public Administration, Yerevan State University, E-mail: vkalashyan@ysu.am

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| In this issue | 6 |
| <i>Regional policy</i> | |
| Armenian Statehood in Foreign Policy Realities: the First Steps of the First Republic <i>Gegham Petrosyan</i> | 12 |
| Erdogan against Turkey: Stalemate of “Patriot-F-35-S-400” triangle <i>Hayk Gabrielyan</i> | 49 |
| <i>Comparative politics</i> | |
| Mapping Political Populism in the European Post-Transitional Periphery.. <i>Nane Aleksanyan</i> | 73 |
| Reflections on the Transformation of the World Order: Emerging Trends and Impending Perspectives <i>Karine Khojayan</i> | 92 |
| <i>Public policy</i> | |
| Civic Journalism as a Phenomenon of Digital Civilization <i>Greta Gevorgyan</i> | 106 |
| <i>Political philosophy</i> | |
| How to Reconcile Equality with Freedom? On the Two Ways in Liberalism <i>Naira Mkrtchyan</i> | 121 |
| <i>Book Review</i> | |
| Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. XV, 329 pp. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8 <i>Review by: Hayarpi Drmeyan</i> | 139 |

Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World, edited by Broers Laurence, and Anna Ohanyan.

London: I.B. TAURIS, 2021. XVI, 271 pp.

<http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214>

144

Review by: Viktorya Melkonyan

Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus, edited by Ulrike Ziemer. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. X, 281 pp.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_8

150

Review by: Svetlana Jilavyan

In this Issue

In the current conditions of the change of cycles of war to a situation of neither war nor peace in the space of the countries of the Eastern Partnership, starting from September 2020, destructive tendencies deepen and spread the turbulence zone in the countries of the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region.

The issue of strengthening the statehood and integration choice for Armenia and other Newly Independent States has been an important part of the national development strategy from the very beginning of the existence of Armenia and these countries as sovereign states. Geopolitically, Armenia is located between large integration associations: the EU in the west and associations of post-Soviet countries in the east, the most important of which are the EAEU and the CIS. Armenia's relations with these associations expanded over time. On the one hand, the desire to take its place in the world economy and reform the national economic system was the motive for the country's rapprochement with the EU Member State. On the other hand, a deep structural relationship with the economies of the countries of the post-Soviet space, as well as a number of social and cultural factors, did not allow Armenia to significantly distance itself from cooperation with Russia and other CIS countries.

In the context of a military and political earthquake, the processes of enlargement of the EU and NATO, despite their apparent slowdown, remain relevant and are the subject of comparative analysis and political science discussion. The increasing activity of Europe on the world stage, intensified after the emergence of isolationist tendencies in the foreign policy of Russia and Turkey, and the remaining significant share of European states in the world economy, make the EU and NATO one of the most influential actors in world politics, whose members include several large and economically developed countries. All this makes membership in the EU and NATO extremely attractive for many of their neighbors, including the countries of the Eastern Partnership. Of particular interest is Armenia, which for many years faced a huge number of obstacles to the implementation of an independent foreign policy. At present, it seems extremely important to study how it is currently trying to promote its national interests in the new conditions, but with the use of international structures, traditionally key tools, thanks to which Armenia, throughout its post-war history of 2020, has gradually returned to the number of main actors in regional politics. It is also necessary to understand what exactly are the national and integration interests of Armenia in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as Eurasian rapprochement.

Armenia, which is among those Newly Independent States, continues to face a large number of military, political, social and economic problems and is in dire need of foreign policy allies. For these reasons, membership in the EAEU and the CSTO, as well as cooperation with the EU and NATO, continues to be one of the main priorities of the Armenian leadership. The current crisis in relations between Russia and the West, which arose after the political processes that took place in Ukraine in 2014 and began on February 24, 2022, is one of the main problems of European security, the impact of this conflict on the escalation of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and also on the risk of a new large-scale war in the South Caucasus and other geopolitical processes. It is hard to overestimate how the fighting affects and destabilizes the situation around

Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russian peacekeepers are stationed, as well as fragile regional stability. For the Armenian statehood, both in history and at the present stage, all this affects the economic, political, military and many other areas of international cooperation. Finding ways out of this situation is an important task for the entire region and the world.

In 'Armenian Statehood in Foreign Policy Realities: the First Steps of the First Republic', Gegham Petrosyan analyzes the ways of establishing the First Republic of Armenia, where a number of problems of a geopolitical, economic, military, interethnic nature are intertwined. The complexity of the analysis and resolution of numerous problems of an international nature of the First Republic of Armenia is explained by the presence of both a sharp differentiation in the positions of internal factors, and a clash of interests here, largely contradictory, external factors of international relations. The geopolitical position of the First Republic is due to the fact that after gaining independence, this smallest country in terms of territory and population in the South Caucasus was involved in a tough confrontation with Turkey. Armenia was almost completely economically isolated from the outside world by the imposition of a transport blockade by Turkey. This article also analyzes the development of the Armenian statehood, the formation of its foreign policy at the current stage of historical development, it is necessary to clearly understand that historical experience and the peculiarities of the national values of the Armenian people have a key influence on these processes.

In his article 'Erdogan against Turkey: Stalemate of "Patriot-F-35-S-400" triangle', Hayk Gabrielyan analyzes the activities of the President of Turkey to strengthen his leadership position through the development of military and defense partnerships. The author explains the motivation of the Turkish President to receive American F-35 fighter jets and Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems.

In the modern world, there are more and more new challenges and threats that both the political leadership of Turkey and the Army have to respond to, taking into account the views and interests of various political forces and social groups. The author comparatively analyzes internal political difficulties and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016, remaining an internal Turkish conflict, attracted much attention from Russia due to their potential impact on the stability of the country and the development of Russian-Turkish relations. According to the author, various political forces in Turkey have made attempts to influence the tone of Russia in relation to the conflict that has arisen. One of the clearest examples of such interaction is the active economic and military cooperation between Turkey and Russia. However, the current situation in the Middle East, the war against radical Islamism, which initiated destructive processes in the countries of the region, creates obstacles to the development of normal interstate relations. Inevitably, these processes also influence the development of Turkish-Russian relations. The involvement of Turkey and Russia in the Syrian events unwittingly affects the historically established geopolitical interests of the states in the region, as well as very painful ethnoterritorial problems that have not yet been resolved. In this context, the author analyzes the inconsistency of military cooperation between Russia and Turkey for the supply of S-400 air defense systems, since Turkey was the first NATO country to acquire these S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Such a decision by Turkey

caused a sharp negative reaction from the United States and NATO as a whole, so the United States does not stop trying to get Turkey to give up Russian air defense systems. In this regard, the United States excluded Turkey from the American program for the production of the 5th generation F-35 fighter-bomber and carried out a series of unilateral sanctions. The author considers a paradoxical situation when Turkey, on the one hand, believes that future EU membership remains a strategic goal, and an alliance with NATO is an important step in the development of military power, and on the other hand, the Turkish side is criticized and distrusted by Western countries due to military cooperation with Russia.

In the article 'Mapping Political Populism in the European Post-Transitional Periphery', Nane Aleksanyan conducts a comparative analysis of the construction of new populist ideologies and projects in the countries of the European periphery, as well as steps to effectively counteract populism. The author's explanation of populism as a political and social phenomenon of our time shows a peculiar understanding of radicalization in the Newly Independent States, taking into account the level of distortion of the transforming post-Soviet society and political regime. Comparison of Western and post-Soviet forms of populism is important for clarifying common and national features, ideological and political manifestations. This article examines the essence of political populism and the general features of its manifestation and features of the myths constructed by populists, as well as the typology of modern populism in the context of its connection with the ideology of conservative nationalism and the mistakes of the liberal mainstream. The author analyzes the phenomenon of resilience of the ruling parties of the European periphery and their ability to lead is often not regarded by voters as undoubted advantages and advantages of a politician, since the use of populist technologies to manipulate public opinion leads to a change in the alignment of parliamentary political parties. The author explains the main reasons why certain segments of the population of the European periphery place unreasonable hopes for improving living conditions on charismatic, expressive and self-confident figures who demonstrate the ability to transform a routine political process into vivid theatrical performances. According to the author's understanding, in attracting and retaining public attention, the personality of a politician, his self-proclaimed talents and bright performances, become more important than professionalism and political convictions. In this sense, obeying the laws of modern political theater, populist politicians regularly play the role of 'servants of the people', make a promise to restore democracy and stop the rule of corruption. The conclusions of this article expand and supplement the theoretical ideas in the field of research on the phenomenon of political populism and the study of personal characteristics of politicians of the populist type in the countries of the European periphery.

In the article 'Reflections on the Transformation of the World Order: Emerging Trends and Impending Perspectives', Karine Khojayan conducts a comparative analysis of globalization and the emergence of new global threats, noting the need for an international discussion of the principles of a civilized organization of the world. The author pays attention to the conditions when the world is undergoing transformation, when new actors appear that challenge the modern political organization of the world, it is important to use such methods of influencing public consciousness, which would be a

fairly effective tool to achieve the goals set in the foreign policy activities of public authority. According to the author, the mechanisms of hegemonic stability are a necessary condition for maintaining global peace and stability. For a critical analysis of what the author uses the ideas of Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Immanuel Wallerstein and other researchers. The current realities of the development of the international system allow us to conclude that the importance of soft power mechanisms in the relations between the actors of world politics will steadily increase. This trend is connected, first of all, with the fact that the use of exclusively violent means of realizing one's own interests becomes impossible even for large states and influential international organizations. The author pays attention to the fact that in line with global trends, changes are taking place in national economic systems, which differ, however, in their own trajectories. As a result of their implementation, there was a sharp change in the trajectory of the development of economic relations, accompanied by huge social costs due to insufficient attention to the state of economic relations and the peculiarities of their previous development, deformations of the institution of private property, unjustified alienation of property objects from the bulk of the population with excessive enrichment of its small stratum, the discrepancy between the institutions being formed and the actual emerging economic relations. The author's interpretation is becoming more and more obvious in that the choice of ways for further development of countries requires an analysis of their own practice of systemic economic transformations, a detailed study of the main directions of development of the world economy, and a generalization of the experience of adapting industrialized countries to the realities of the modern world market. Being an inevitable consequence of the general patterns of development, the processes of transformation of economic systems at the same time require a theoretical understanding of not only the general, but also the specific in their implementation, taking into account modern trends in economic dynamics and the challenges of rapidly developing globalization processes. At present, awareness of the relationship between the transformation of economic systems and modern globalization challenges, patterns and trends in the information and scientific and technological development of the world economy is becoming especially important. The growing interaction of national economies, the accelerated development of globalization processes are increasingly influencing the formation of the vector of economic transformation, the effectiveness of systemic changes.

In 'Civic Journalism as a Phenomenon of Digital Civilization', Greta Gevorgyan analyzes the mechanisms of development of civic journalism and its connection with the social activity of politically conscious citizens, with their protection of civil rights and freedoms. The author argues for the civilarchic and democratic significance of the digital society, in which the possibilities of citizen journalism have expanded, it has acquired new large and small forms. New citizen journalists operate in new media, the accessibility and inclusiveness of which has allowed voices of varying degrees of loudness to be heard. They flow into the media space, complement it, sometimes compete with it in terms of influence. Professional journalists, ordinary users, civic activists and eyewitnesses of events operate in the Armenian information field of the 21st century, and all of them influence the formation of the general agenda in different ways. The author considers ways of bringing citizen journalism closer to professional

journalism, raising legal and ethical issues that affect legislative initiatives in the field of information, telecommunications and the behavior of ordinary users on the network. Separately, there is the problem of typology and classification of new journalists in the media system of the Eastern Partnership countries, the interaction of civil and professional media and users. In this sense, the structure of the media environment becomes more finely dispersed and fragmented, since it no longer consists of individual media and editorial offices, but of individual users and actors. According to the author, the same participant can play different roles in the media system, thus acting as a journalist or blogger, on behalf of the editorial board or on his own behalf, and also change these roles. The agenda of the media of the Eastern Partnership countries and informal information channels has a national character, which distinguishes their civic journalism from the world.

In the article 'How to Reconcile Equality with Freedom? On the Two Ways in Liberalism', Naira Mkrtchyan analyzes the philosophical dimension of equality and freedom, as well as various issues of understanding and analysis of the theory of liberalism. The author explains the relationship between political ideas and values, equality and freedom mainly within the framework of the works of Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls. The author argues for the presence of a variety of acceptable values and lifestyle options, which are associated with the concept of value pluralism, make the question of the relationship of this concept with the foundations of various ideologies vital. In particular, there is a problem of correlation between the concept of value pluralism and liberalism. In this context, the crux of the issue is whether a liberal ideology can be pluralistic or whether liberal universal provisions are incompatible with the concept. If the conflict of values is an integral part of human existence, then this fact cannot be ignored in the interactions of social groups, peoples and states. However, a number of questions arise here that actualize the need to address the idea of pluralism of values. Such questions include the following: is the conflict of values necessarily associated with value relativism? In continuation of the author's argument, the concept of pluralism of values, formed under the influence of the events of the 20th century, leaves a number of debatable questions, without losing its relevance both in political science and in political and philosophical discourse. Although the ideas of Berlin and Rawls have long been the subject of philosophical research in various directions, the concept of pluralism of values is practically not developed in Armenia, and the ideas of pluralism of values are not popular. Both the key concepts that make up the concept of values pluralism and the arguments about the relationship between the concept of values pluralism and ideology need to be elaborated, which determines the choice of the topic of this article.

The second volume of the journal features three book reviews focusing on Russia, the EU and the failures of post-Soviet democracy, the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, and the daily lives of women in war and peace in the South Caucasus. The problem of unresolved protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space continues to put the countries of the Eastern Partnership in a difficult position, and the EU, instead of supporting European integration, is trying to choose tools for effectively influencing Russia and them, thereby making it increasingly necessary to generalize successful practices of negotiation processes and experience settlement.

Since 2020, a new stage of common threats has emerged in the Eastern Partnership space, that is, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Second Karabakh War, the escalation in eastern Ukraine and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which in 2022 not only did not become less conflicting, but also actualized the issue of international intervention in protracted conflicts.

The countries of the Eastern Partnership found themselves between war and peace, against the backdrop of the ongoing transformation of the political organization of the world, once again exposed the disunity of the international community in matters of approaches to promoting peace in conflict regions. All the new contradictions appearing in the broad Russia-EU foreign policy agenda make hardly noticeable the prerequisites for stepping up joint work to counter crises and conflicts and searching for new formats for cooperation between these actors in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, there are current formats of negotiation processes, but the effectiveness of these formats, as well as the intensity of work within their framework, is increasingly unsuccessful and is subjected to harsh criticism from the international community.

The democratization of the Eastern Partnership countries remains important and, as the example of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia will show, it led to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the decline of authoritarianism, but unfortunately it did not save the Armenian society from war and the ongoing aggression from authoritarian countries. In the context of regional turbulence, the sustainable development and quality of life of the peoples of the South Caucasus has traditionally been studied, but a separate study of women's life in conditions of war and peace has been considered only recently. A comparative analysis of women's everyday life in the conditions of war and peace in the South Caucasus, as well as women's history and gender anthropology by modern ethnologists and researchers makes us pay close attention to the study of women's daily practices and distinctive features.

These book reviews are for all those who are interested in European integration, the democratization of political regimes and the improvement of the quality of life in the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

Ashot Aleksanyan
Magda Arsenyan

ARMENIAN STATEHOOD IN FOREIGN POLICY REALITIES: THE FIRST STEPS OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC

GEGHAM PETROSYAN 

Abstract

The article analyzes the prerequisites for the establishment of the restored Armenian statehood in Eastern Armenia at the end of May 1918, as well as from June to November, which was of existential importance for the further development of the Republic of Armenia. The establishment of Armenian statehood took place under extremely difficult internal and external conditions. The problems facing the newly created Republic of Armenia and requiring immediate solution were diverse and many. In unprecedented geopolitical conditions, the political elite is faced with a national agenda to bring the state institutions and the Armenian society out of a hopeless situation. For the implementation of which political will, enormous efforts and consistent work were always needed.

The article also analyzes the problems related to social security, because hunger, epidemics and various diseases continued to negatively affect all spheres of Armenian society's life. It was obvious that the genocidal policy was continued against the Armenian people, because being isolated from the civilized world, helpless and surrounded by enemies, Armenia was quickly running out of food supplies.

The moral and psychological atmosphere prevailing in the Armenian society is also in the center of attention in the article. The latter generated despair and internal division, which gradually destroyed the united spirit of the nation, weakened resistance, and deprived the ability to think and act for the common good of the state. In such circumstances, the establishment of Armenian statehood was extremely difficult. The disastrous internal political and economic situation of the republic continued until the end of the year, one of the main reasons of which was the security and hostile environment of Armenia.

Keywords: *Armenian statehood, civilized world, genocidal policy, Eastern Armenia, First Republic of Armenia, security, hostile environment*

Introduction

The Prime Ministers of the governments of the first Republic of Armenia and their plans were discussed and adopted in a difficult military, political and economic situation,

* Gegham Petrosyan is a Professor, Doctor of Sciences (History), Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University.

Email: gegham.petrosyan@ysu.am

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 12–48



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 20.05.2022

Revised: 10.06.2022

Accepted: 15.06.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

which was more than risky on the eve of the independence of the Republic of Armenia and after it. The prime minister and members of the government often mentioned that, on the one hand, they were in exceptionally difficult conditions, on the other hand, the conflict in the development and implementation of the internal and external policies of the executive power was deepening.

It was obvious that the government of the First Republic was taking the first steps, because it had no support in the past and it did not follow the previous government to be able to continue the state work already underway. Moreover, the First Government and the First Parliament of the First Republic did not even inherit ready-made apparatus adapted to the needs of the central government. According to which, the state authorities are forced to start everything from the beginning, which resembled a 'pile of chaos' and 'ruins', from which viable and working institutions had to be created.

The geopolitical factors of the catastrophic situation, the First World War, the February and October revolutions of 1917 in Russia and other circumstances caused a regional conflict. It was obvious that the irregular withdrawal of Russian troops from the borders of Armenia, the destruction of the Russian Empire, the defeat of the Armenian people in the war and the loss of territories, as well as the division of the Transcaucasia into separate states, which these profound upheavals caused enormous traces.

The key task of the public authorities of the First Republic was to stop the process of disintegration of the country, to remove the country from anarchy and to create the necessary conditions for state building. In the conditions of national security risks and anarchy, such phenomena prevailed, among which were: complete destruction of economic life and financial situation, cessation of goods and industry and exchange, extreme shortage of living products, interruption of imports, cessation of railway communication and lack of vehicles, then hundreds of thousands of homeless people and immigrants. In such exceptional conditions, the governments of the newly independent country could not strive for a comprehensive and comprehensive program of activities, which were limited from time to time by urgent problems.

Difficulties in harmonization of domestic and foreign policy of Armenia

At the end of May 1918, Armenian statehood was restored in Eastern Armenia, and the Republic of Armenia was established. It was founded under harsh internal and external conditions. The problems of the newly created republic and requiring immediate solutions were diverse and numerous. They were related to the country's inner life and foreign policy. According to A-Do's assessment, "the territory, from which the Republic of Armenia was formed, with a small exception, was the mountainous and barren region of the Armenian provinces. There, even in normal years, the population was subject to deprivation, and when life went out of its natural course, the people succumbed to hunger. Hundreds of thousands of refugee people from the devastated provinces came to take refuge on this land. The country's territory is narrow, hilly and barren, the conditions are extraordinary and exceptional, and the population has grown and accumulated. Here is the fact that the reality was rapidly moving towards the worst days" (A-Do 2014, 530).

Political will, enormous efforts and consistent work were needed to bring the country out of its desperate state. First Prime Minister of the First Republic of Armenia Hovhannes Kajaznuni, in June-July of 1918, made a program-application in which he presented the main directions and priorities of the internal and foreign policy strategy of the provisional government he headed¹ which he delivered on August 3, 1918, to the Council of Armenia (parliament) (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10-12).

Kajaznuni divided the problems faced by the republic into two groups: internal and external. The Prime Minister realistically presents the country's complicated internal situation and the causes of the current crisis, from which would derive his foreign policy. As it is known, the foreign policy of any state is the continuation of its domestic policy, the reflection of its internal situation and is meant to solve the existing problems, to use favorable international conditions for the benefit of its country.

According to Kajaznuni's brief description situation in the country was desperate. More than half of the population was made up of refugees and migrants, homeless, naked and hungry; the villages were destroyed, and the agricultural works were disorganized. Due to the lack of bread and the severe scarcity of other foodstuffs, the peasants had eaten their seed, and then it was the turn of the draught animals. Famine prevailed in the true sense of the word. As a result, epidemic diseases, particularly typhus, became widespread, and there was no medicine. Communication with the outside world was cut off because Turkish troops took over the only railway, and the import of goods had stopped. There was an acute shortage of the most necessary goods. Complete chaos and anarchy reigned in the country. It was essential to start everything from the beginning, to build a new state on the ruins². It should be noted that all of this was mainly the result of the Turkish authorities' raiding. It is clear from Kajaznuni's report that the Armenian world was a miserable state at the dawn of freedom.

On December 7, 1918, the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia Arshak Jamalyan, in a secret letter-instruction addressed to the representative of the Republic of Armenia in Ottoman Turkey F. Takhtajyan, wrote: "They have taken away everything, be it state, public or private. They have taken away all the bread, livestock, fuel, goods of warehouses and stores, railway semaphores, lanterns, telegraph wires, telegraph poles, and so on. If in short, they have taken away everything that has any value for our people or the state. The situation of the migrants is simply desperate: some of them cannot return to the country because the Turks are still there, and their fear is great; those are the people from Turkish Armenians, Kars and some parts of Etchmiadzin, Surmalu, Sharur, Nakhijevan and Akhalkalak. The other part of emigrants, who managed to return to their place of residence, were doomed to starve to death because, as I mentioned above, the Turks had taken away all the food and fuel supplies and destroyed their homes. The difficulties of communication in Transcaucasus have reached unprecedented proportions. Going to Baku is considered a heroic exploit for us. We also cannot go to Gandzak without risking our lives. Since we have been separated from Karabakh for almost a year, it is possible to go back and forth to Tiflis on the condition of completing 5-6 formalities, but there is hardly a single train going back and forth between Tiflis and Yerevan every 3-4 weeks. These communication difficulties

¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 5-15.

² National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 48-50.

create an impossible situation for us, not only from the point of view of economic operations but also from the point of view that emigration and war prisoners are unable to return to their places. Armenia's food supply situation is terrible. They cannot get bread either from Georgia or especially from Azerbaijan, where there are vast reserves of bread, because Georgians and Azerbaijanis are not allowed to buy and export. We cannot get bread from the North Caucasus and Ukraine, where there is an opportunity to make purchases, because communication is complicated. The second, we have difficulty getting Russian currency, and our Transcaucasian bonas (Ruble of the Transcaucasian Commissariat) are not accepted there, and the third, there are great difficulties in Georgian transit"³.

The republic's internal political and economic disaster continued until the end of the year. "Enemies from all sides surround Armenia, and we are completely cut off from the outside world," writes Simon Vratsyan (1962, 274). "Famine, epidemics, and diseases continue to rule our country: the weak die and the strong become weak and then die. If it continues so for another 6 months, most of the people of Armenia will be slaughtered" (Vratsyan 1962, 274). Cut off from the world, helpless and surrounded by enemies, Armenia used up its poor supply of bread within a few months until October. "The wheat stored by the government ran out and hunger stuck its merciless claws into the Armenian's chest. They died by the thousands, tens of thousands," writes Artashes Babalian (1959, 19).

Since 1918, infectious diseases (typhoid, cholera) were widespread in the country, which have claimed thousands of lives. In Yerevan and Etchmiadzin, there were days when the number of deaths exceeded several hundred (Zohrabyan 2000, 117). There was also a difficult situation in the army. "Military hospitals were overcrowded, and the paramedics were more involved in transporting corpses than caring for the sick. And what happened at that time in Sardarapat, Ghamarlu and Igdir region and in the migrant barracks is beyond imagination. Hundreds of doors in these regions remained closed forever because all their inhabitants were dead. The number of dead was so great, and their owners were so exhausted that they could not even carry out burial ceremonies. Remaining unburied for days, the corpses rotted and served as a basis for new epidemics. No animals, dogs, or cats were left in the famine-stricken regions, and people turned to animal carcasses and even human corpses," (Hairenik 1924, 72), writes A. Jamalyan. Until the summer of 1919, according to the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Republic of Armenia lost around 192 thousand human lives due to the typhus epidemic and famine (Hairenik 1924, 72). It is clear what a problematic morale-psychological atmosphere was prevailing in the country due to all this. The internal split was like a worm gnawing at the united spirit of the nation, weakening the resistance and depriving it of the ability to judge for the common interest of the state. In such circumstances, the establishment of statehood was challenging.

Deprived of statehood for centuries, the Armenian people had the opportunity to regain their independence. Still, each part of the republic had various local groups that approached all problems in their favor and continuously pushed their interests to the front line. "All these representatives of Yerevan, Van, Sasun, Karabakh, Shatakh, Nukh, Aresh

³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 430, list 1, file 533, sheets 13-14; National Archives of Armenia, fund 4033, list 2, file 963, sheets 102-103.

and others caused such a disturbance in our state-social affairs that it is difficult even to imagine, - writes A. Jamalyan. - Yerevan people were dissatisfied with the leaders of Armenia, who, being foreigners, did things in their city without the proper participation of locals. That is why they played the role of bystanders in the events of Armenia, like riotous children. The Van people believed that the government should prioritize the recapture of 'Van City' and the region above all other problems to liberate the migrant population and provide them with decent living conditions. On the contrary, the people of Karabakh claimed that, first of all, the liberation of Karabakh should be the problem of the government because Karabakh is the backbone of Armenia.

Sasun people lived for themselves like a single tribe. They did not allow anyone to interfere in their internal affairs, just as they did not interfere in the affairs of others. They did not consider any government order binding for them until that order came known by the head of the tribe in the name of "Ruben Pasha". Aresh people could not understand how the Armenian government could be engaged in any other business when it had not yet killed the last Turk in our country. Didn't those Turks, their relatives, destroy 40,000 people of Aresh and Nukh? And for that reason, what the government was not doing, they wanted to do themselves. So did all the other locals. They all had their expectations of the government of Armenia, and in many cases, they conditioned their assistance to that government on satisfying their demands.

I am not talking about individuals or small groups who came to our country from Russia, Europe, America, Istanbul, Tiflis, Baku and brought many programs, advice and criticisms. Each of them brought their diversity into our reality, wanting to shape and set the affairs of Armenia according to what they had seen and heard. I am not talking about the similar attitudes of the Armenians abroad towards the Republic and its affairs, which did not remain without influence for our state-building" (Hairenik 1924, 70-71). This is how A. Jamalyan realistically presents the moral and psychological atmosphere in the republic. The situation was becoming more complicated in the sense that about 30% of the population of the republic was Muslim, who constantly caused obstacles and were a threat to the existence of the newly formed state. Kajaznuni testifies: "Azerbaijan's position has been openly hostile towards us. It is undeniable that the Muslim population of Armenia, encouraged by Turkey and Azerbaijan, has taken an anti-government course. But the important thing is that we have not been able to find suitable means to secure our situation, from outside and inside. We were not able to find a somewhat tolerable modus vivendi with Azerbaijan; we were not able to keep the Muslim provinces in order by administrative means; we were forced to resort to arms, to move troops, to destroy and massacre and - which was a double discredit for the government - to face major failures. In such important places as Vedi-Basar, Sharur and Nakhijevan, we did not manage to establish our power even using a weapon; we were defeated and retreated" (Katchaznuni 1923, 35-36). "The majority of the Muslim ethnic population of Armenia, under the influence of external dictates and internal moods, did not recognize our government at all and did not want to deal with the state," writes A. Jamalyan. - And the minority, which in some places due to its weakness, could not go against our government completely, although it probably recognized its power, but did not want to be a supporter of it in any way" (Hairenik 1924, 69). Moreover, they did not recognize the Armenian government and resorted to armed actions.

Although the number of Russians in the Republic of Armenia was small - about 10 thousand - they were influential in the state bodies and the army. They were divided into two groups: peasants who had established permanent residence in Armenia due to the tsarist government's resettlement policy, and government officials and employees, mainly in the military, judicial and communications fields. With few exceptions, the first and the second, who had a privileged position in Armenia during the Russian rule, "were very ill-disposed towards our statehood. Even though they could not psychologically come to terms with the idea that a Russian subject has become the master of his country today, they did not agree with the aspiration of our state to equalize the situation of the Armenian peasant and the Russian peasant in terms of the land plot distribution and making the Armenian language the state language in all public affairs. The first was difficult for the Russian villagers because it violated their privileged position. The second was not easy for the Russian officials because it made it difficult for them to hold office in Armenia. So, in case of the ethnic Russian population, we generally had an ethnic group, which was at least unfriendly to our statehood" (Hairenik 1924, 68). I think there is no need to bring up any fact that the moral and psychological atmosphere created in the country in the first months of independence also left its corrosive and heavy stamp on both the internal and external political activities of the government of the newly established Republic of Armenia.

The decisive imperative to bring the country out of the worst situation was the efficiency of the newly formed state system. However, the relations were strained: the harmonious, interconnected work of different wings of the state system was still missing. There were disagreements between the legislative body - the Council of Armenia (parliament), the executive body - the government, and the dominant political force - the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party. In this regard, the Prime Minister of the Republic Kajaznuni later writes: "Practically, our party sought to subjugate, to bring under its control both the legislative body and the government. We did not have the courage (or the ability) to declare a party dictatorship openly. But we didn't want to stay within the limits of parliamentary procedures, and we were trying to implement the practices of Ittihat members in Armenia disguised under party dictatorship. There was an intolerable duality of power: in visible and open aspects - the parliament and its government, in the shadows - the party and its organs. It is clear that these two types of authorities - official and unofficial - could only hinder and constrain one another. The formal requirements did not allow the party to work freely and quickly to express its will. And the party's interference did not allow the government to do what it knows, to follow its political course" (Katchaznoui 1923, 32).

Apparently, such a situation was inevitable: the formation of a democratic political-state system was not an easy task. The Prime Minister correctly imagined the solution. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party, which came to power, should not establish a monopoly but should leave the arena to the parliament and the government. However, Kajaznuni failed to implement the vision and overcome the party's influence in the country's political life. The consequence was that he was isolated from the state governance process. On that occasion, Ruben Ter-Minasyan writes: "The absence of Kajaznuni - in essence, his removal - meant the strengthening of the influence of the ARF" (Ruben 1982, 278). Moreover, he was expelled from the country. On February 4,

1919, the Council of Armenia adopted a law: to send Prime Minister Kajaznuni to Europe and America to procure bread, food and other basic necessities for the Republic of Armenia. However, due to the deliberate delay of the entry visa by the British command, Kajaznuni was able to leave for America only on May 29, 1919. The complex internal and external political situation in the Republic created an atmosphere of mistrust among the majority of the people towards the independent Republic of Armenia. For most Eastern Armenians, independence was incomprehensible, contemptible, and meaningless. "The Russian-Armenian peasant and the petty-bourgeois living in the city, - writes A. Jamalyan, - who suffered a lot from the recent years' upheavals and were in a difficult economic situation, dreamed of the return of Russia, which would bring with it cheap bread, sugar, clothes and make life as easy as before..." (Hairenik 1924, 69). According to Grigor Chalkhushyan, in the first months of independence, no one in Armenia believed that independence was permanent. Its existence seemed a matter of time, because the state was in ruins. Eastern Armenians thought that eventually, the Russians would come and rule their country, while for Western Armenians, Armenia was Anatolia⁴. Individual members of the Council of Armenia did not even accept the existence of an independent Armenia; they demanded the country's reunification with Russia. For example, on August 6, 1918, at the fourth session of the Council of Armenia, MP S. Mamikonyan, addressing the parliamentarians, asked: "Isn't the very existence of the Republic of Armenia itself a catastrophe?" (Vem 1934, 98). Speaking against the country's independence, S. Mamikonyan demands to "restore the union with Russia"⁵.

I think it was no coincidence that in the first period of the existence of the Republic of Armenia, the Council of Armenia and the government did not consider it appropriate to officially accept the country's declaration of independence, and this, according to S. Vratsyan, also gave an opportunity to "think about our suspicious neighbors. And not only these neighbors, that Armenians are not in favor of independence" (Vratsyan 1924, 64). Naturally, the republic's unstable and uncertain external situation had a negative impact on the internal life of the country, making it more difficult. Thus, in the first months of the independence of the First Republic of Armenia, the country survived in unspeakably difficult socio-economic and political conditions, from which the main directions and priorities of its foreign policy strategy would emerge.

First Prime Minister and Provisional Government

August 1, 1918, is one of the most important historical days in the annals of an independent Armenia. At 11:30 a.m., the first session of the inaugural Supreme Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, the Council of Armenia (from August 1, 1919, the Parliament) officially began in solemn conditions in the building of the City Club of the capital, Yerevan. The temporary chairman of the Armenian National Central Council of Tiflis, the oldest member of parliament, Avetik Sahakyan (father Abraham), opening the inaugural session of the Armenian National Council, said: "Citizens, members of parliament of the Council of Armenia. On behalf of the Supreme Armenian

⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 4033, list 6, file 293, sheet 26.

⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 7, sheet 80.

National Council, I have the honor to open the inaugural session of the Council of Armenia today and announce that from now on, this is the only authorized body of the state power of the Republic of Armenia. This day will become historic for us and open a new, bright era in the life of our young state, independent political and economic development. This day will remain in our minds forever because, for the first time, we see the beautiful dreams and the cherished longing for self-determination within the limits of our poor possibilities, although in impossible, challenging conditions. Yes, our republic is small and narrow in its borders; it has been deprived of its most valuable territories and cannot give place entire population, and, it seems, has no conditions for independent existence. But I think that the country's borders cannot always remain frozen. I believe that the borders of our country will be expanded by the iron power of life, by the protection of our just and indisputable rights regarding the occupied lands and by a new friendly alliance with Tachkistan and its allied states, whose representatives are present here. We have chosen the way of agreement and peace, and I want to hope that we are not mistaken. Until then, we will perform our duties arising from the alliance of peace with sanctity and steadfastness. Let us leave aside the future perspectives, at least, today, here, without hesitation and with complete determination, we drop the anchor of our state ship and lay the foundation of the state building, striving to always improve it for the benefit of all nationalities of the Republic of Armenia, as children of our dear motherland" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 7-8).

After Av. Sahakyan's opening speech, at 12 o'clock, the national flag of Armenia, the Tricolor, was solemnly raised at the top of the building of the Council of Armenia, accompanied by the anthem "Our Motherland" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 9). At the same session Av. Sahakyan was elected the Chairman of the Council of Armenia. Deputy Chairpersons were elected Gr. Ter-Khachatryan and D. Zubyan, and senior secretary P. Zakaryan (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 9). The council decided to hear the report on the draft program of the provisional government at the next session. It should be noted that the Council of Armenia did not elect a prime minister in August of 1918. The fact was that the Armenian Council, considering itself the legitimate successor of the Armenian National Central Council of Tiflis, did not question the prime ministership of Kajaznuni (Vagharshyan 2012, 24).

Kajaznuni, in June-July of 1918, submitted a program (application) in which he presented the main directions of the internal and foreign policy strategy of the provisional government, headed by him.

On August 3, at the second session of the Council of Armenia, the Prime Minister realistically presented the draft plan of the provisional government. I do not consider it superfluous to focus on the most important arguments presented in the preface of the Prime Minister's speech, from which it is obvious what a difficult military, political and economic situation the Republic of Armenia was in before and after the restoration of its independence. "The government I formed started to work in extremely difficult conditions," says the Prime Minister (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10). And "it is called to exercise executive power in a state that has just been born and has not yet passed the first period of its organizational works. The government has no support from the previous period: it is not the successor of the previous government to continue the state work, which is already in progress; it has not even inherited ready-made apparatus

adapted to the needs of the central government. It is forced to start all over again; it must create a viable and functional body from formless chaos and piles of ruins. On the other hand, the government finds the country in a condition that can only be described in one word: catastrophic. The four-year war, the Great Revolution, the irregular retreat of Russian troops from our borders, the disintegration of the empire, our defeat on the war front, the loss of territories, Transcaucasus partition into separate states, these profound upheavals could not but leave enormous traces behind them. Complete destruction of economic life and financial situation, cessation of goods and industry and exchange, extreme shortage of basic necessities, deficiency of the most necessary items or terrible prices, complete interruption of imports, termination of railway communication, lack of other means of transportation, then - a homeless and malnourished emigration numbering in the hundreds of thousands, insecurity at the borders and, as an inevitable consequence of all this, anarchy. These are the difficult conditions under which my government was called to work. This exceptional situation predetermines the very nature of the government. It cannot strive for versatile and complete activities, cannot have a serious program and will limit itself to the most critical and urgent problems. To stop the process of disintegration, to pull the country out of anarchic conditions and to create the necessary conditions for state-building, this is how the current government understands its calling” (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10). Then, at the session of the council, Kajaznuni announced the following strategic tasks to be implemented in the fields of the internal and external policies of the provisional government headed by him to pull the country out of that deep crisis.

A. In the field of internal politics: 1) To establish a basic legal system, security of life and property in the country; 2) To open the roads of communication for uninterrupted traffic; 3) To restore regular postal and telegraphic communication within the country and neighboring states; 4) To take serious measures to mitigate the food crisis as much as possible; 5) To manage the situation of migrants and refugees, partly by returning them to their former places and partly by settling in new areas; 6) To prepare the convening of the Constituent Assembly of Armenia as soon as possible (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10-11).

B. In the field of financial policy: to prepare the ground for laying the foundation of the own monetary system. To take the necessary steps to secure the country with money, restore industrial life and the exchange of goods, and develop a sound taxation system (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10-11).

C. In the field of justice policy: to adapt the court to the conditions of the country’s civil legal understanding and legal customs while making the people’s representatives participate in the criminal proceedings (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10-11).

D. In the field of military policy: to restore the country’s military forces, to create an army that is not large in number but strong in spirit and discipline (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 10-11).

It is not difficult to notice that the primary and urgent strategic issues, the solution of which would bring the country out of the worst crisis and ensure a little stability, were the basis of the project of the provisional government’s plan in the field of the country’s internal policy. According to Kajaznuni, if the government “...manages to provide a favorable solution to at least some of the problems mentioned above, I will consider that

it has rendered a great and invaluable service to the country...”⁶. As mentioned above, in the first months of independence of the First Republic of Armenia, the country survived in unimaginably difficult social, economic and political conditions, from which the main directions and priorities of its foreign policy strategy followed. As it is well known, the foreign policy of any state is the continuation of its internal policy, a reflection of its internal situation. It is meant to solve the problems it faces, to use favorable international conditions for the benefit of its country.

Prime Minister Kajaznuni presented the following vitally essential directions of the provisional government’s foreign policy strategy:

1. To consolidate the peace concluded with the Ottoman Empire and establish neighborly relations with it. To fulfill strictly all the obligations that Armenia has undertaken towards the Ottoman Empire and see that the Ottoman Empire does the same in its turn for the Republic. And, in particular, to resolve the issue of the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Armenia and to ensure the return of emigrants.

2. By reaching a mutual agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia, to resolve the issue of the borders of Armenia and those states based on the ethnic principle, as the only one that corresponds to the spirit and goals of the ramkavar (democratic and liberal) states.

3. To liquidate, in agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia, the common institutions and property that remained from the Transcaucasian Republic (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 11).

4. To fulfill the obligations of the Batumi Treaty, demanding the same from Turkey before their review by the Constantinople Conference. In particular, to control the movement of Ottoman troops through the territory of Armenia⁷.

5. To establish neighborly relations with neighboring states, paying particular attention to the issue of restoring trade ties (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 11).

This was the government’s plan. “This can be called the most necessary pledge program to ensure the existence of the state,” says the Prime Minister. - It is clear that it does not cover the diverse needs of the country entirely and that several fundamental and mature problems remain outside. But the government does not include these problems in the agenda because it considers their solution impossible in today’s conditions. The government does not want to make mistakes, promising perspectives and unrealizable capacities; it does not want to take on responsibilities, the fulfillment of which is beyond its power. The government ensures that the proposed program is the maximum of current possibilities. The government will exert all its strength and ability to reach that maximum and hopes to successfully solve at least a part of the set problems if it has the council’s unconditional trust and active support” (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 11-12). Kajaznuni summarized the main directions of his not extensive strategic program with these words.

On August 5, at the third session of the Council of Armenia, the draft of the provisional government’s plan was discussed, which was accepted with great reluctance and received sharp criticism from party factions and individual members of parliament. For example, on behalf of the faction of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party S. Khondkaryan stated that the program draft briefly presents the problems and details of

⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 32, sheet 6.

⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 5.

the republic's foreign policy. He noted: "For the Member of Parliament the motives that forced the government to present to the parliament such a statement seem to be incomprehensible, in which general words hide the government's true intentions. But that very circumstance does not allow forming some idea about the government and its policy. That is why Socialist-Revolutionary faction, finding it difficult to determine its attitude towards Kajaznuni's based only on the application, decided to abstain during the vote of confidence or no confidence" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 13). He also expressed his surprise that not a single word is said about the relations with Russia. He raised a question: is this explained by the fact that the government considers the Russian issue resolved, or are there other considerations? (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 12).

Representative of the Armenian People's Party A. Mkhitarian, on behalf of his faction, expressed satisfaction with the draft plan of the provisional government published at the session on August 3. "The government has decided to follow real policy and avoided programmatic announcements" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 13). However, on behalf of his faction, he considered the part of the draft plan unacceptable, especially the part related to the relations with Ottoman Turkey, where it was said: "To consolidate the peace signed with the Ottoman government and establish friendly relations with it. To fulfill strictly all the commitments we have made to the Ottoman government and make sure that the Ottoman government does the same for us, in particular, to resolve the issue of the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from our country and the return of the emigrants". He expressed great surprise, "...how the government ignores the longing and vital interests of the Armenian people in such a case, on which depends the existence of the Armenian state." Meanwhile, with the agreement of the Ottoman state and its allied states, government MPs are working in Constantinople to re-examine the Treaty of Batumi, having a goal to expand our state's borders and give the people the opportunity to live a normal (state) life. While on the solemn opening day of the Council of Armenia, the Chairman of the Parliament, expressing the unanimous desire of the people, expressed the hope that "the borders are not carved in stone, that they will expand by the power of the iron law of life, concerning the seized land and taking into consideration our just and indisputable rights for its protection", the government in its statement ultimately reconciles with the Batumi Treaty. It promises to strengthen it, thereby preventively disrupting the work of its MPs and simply making it invalid" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 14).

A. Mkhitarian also expressed reluctance that the provisional government is silent on what kind of relationship newly independent Armenia will maintain with neighboring new and distant great powers; what direction will it follow in its foreign policy? This is a circumstance that is of crucial importance for the establishment of the interstate relations of our country. In his opinion, the draft plan of the provisional government is incomplete and insufficient in many parts. Therefore, the faction of the Armenian People's Party declares that it will support the government only to the extent that it implements the promises of the draft program, to which the faction has no objection, and to the extent that it will consider and work to implement the remarks of the faction (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 14).

On August 6, at the fourth session of the Council of Armenia, Kajaznuni explained the sharp criticisms and remarks made by the parliamentarians during the third session of August 5, which were related to the policies of the provisional government in the internal and external arenas of the country, etc. Addressing this or that criticism and remarks of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia, he presented his well-argued and well-founded explanations.

The Prime Minister, contradicting the views of individual MPs, firmly stated that the government would adhere to the terms of the Batumi Peace Treaty signed with Ottoman Turkey and would not allow any deviations. "Yes, I have to say that since we have taken on responsibilities with the treaty, which the new act has not changed, we will strictly fulfill them and demand others to do the same. MPs Mamikonyan and Melikyan demand the government be brave. Still, since the current government exists, it will not lead the country to new adventures and trials and will not allow others to do the same" (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 18).

Let us remind you that at the session of the Council on August 3, Kajaznuni had mentioned preventing the MPs from excessive passion. "The government does not want to make mistakes, promising perspectives and unrealizable capacities; it does not want to take on responsibilities, the fulfillment of which is beyond its power." It is a fact that at the second session of the Council on August 3, Kajaznuni bypassed the interpretations and valid conclusions of individual points of the strategy and tactics of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia, as well as the sensitive and complex problems and their painful and difficult solutions, which were included in the handwritten draft of the plan of the provisional government. However, the question arises: why and what were the primary motivations for not announcing them during the session of the council? Let us try to answer those questions. It is obvious that Kajaznuni, being a circumspect and insightful statesman and politician, while developing the project of the government, took into consideration the realignment of the geopolitical forces of the great powers in the region during the First World War, the sharp contradictions, the conflicts of military-political and economic interests, as well as the complex military-political tactics and diplomatic impasses by Ottoman Turkey - the conditions, the focus of which was the Republic of Armenia with its unspeakably deep political and economic crisis, and finally, the coercion of external and internal factors on the newly independent country, etc. Thus, in the handwritten draft of the unpublished plan at the board meeting, Kajaznuni writes: "In the field of foreign policy, I will follow a supreme principle: to establish neighborly relations with neighboring states, avoiding conflict with them by all possible means. It is dictated by the fact that our people, our country needs rest, peace, even if it is unstable. We are exhausted and ultimately broken. We are not capable of further tension; we will not withstand new trials. Any new complication of the external situation threatens us with inevitable and final destruction. We are a defeated side. We must clearly realize this, always remember and have the courage to make appropriate conclusions. At this moment, we can have one goal: to save the remaining part of the Armenian people and to make a heroic attempt to establish a state on the small territory that is still in our hands. This awareness should become the cornerstone of our current foreign policy"⁸.

⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 6-7.

Indeed, this saved part of the Armenian people tried with superhuman efforts to get on feet again, to establish a state on that small territory allocated to it. And for that it needed peace, otherwise would not be able to withstand the new challenges, expected from the neighboring states, which showed a very unfriendly and hostile attitude towards this part of the Armenian people, which was in terrible conditions. Therefore, the main task of the young republic's foreign policy was to establish good relations with neighboring states, which was not so easy. At the same time, Turkish aggression posed a greater danger. The Turks had not yet given up the idea of eliminating the main obstacle to the implementation of the pan-Turkish strategic plan, Armenia, from the historical arena. It is clear from the draft of the project that the priority issue for the Republic of Armenia in foreign relations was the policy to be adopted towards Ottoman Turkey. Kajaznuni rightly believed that all possible means should be used to find peace with that country. The Prime Minister witnessed the policy of Ottoman Turkey towards Armenia and the Armenian people. "Turkey caused us great harm, it was merciless and cruel to us, and it gave such a terrible blow to our national structure, from the consequences of which we may never recover. By quickly solving its state problems, the Turkish state deliberately and in a planned manner destroyed the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia, thereby putting an end to the Armenian-Turkish problem."⁹.

Violating even the peace treaty signed in Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, Ottoman Turkey separated two Armenian marzes (provinces) (Kars and Kaghzvan) from Eastern Armenia and reached Araks, establishing itself at the gates of the Shirak and Ararat valleys. Later, by the Treaty of Batumi after June 4, 1918, Ottoman Turkey separated from Armenia the entire province of Akhalkalaki, most of the province of Alexandropol together with the city, the best parts of the provinces of Etchmiadzin and Yerevan, and the entire province of Surmalu. It left Armenia too small territory for independent state existence. But it wasn't even limited to that. Violating the same Batumi Peace, Turkish troops entered Karakilisa, Jalaloghli and did not want to leave its places. And they could finally end up in Yerevan¹⁰.

Ottoman Turkey was also violating the Batumi Treaty regarding the refugee issue. The return of refugees was simply prohibited in some regions, while in other places conditions were created to make it impossible¹¹. Kajaznuni, as a statesman-politician, gives perhaps the most sober and true assessment of Turkish politics. "...Turkey in the Transcaucasis, as well as in Eastern Anatolia, strives to destroy politically the Armenian element and hinder the establishment of the Armenian state. Thus, we have no reason to have friendly feelings towards Turkey either for its past or present activities. Likewise, we have no reason to think that Turkey will have a friendly or at least neutral position towards us in future. From this, one can come to the logical conclusion that we should break off relations with Turkey and, protecting our vital interests, enter into a struggle against it. I do not agree with that conclusion and because I consider that struggle beyond our strength"¹².

⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 7.

¹⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 7.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 6-7.

After the Armenian Genocide and depatriation, were the Armenian people able to choose another way, that is, to enter into a struggle against Ottoman Turkey, when the latter had a well-organized, disciplined army located in the territory of the Republic of Armenia? Moreover, Ottoman Turkey also held in its hands the main lines of communication and the centers of strategic importance. After the capture of Trabzon, Erzurum, Batumi, Kars and Alexandropol, the Turkish army had a large amount of weapons, ammunition and food at its disposal¹³. After all, the Turks had a strong support of the Muslim population in the Republic of Armenia itself, which strongly protected Ottoman Turkey. Thus, the prime minister, who does not go beyond the borders of reality, concludes. "What can we do against that tremendous power? Disintegrated fragments of former military units, exhausted, hungry, poorly armed... And the most important and the most terrible thing is that we do not have and cannot have a state mechanism in the near future. Our "... government cannot establish order even in the building where it is located. Can such a government wage war against Turkey? I can give only one answer to this question: no, it cannot"¹⁴. In his opinion, if there was still a chance to save the remnants of the Armenian people, then first of all it was necessary to reach an agreement with Ottoman Turkey. "This means that our demands and complaints should not lead to a conflict. This should be our policy towards Turkey"¹⁵. There was no alternative: this all dictated the dire state of the country. By the Treaty of Batumi after June 3, 1918, and the Peace Agreement after June 4, Ottoman Turkey drew a framework for the Republic of Armenia, which required strength, time, and superhuman efforts to overcome and enter a new phase. Being the first to recognize the independence of the Republic of Armenia and "welcoming the final solution of the Armenian Question", Turkish military and political authorities reported in the press pages at the end of June that "...they created Armenia and thus consider the Armenian Question finally closed"¹⁶.

The Armenian Question was Turkey's sword of Damocles for decades. The Great Powers used it to interfere in the internal affairs of that country, to establish their influence there. The Turkish state naturally sought to get rid of that big "headache" as soon as possible. That is why it chose the method of erasing Armenians and Armenia from the historical arena. So it was Pharisee on the part of the Turks to announce that they had solved the Armenian Question, when at a favorable moment they were ready to exterminate even the last part of Armenians. The Pact of reconciliation in Batumi was another step on that way.

The Republic of Armenia, squeezed into a small area, looked more like a vast prison than an independent state. Ottoman Turkey surrounded and isolated the country from the outside world. "Armenia was left alone, surrounded on all four sides by hostile or unfriendly forces, without any external support and help"¹⁷, writes Kajaznuni. And here, in violation of the peace agreement of Batumi, the Turks without any reason and without warning started regular military operations against the Armenian military units of Sardarapat and Etchmiadzin on July 7-9, capturing the villages of Khatunarch,

¹³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 8.

¹⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheets 8-9.

¹⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheets 11.

¹⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 116-117.

¹⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 48.

Chobankeara, and Nejirlu (Hairenik 1928, 119). In June-August of 1918 and subsequent months, more than half of the territory of the Republic of Armenia was filled with Turkish troops, “the rest was in a state of confusion and chaos. The Armenian people lived in days of great anxiety. Intellectuality was in terrible conditions. The figures holding the mental balance were just numb” (Vratsyan 1924, 156-157). The Turks were a few kilometers away from Yerevan and could head there to deliver the final blow to the country. It is true that a reliable Armenian military unit stood against them both in numbers and in terms of internal organization and “discipline”, “but the latter,” writes A. Jamalyan - felt a severe lack of ammunition and therefore could not endure a long battle”¹⁸.

At the session of the Council, Kajaznuni also addressed the questions of the MPs, why the Prime Minister, when talking about the country’s foreign policy, does not say a word about relations with other states, except for immediate neighbors Ottoman Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. He emphasized. “The answer is very short. First, from a legal point of view, our independence has been recognized by the above-mentioned three states so far, and the second, there is no technical facility to establish relations with other states. Starting wider political relations is a matter of the future” (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 17). And what did Kajaznuni mean, when he mentioned that “there is no technical facility to establish relations with other states”? It is noteworthy that the handwritten draft of the program of the government included the clause “What should our relations with Russia, England and Germany”¹⁹ be, but he did not speak about it in the parliament. It was no coincidence that in the parliament, Kajaznuni bypassed the official position of the government of the Republic of Armenia on the Armenian-Russian relations in the handwritten draft of the program. It contained quite realistic judgments. Russia’s departure from Transcaucasus is a real misfortune for Armenia. It was not desirable for us, and if Russia ever returns to Transcaucasus, it will have our support. However, our current policy cannot be built on the Russian orientation. At the moment, Russia cannot support us in any way. That is why I believe that diplomatic games with Russia can be destructive.

This will increase the suspicion of the Turks, and they will not hesitate to resort to appropriate measures to disrupt cooperation with Russia. The Russian orientation is a political direction that may be necessary in future, but now it may lead to new complications. A question arises: why Kajaznuni did not give an explanation in the parliament, and why were those main political motivations not included in the handwritten draft of the plan of the provisional government headed by him: “Diplomatic games with Russia can be destructive” for Armenia, etc.

The question is that back on June 3, 1918, the head of the Armenian delegation in Batumi Al. Khatisyan under the pressure of Ottoman Turkey, signed a document (deed of obligation) and assumed a certain obligation: “The Government of the Republic of Armenia undertakes not to maintain diplomatic relations with the states that are at war with the Ottoman Empire throughout the war”²⁰. It clearly follows from that document that the Republic of Armenia was committed, on the one hand, to not have ties with the

¹⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 276, list 1, file 22, sheet 6, 19.

¹⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 11.

²⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 13, sheets 6.

Entente Powers, including Russia, during the entire war, and on the other hand, presenting that document to public opinion meant putting the credit of the Government of the Republic of Armenia to the ordeal, because “the Russian Armenians,” as A. Jamalyan writes, dreamed of the return of Russian rule” (Hairenik 1924, 78). The reality was that the existence of that document (obligation) was not known to the Armenian political and social circles.

The events of 1918 were still fresh in the memory of the Armenian people. These were the harsh conditions of the Batumi (June 4) Armenian-Turkish reconciliation agreement, which became known during the heroic battles of Sardarapat on June 6. The rebellious demonstrators gathered in front of the Armenian Council building came out against the pact, and Officer Vardan Arakelyan incited the people to disobey the government’s orders, urging them to continue the war. The demonstration was dispersed by police forces, and the next day he was sentenced by a military court to three years in prison and deprived of certain rights (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 20).

On August 10, 1918, at the sixth session of the Council of Armenia, it was decided to pardon officer Arakelyan with the following justification: he “did not aim to overthrow the government, but fulfilled his patriotic duty...to restore all his rights” (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 20).

I think it was in accordance with the commitment made on June 3 that Kajaznuni also bypassed the official position of the Republic of Armenia regarding England, a member of the Entente. The handwritten draft of the government’s plan states that it is obvious that even if England comes to us, it will be so slow that Turkey will have time to retaliate against us several times before the first English soldiers set foot in the Ararat Valley. It is possible that a small English contingent has already arrived or will arrive in Baku in the near future. It is possible that this first detachment will be followed by new English forces, smaller in number but stronger in material means. The oil region of Baku and the port, which is the gateway to northern Iran and Turkestan, are such valuable trophies that England will spare no forces to acquire it²¹.

According to the Prime Minister, England can provide serious support to Baku, but not to Armenia. If it had any significance to it, England would make a rapid march to the Jugha and then up the Araks. But such an invasion does not take place. The very fact that the Turks are not in a hurry to transfer their troops from Alexandropol to Julfa, but only send them to Elizavetpol, proves that they are not expecting an attack from Iranian Azerbaijan. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine what the British could be interested in in Yerevan province. According to Kajaznuni: “Would they undertake such a difficult and dangerous campaign from Mesopotamia through the territory of Iran to Central Transcaucasus for our interests? Having no reason to believe it, I think that the English orientation is still unrealistic and also destructive”²².

According to Kajaznuni, the situation in Germany is different. In his opinion, as a senior and powerful ally of Ottoman Turkey, Germany can force Turkey to do this or that. In addition, the German flag is already waving in Transcaucasus. Germany is a real force that makes it felt at every turn. At this moment, if anyone can protect Armenia from Turkey, it is Germany. Germany can help us if it decides to do so. And we must do

²¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 12.

²² *ibid.*

everything to get it on our side and get interested in our cause. But extreme caution is needed here. There are disagreements between Germany and Turkey regarding Transcaucasus, as their interests collide here. They are allies, but at the same time they are also rivals, and very jealous rivals at that. They watch each other closely, and the slightest deviation of each of them provokes the complaint of the other²³.

Kajaznuni thought. "We should ask for Germany's help only when we get its consent to give that help and when that support can really be given. In the absence of these conditions we must follow the policy of maneuvering between Scylla and Charybdis. A cautious policy towards Germany cannot be dangerous, because Germany will not suspect us of patriotism, while Turkey knows that we are ready to side with its opponents at any moment. That is why extreme caution is needed in order to attract Germany's attention in order to defend against Turkey ..."²⁴.

Concluding his speech at the fourth session of the Council of Armenia, Prime Minister Kajaznuni announced: "This is the policy that I intend to pursue. It is dictated by current situation. If the situation changes, and it can happen every minute these days, and there is a need for a drastic political turn, then I will give up my place to those who will better assess the current situation and lead the country on a new way..."²⁵. On August 6, with great reservations (11 abstaining), the Council of Armenia approved the plan of the provisional government. After the defeat of Ottoman Turkey and its allies in the First World War, the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia changed.

Attempts to establish relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia

The newly independent Republic of Armenia, being in an indescribably deep political and economic crisis, was forced to continue the struggle with its immediate neighbors Azerbaijan and Georgia due to their completely different political orientations, goals and territorial disputes. There were many complicated border and territorial disputes between the three republics, old mutual distrust, suspicion and fear, and radical differences in foreign policy orientation. Azerbaijan unconditionally and Georgia with minor reservations sought to get closer to Ottoman Turkey in order to create a common front against Russia, while Armenia considered Turkish dominance in the Transcaucasus as not only dangerous, but also a serious threat to its existence (Kajaznuni 1990, 15).

From the very beginning of the First World War, the Caucasian Tatars (Azerbaijani) were completely inclined to the side of Ottoman Turkey, with whom they shared religion and ethnicity, when "at the end of 1917, the Russian troops left the Caucasian front, and the Tachik army began its victorious campaign to the north, the Tatars, having almost unmasked themselves, went to the side of Turkey, writes Kajaznuni: not only did they not want to continue the war against Turkey, but they also did everything in their power so that Turkey would take over the Transcaucasus sooner or later"²⁶. After the establishment of the Republic of Armenia, "Azerbaijan (Transcaucasian Tatarstan),

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 13.

²⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 15.

²⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 40.

relying on the presence of the Turkish army, continues Kajaznuni, narrowed the eastern (partly northern) borders of Armenia and threatened to encroach on the Armenian population of those parts"²⁷. Not only did they threaten, but in the same period also put tens of thousands of Armenians to the sword (Ghaziyan and Mirzoyan 2003, 89). After the declaration of Georgia's independence, the Georgian government clearly expressed its foreign policy position towards the neighboring countries and Russia. After the conclusion of the Batumi Treaty, Georgia threatened the Republic of Armenia and demanded an end to Russian political orientation. That actually meant giving up the Armenian territories, adopting a German-Turkish orientation and through them accepting the dominance of Georgia in Transcaucasus.

For Georgians, there was no Turkish or Azerbaijani danger to threaten their physical existence and to search for ways of forced escape. The conditions for the Georgians were arranged in such a way that they did not have any acute, imperative need for foreign support (Darbinyan 1991, 74). In the handwritten draft of the Provisional Government of Armenia Kajaznuni notes: "Georgia has already made its choice. It openly focuses on Germany. It can do this without risk, because Germany was entrenched in its territory and protected its borders. To reach Georgia, Turkey will have to walk over the dead body of a German soldier, a step it will not take easily. Our situation is different. There are still no German soldiers, no German flags wave on our territory, and it is to be hoped that there never will be. Germans are interested in Batum-Baku and Poti-Baku railways, but not in Yerevan province. It is possible that the agreement between Germany and Turkey will take place at the expense of Armenia, and the Turks will continue to occupy the lands of Armenia. That is why rapprochement with Germany should proceed in such a way as not to cause Turkey's anger"²⁸.

Taking advantage of favorable external conditions, in the first half of June 1918, Noe Zhordania and Noe Ramishvili invited representatives of the Armenian National Central Council to Tbilisi on behalf of the Georgian National Council and the government. Our delegation was composed of Av. Aharonyan, Hovh. Kajaznuni, Al. Khatisyan, Kh. Karchikyan and H. Hakhverdyan (Hakhverdov). The agenda of the meeting was the discussion of the issue of dividing Borchalu province between Armenia and Georgia on ethnic basis (Melkonyan 2003, 285-289). Addressing the Armenian delegates, I. Tsereteli announced on behalf of the National Council of Georgia that Akhalkalaki, Ghazakh and Borchalu provinces and Pambak region of Alexandropol province will enter their borders. And "...all disputed territories with a mixed Armenian-Georgian population should go to Georgia. The former leader of the Russian revolutionary democracy gave the following reasoning: Armenians cannot form a more or less viable state after the agreement of Batumi writes in his memoirs, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General A. I. Denikin - and it is beneficial for them to strengthen Georgia so that it becomes a strong Christian state in the Caucasus, which will protect both itself and the Armenians with the help of the Germans"²⁹. Kh.

²⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 48.

²⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 13.

²⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 4033, list 6, file 295, sheet 31; National Archives of Armenia, fund 198, list 1, file 15, sheet 18; National Archives of Armenia, fund 223, list 1, file 113, sheet 27; National Archives of Armenia, fund 276, list 1, file 96, sheet 125.

Karchikyan complained indignantly against I. Tsereteli's statement, stating that his proposal is nothing but a plan to divide Armenia between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and this proposal is contrary to N. Zhordania's and N. Ramiashvili's assurances in the Armenian National Central Council that the mentioned territories belong to Armenians (Hairenik 1957, 1-2). It certainly could not happen that I. Tsereteli was not aware of those assurances. He openly expressed the real goals of Georgia, to occupy the Armenian territories, with the support of Germany. Moreover, he announced on another occasion in Tiflis: "What do you think about Armenia? Wouldn't it be better if a bigger Georgia was created and Armenians lived under its wing?"³⁰.

Georgia then improved its domestic and foreign political situation by accepting the real patronage of German Empire. On May 28, 1918, Germany and Georgia signed a secret agreement at Poti to determine their future relations. On behalf of the German imperial government, the agreement was signed by General O. von Losov, and from the Georgian government, Foreign Minister Akaki Chkhenkeli (Vem 1938, 84; Hairenik 1935, 103).

According to the agreement, Germany is sending a large contingent to Tiflis to maintain the country's internal order and ensure the security of its borders with Georgian troops. Throughout the First World War, the Georgian government allowed the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, to use the railway network in Georgia to transport troops and military equipment. For this purpose, a military commission was to be formed in Tiflis under the leadership of Germany, which, in consultation with the Georgian government, was supposed to regulate railway communication. Railway stations and military facilities were to be guarded by German guard soldiers (Vem. 1938, 84). The Port of Poti was to be handed over to Germany for 60 years of use. The latter also signed an agreement by which a loan of 50 million rubles was provided to Georgia³¹. On July 24, the Georgian government secretly confirmed the cooperation between Germany and Georgia in the military, economic, commercial, financial and other fields³².

The Georgian-German agreement gave a new quality and favorable course to the relations between Germany's ally Ottoman Turkey and Georgia. In this regard, Georgian military minister Georgadze's speech in honor of Halil Pasha, the commander of the Turkish troops of the Caucasian front, at the party organized in the building of "Georgian Club", in which he wished "success to the brave Turkish troops and their allies", is quite characteristic. In his reply, Halil Pasha stated that Turkey has the best feelings towards Georgia, and if an external enemy threatens the independence of Georgia, they should fight against him together³³.

The Georgian-German and Turkish alliance was primarily directed against the Republic of Armenia. Georgia and Ottoman Turkey sought to realize their conquest ambitions. That alliance was also directed against Russia. And it was no coincidence that in those days the Georgian press did not hide Georgia's anti-Russian position either. This policy was demonstrated towards the Russians living in Georgia. The government of Georgia, based on political motives, arrested a group of former high-ranking Russian

³⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 198, list 1, file 15, sheet 43.

³¹ Russian State Military Archive, fund 39720, list 1, file 49, sheet 5.

³² Russian State Military Archive, fund 39720, list 1, file 49, sheet 1-4.

³³ Russian State Military Archive, fund 39720, list 1, file 49, sheet 2.

soldiers and “suspicious” political figures. Thus, after the arrest of Generals Rubenau, Junkovsky, Durnov and others, the official Georgian newspaper “Sakartvelos Respublika” (Georgian Republic) announced in its issue of July 8, 1918 that “... the Minister of Internal Affairs discovered in Tiflis an organization fighting against the independence of Georgia, which aimed to restore ... in Georgia autocratic rule” (Sakartvelos Respublika 1918a). Russian officers, officials, Bolsheviks and representatives of other circles allegedly entered that organization. That organization allegedly included “Russian officers, officials, Bolsheviks and representatives of other circles. The means of activity should have been the blowing up of a number of institutions, terrorist actions, etc.” (Sakartvelos Respublika 1918a).

The same newspaper in the issue of August 18, 1918, criticizing the Russian orientation of the Armenians, declares that the relations between Georgia and Armenia will remain tense until the leaders of the Armenian people do not abruptly announce that their orientation and policy have radically changed (Sakartvelos Respublika 1918b).

Thus, after the proclamation of independence of the three nations of the Transcaucasus, a very favorable situation was created for Georgia and Azerbaijan. The direction of their foreign policy was also clear. Germany protected the interests of Georgia, and Ottoman Turkey protected the interests of Azerbaijan, and both to the detriment of the Republic of Armenia. The political situation of the Armenian people was radically different from the situation of the Caucasian Tatar and Georgian peoples since the historical moment when the Russians began to leave the borders of Transcaucasus.

Relations or conflict of interests of the republic with the central authorities for the period June-October 1918

Three newly independent republics were formed in the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, during World War I, in a difficult international political situation. These countries were in the focus of major powers in the context of new geopolitical realignments, sharp contradictions, military-political and economic conflicts of interest. Indeed, the struggle for control of the region was between not only the Central Powers and its individual allies, but also the Allies (Entente) and Soviet Russia. Each of them, openly or behind the scene, was shaping its policy for far-reaching geopolitical and economic goals.

On the verge of the forthcoming defeat of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey), the newly formed Republic of Armenia found itself in a deep political and economic crisis, continuing to remain in the most difficult vortex of Ottoman Turkey's military and political tactics and diplomatic deadlocks. The requirements of the Batumi Treaty (June 3, 1918) posed serious obstacles for the Republic of Armenia to pursue an independent, free foreign policy and to establish diplomatic relations with the states of the Triple Entente and other neighboring countries. The point is that the Ottoman Empire put the Republic of Armenia in a circle with this treaty, allowing it to establish diplomatic relations only with its immediate neighbors, its allies in the framework of the Central Powers and those, which are loyal to this alliance.

Although a peace treaty was signed in Batumi on June 4, the Ottoman Turkey was not satisfied with its achievements. It remained real a threat to the newly independent Armenian state, which, in its turn, had quite a small territory. The threat of the military invasion of Turkey was becoming more and more real. Leo has written: "After the destruction of the Turkic Armenia, the young Turks were also destroying the Russian Armenia." (Leo 1925, 344).

Now we will make an attempt to present briefly the strategy and tactics adopted by the Central Powers in the region during the World War I. What were the reasons for the clash of the geopolitical and economic interests, as a result of which the Transcaucasus was divided between the two main allies regarding the sphere of influence, German Empire and Ottoman Turkey?

At the beginning of June of 1918 Turkey was close to defeat, but consistently continued to implement its strategic and tactical expansionist plans of pan-Turanism in foreign policy. After occupying all of Western Armenia in April, as well as Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, the Turks, in gross violation of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty (March 3, 1918), continued their military advancement, introducing new territorial claims towards the entire Transcaucasus, Iran, the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia, striving to reach as far as China. It is quite obvious that the independent existence of the three Transcaucasian republics and the signing of separate treaties with each of them was directly in the interests of Ottoman Turkey to implement its strategic and tactical plans. All this was due to a number of favorable domestic and foreign policy factors in the region, which the Ottoman military-political leadership smartly used to call to life its belligerent and aggressive plans. The point is that the deep internal and external contradictions and conflicts between the three main nations of the region - Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis, their different orientations in foreign policy and national-territorial border disputes, mutual distrust and intolerance, suspicion and fear. All these factors provided favorable conditions the Ottoman military-political leadership to deepen and split of the Transcaucasian Union. Of course, in the current circumstances, it was not possible to form a united front in the region to stop Turkey's military advancement. There is no need to say that Transcaucasus was unable to show any serious military resistance against the Ottoman regular army. The point is that the main burden of the Turkish-Transcaucasian war fell on the Armenian armed forces, so it turned into a Turkish-Armenian war. The Georgian military participation against the Turks was insignificant. They enjoyed German patronage, thus feeling safe from Turkish military attack. The Muslim division did not take part in the hostilities at all. Moreover, the Caucasian Tatars openly stated that not only would they not fight against their blood relative Turks, but they would unconditionally support them. They considered the victory of the Turks and the military territorial conquests to be the realization of their national-political aspirations³⁴. By the way, the Ottoman military units, taking advantage of the impossibility of creating a front with joint anti-Turkish forces, the defenselessness of the front, launched large-scale military operations in the direction of Sardarapat, Karakilisa, Bash-Aparan, where they resisted the Armenian people, left alone against the enemy, showed them serious resistance.

³⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 19, sheet 14.

The different foreign policy orientations of the three independent Transcaucasian republics were quite obvious. The Georgians adopted a German and the Caucasian Tatars an unconditionally Turkish orientation, and both pursued an openly anti-Russian policy. It is noteworthy that the foreign policy position of the Armenians was radically different. Its traditional orientation was Russian. "They understood very well that the most real thing for them," writes Leo, "is the Russian orientation, that without Russia they could not find peace in his historical homeland. That is why Georgians and Turks hated Armenians." (Leo 1925, 365). In fact, each of the major Transcaucasian nations was acting in its own interests, so it could not quickly and accurately analyze and resist the new conspiracies expected from Ottoman Turkey. It is not difficult to notice that because of all this it became impossible to conduct a common Transcaucasian foreign policy - flexible diplomacy.

Turkey, taking the advantage of the favorable conditions in the region, at the same time with military territorial invasions, threats, moral and psychological pressure, without the consent of its allies Germany and Austria-Hungary, on June 4, 1918, in Batumi, signed separate peace treaties with each of the three newly independent Transcaucasian republics. In this way, the Ottoman Empire actually had a wide opportunity to finally secure its military-political-economic influence in the whole region. The point is that the clearing and handing over of the railways to Ottoman Turkey on the basis of the additional protocols to the treaty began immediately after the signing of the treaty, while the full ratification of the treaty was to take place in Constantinople within a month³⁵. In fact, with that treaty, Ottoman Turkey was given a wide opportunity to quickly penetrate the Caucasus, Baku, Central Asia and beyond through Armenian territories. "Turkey," writes A. Khachatryan, even in spite of the usual politeness in the alliance, without the participation of its comrades-in-arms, had begun separate peace negotiations with the republics of the Caucasian peoples. Earlier, as the Bulgarian ambassador to Istanbul said, it had deceived his comrades-in-arms, saying that was sending a commission to the Caucasus to see the affairs in the Caucasus right on the spot, and not to sign a treaty. In the end, however, against their will, dividing this union by internal conspiracies, it signed a pact with each of them that only met his demands" (Khachatryan 2010, 114).

Thus, Turkey saw the signing of peace treaties with each of the three independent republics individually that met only its demands as a reliable buffer to ensure its security from Russia, which could become a real threat to it in the near future. As A. Khatisyan writes: "For the Tajiks, the independent Caucasus was a coveted barrier between Turkey and Russia" (Haïrenik 1924, 110-111). In fact, this tactic was one of the most important military-political summaries of the Ottoman Empire to protect itself from the Russian threat. Thus, favorable military-political conditions were created for Ottoman Turkey to advance to Baku, Kars-Surmalu-Nakhichevan-Zangezur (Syunik)-Karabakh (Artsakh) via the Yerevan-Julfa railway to penetrate Iran, and the Central Asian countries to implement the programs of pan-Turanism. After all, Ottoman Turkey was also threatening the military-political-economic interests of Germany, a major ally in the region. According to Kajaznuni "They are allies, but at the same time they are rivals, and

³⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 9, sheet 6.

they are very jealous rivals. They follow each other carefully, each of them slightly deviating from the other”³⁶. Turkey was blocking Germany from penetrating the Middle East, while depriving it of using so much-needed natural resources, available in this region. Germany was no less interested in economics than in military-political issues in the Caucasus. In 1918 the Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia to Berlin Hamo Ohanjanyan informed official Yerevan on July 26 (according to the explanation of the representative of Germany, the General O. von Losov). Germany is much less interested in Armenia than in Georgia, both in terms of policy and economy.

Politically, Georgia is much more interesting for Germany than Armenia, from the point of view of the advanced international law. They have already even lent money to Georgia. And Armenia, with its still undefined borders, between Azerbaijan and Georgia, with its uncertain policy, its undefined economic opportunities, is not very useful for Germany, only the moral side of our problem remains, the responsibility for the Armenian Question”³⁷. After all, German political and economic interests necessarily led it to take Georgia under its auspices. It was no coincidence that Ottoman Turkey’s policies in the region angered Germany. The latter decided to moderate the excessive appetite of the Turks, not to allow them to violate the borders and conditions set by the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. It is obvious that the railway network of the region was very much demanded by each of the parties, which would be in the sphere of influence and would contribute to the strengthening of that country. Though, the Germans were not interested in Eastern Armenia economically or politically, but a part of the railway junction of the region passed through that territory, where the military-political and economic interests of Turkey and Germany clashed. Based on this, the Germans made corresponding promises to ‘support’ the Republic of Armenia. However, as subsequent events, political events and diplomatic negotiations showed, German support was unrealistic. As mentioned above, Germany was not interested in Eastern Armenia economically or politically, so it was not in its interest to endanger for the sake of the Armenians, to deepen the already tense relations with its ally Turkey. Thus, it is not difficult to see why the two main allies in the region, the geopolitical and economic interests of Turkey and Germany, clashed. German interests necessarily pushed to take Georgia under his auspices. Germany demanded that the Turkish military-political leadership stop its military advance and territorial occupation in the region and start to negotiate with the representatives of the region. Under its pressure, on April 27, 1918 a secret German-Turkish treaty was signed in Constantinople, which divided Transcaucasus into the spheres of interest of Ottoman Turkey and Germany. According to the treaty, almost all the Armenian territories occupied by it in the Transcaucasus passed to the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Kars-Alexandropol-Julfa railway and Azerbaijan. The rest of the Transcaucasus, particularly Georgia, came under German influence. It was no coincidence that the German flag was already erected in Georgia³⁸. And this did not give rest to the Turkish military-political leadership; it contradicted its geopolitical and economic interests in the region. In response, on the same day, April 27, in order to circumvent the German-Turkish pact, Ottoman Turkey signed a secret alliance

³⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 12.

³⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 657, sheet 145.

³⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 199, list 1, file 10, sheet 12.

with the Musavat Party, which opened the way for the Turks to Baku's oil, the cotton of Turkestan and so on. In such an extremely difficult and tense military-political situation, a conference to be convened in Constantinople at the end of June by the diplomatic representatives of the Central Powers, other countries and the newly independent republics of the Caucasus: the new inevitable conflicts of interest was to appear in the horizon. In fact, a conference to be convened in Constantinople in June would mark the beginning of a new phase in Armenian-Turkish diplomatic relations. According to L. Shant, It would be madness for us to hope for the Turks' sincere attitude towards us. All this is nothing but a comedy, the Armenian knows very well that what he is doing at the moment is just a comedy, as the circumstances demanded.

Personally, I think that this game cannot be decisive, even a tacit reconciliation cannot be final, because the interests of us and Turks are diametrically opposed. This comedy of the Reconciliation Conference took place first between Trabzon-Batumi, then-Batumi-Constantinople and will now move from Constantinople to Berlin and from here again to the Caucasus. Thus, successively, as far as our struggle continues, the defeat of the Germans comes and the great world conference finally begins (Beylerian 2005, 330; Beylerian 1983). As mentioned above, on the same day, June 4, Ottoman Turkey signed peace treaties in Batumi with each of the three newly independent Transcaucasian republics. The last Article 14 of the Armenian-Turkish "Reconciliation and Friendship" Pact states: "The pact will be ratified; the exchange of the ratified copies will take place in Constantinople, within a month or earlier, if it is possible. It will come into force on the day of the exchange"³⁹. Therefore, on July 4, the one-month deadline for ratification of the peace treaties signed between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Turkish capital was to expire. So, the military-political leadership of the Ottoman Empire sought to legally consolidate its territorial occupation of the region. At the conference (National Archives of Armenia 2009, 177). to be convened in Constantinople on June 25 at the initiative of the German military-political leadership, it was planned to return to the revision of the provisions of the treaties, to the joint solution of all existing Turkish-Caucasian border issues, which were "interconnected"⁴⁰. The conference will be attended by the diplomatic representatives of the Central Powers and the newly independent republics of the Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus). The leadership of the German Empire considered it necessary to invite Soviet Russia to the conference as a signatory to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. That diplomatic move had a tactical significance. By doing so, the German government was implying that without the consent of Soviet Russia, it would not be possible to resolve any controversial issue concerning the former Russian territories at the conference. In addition, the participation of the delegation of the RSFSR could moderate the excessive demands of the Turks (Tumanyan 2012, 47-48).

Going forward, we should note that there was no alternative to resolving the issue of ratifications through diplomacy, so the treaties did not enter into force. The question arises: what were the main motivations and consequences of that tactic? Now we should make an attempt to answer those questions. As we have mentioned, the military-political government of the Ottoman Empire, grossly violating the terms of the Brest-Litovsk

³⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 10, sheet 6.

⁴⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 9, sheet 6.

Peace Treaty of March 3, 1918, without the consent and participation of its allies, signed separate treaties with each of the three newly independent Transcaucasian republics on June 4 in Batumi. The fact is that 28.6% of the 38,000 square kilometers of Transcaucasus, occupied as a result of a gross violation of the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, and this is 38,000 square kilometers with a population of 1,250,000 people (Zavriev 1947, 70-71; Sargsyan 1995, 56-57), the Ottoman Empire secured in the Batumi peace agreements that was incompatible with the geopolitical and economic interests of its allies in the region. And it is not at all accidental that all this had its logical reaction in the diplomatic negotiations to be convened in Constantinople.

On June 26, the Ambassador of Germany Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, accredited to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, held a meeting with the head of the delegation of the Republic of Armenia Av. Aharonyan and Al. Khatisyan (member). He stated the following during the meeting: "That issue should be left aside in the current period for now, because the Constantinople Conference is the continuation of the Batumi talks"⁴¹. And what did Johann Bersdorf mean, when he mentioned, that "the Constantinople Conference is the continuation of the Batumi talks". In fact, the conference was going to make a focus on the diplomatic revision and changing the provisions of Brest-Litovsk and Batumi Peace Pacts. Germany and Austria-Hungary instructed their ambassadors and representatives in Constantinople to make a joint effort at the conference to review, as mentioned above, amend the Batumi Peace provisions, which were incompatible with their interests and goals, to exert pressure on the Ottoman Empire to implement the terms and conditions of the violated Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. The final goal was not to ratify the demarcation of borders between Turkey and the newly independent Transcaucasian republics, which was enshrined in the relevant articles of the Batumi Peace Pacts and their additional protocols⁴².

Thus, at the conference to be held in Constantinople, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the ally of Ottoman Turkey, presented the following main demands: 1) To change the Batumi Peace Pacts, their ratifications; 2) To recognize the terms and conditions set out in the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of March 3, 1918; 3) To withdraw the deployed Turkish troops from the occupied Caucasian territories to Kars, Ardahan, Batumi, the borders established by the peace treaty; 4) To stop the ongoing Turkish military invasions and territorial occupations in the region, etc.

However, these demands were not acceptable to Turkish diplomats, so they were openly rejected. "If Germany convenes a conference for this, the Turks do not need it. That's Turkey, - writes Khachatryan, did not give in to these demands in advance, but the relentless rhetoric of the war came to reach an agreement with his 'great ally'" (Khachatryan 2010, 116). It is important to note that the military-political events developed in such a way that the conference to be convened in Constantinople was postponed for days and weeks and never took place. The question arises, why? The first reason: the Ottoman Empire adopted a diplomatic strategy to delay the convening of the conference in order to renounce the above basic requirements of the allies Germany and Austria-Hungary. The second reason was the existing disputes and conflicts of interest between the Central Powers in the region. Internal divisions and disagreements gradually

⁴¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 13, sheet 4.

⁴² National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 13, sheet 1,4.

intensified due to new military failures of various German-Turkish factions and their imminent defeat in the World War I. Al. Khatisyan has written later: “On the big fronts of the war, there would be a fatal breakthrough. The fate of the war betrayed Germany and its allies” (Hairenik 1924, 108), “The greater those failures, the more the Turks and Germans avoided talking about the conference” (Hairenik 1924, 101). Diplomacy was no longer able to prevent the rapid course of events. In fact, convening a conference in the new military-political situation was no longer acceptable to the ally Germany. And it was not accidental that the latter was forced to abandon that diplomatic tactic. Thus, the convening of the Constantinople Conference finally failed.

However, a number of important and key issues to be discussed at the conference became the subject of discussion during the numerous private meetings and diplomatic negotiations in Constantinople, Berlin, Vienna, other cities, representatives of the various delegations of the Central Powers. Undoubtedly, in private meetings and negotiations, the Armenian Question should have been resolved by the same logic, in the realities of political and diplomatic disputes and conflicts of interest. It is not difficult to notice that new trials and hard days were ahead in the whirlwind of the difficult diplomatic struggle of the Armenian delegations.

Diplomatic efforts of the Armenian delegation between Constantinople and Berlin

Now let us focus on the coverage of numerous and complex private mutual meetings and diplomatic negotiation processes of the delegations of the Republic of Armenia aimed at resolving the Armenian Question.

On the evening of June 11, 1918, the Armenian National Central Council received a telegram⁴³ from the Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Khalil Bey, the head of the Turkish delegation at the Batum negotiations, inviting the Armenian side on behalf of Talaat Pasha to participate in the Constantinople Conference. “Representatives of our allies want to establish a friendly alliance with the states of the Caucasus. They are already in Constantinople. I also ask the representatives of Armenia to come and start negotiations in Constantinople”⁴⁴. On the next day, June 12, the telegram was discussed at the meeting of the council, it was decided to send a delegation to the Turkish capital, composed of the following members: Chairman Av. Aharonyan (Chairman of the Armenian National Central Council), members: Al. Khatisyan (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia) and M. Papajanyan (MP of the State Duma of the former Russian Empire)⁴⁵. In addition to three delegates, General G. Korganyan (on the military issues), G. Khatisyan (on demographic issues) and M. Buniatyan (on the economic and financial issues) were appointed as advisers. H. Kocharyan was approved as the head-first secretary of the delegation’s staff, and T. Mirzayan was appointed second secretary, F. Takhtajyan was appointed secretary-translator, L. Lisitsyan was appointed assistant to the diplomatic attache of the secretary, H. Berberyan was

⁴³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 116.

⁴⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 120, sheet 40.

⁴⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheet 1, 24; National Archives of Armenia, fund 222, list 1, file 141, sheets 253-254.

appointed diplomatic courier, and service personnel - A. Harutyunyan and Z. Simonyan. They were accompanied by bodyguards Colonel Shahbazyan and Lieutenant A. Aghababyan. The delegation was authorized to sign treaties, agreements, declarations, petitions, memorandums, as well as other international documents on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Armenia⁴⁶. Al. Khatisyan writes. "We have a mandate to be neutral and stay out of international conflicts"⁴⁷.

Earlier, in April-May, another delegation of the Armenian National Central Council, composed of A. Jamalyan, G. Melik-Karagozyan and L. Nazaryan, developed activities in Berlin (Hayruni 2013, 21-38). Armenian diplomats sought to find a solution to the Armenian Question in the complex realities of geopolitical, economic and diplomatic tensions and conflicts of interest between the Central Powers, in particular Ottoman Turkey and German Empire. As already mentioned, the Ottoman Empire, grossly violating the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, invaded Transcaucasus, which was contrary to the geopolitical and economic interests of Germany and its allies in the region. That is why official Berlin and its allies have repeatedly demanded from the military-political leadership of the Ottoman Empire an immediate cessation of military invasions and territorial occupations in the region. However, the latter, ignoring the complaints and demands of the allies, persistently continued to implement its strategic and expansionist programs of pan-Turanism. On this occasion, the German military and political leader, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Erich Ludendorff, writes: "Enver Pasha and the Turkish government thought more about pursuing their goals of pan-Turanism in the Caucasus than about waging war with Great Britain." (Ludendorff 2014, 563). Meanwhile, Turkey continued to respond to the warnings and demands of official Berlin with baseless and false excuses, being well aware that allied Germany would never act from a military position. Another German military and political figure, Karl Mühlmann, in his remarkable work "The German-Turkish Military Alliance in the World War II" testifies to the numerous unfounded denials of Turkish military and political figures. For example, according to the author, the Minister of Defense of Ottoman Turkey, Enver Pasha, did not accept the warnings and demands of the official Berlin, "motivating" that: 1) The advance of Turkish troops in Transcaucasus is necessary to prevent the spread of the influence of Bolshevism; 2) To put an end to the Armenian 'atrocities' against Muslims in the region, a circumstance to which Turkey cannot look 'indifferently' (Mühlmann 1940, 199; Sargsyan 1994, 60).

In the current military-political situation, Germany and its allies, guided by their own interests and the logic of deep internal and external contradictions, sought to convince Georgia and Armenia of their sincere aspirations, and in fact 'persuade' (Sargsyan 1994, 61) them to raise their voices of protest in Constantinople and demand amendments to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to withdraw the stationed Turkish troops from the occupied Caucasus to the borders of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi, to immediately stop military invasions into the region and "refuse to ratify the Batumi Treaty"⁴⁸. On June 23-26, German Ambassador to Constantinople I. Bernsdorf during the meeting with the Chairman of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia Av. Aharonyan and Al.

⁴⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 657, sheets 1,2.

⁴⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 116.

⁴⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117.

Khatisyan (a member of the delegation) suggests: “Now the problem is how to force Turkey to comply with the Brest Treaty”⁴⁹, “But there should be an opportunity to insist on it. It would be very good if Georgia and Armenia joined by mutual agreement on any grounds”⁵⁰. As we can see, the pronounced diplomatic tactics of Germany and its allies coincided with the demands of the new independent Transcaucasian republics in the region. Of course, each of these interests pursued completely different strategic and tactical goals. However, as subsequent events, military-political events and diplomatic negotiations in Berlin, Constantinople, Vienna and other places showed, the hopes of the Armenian diplomats regarding Germany and its allies were unrealistic and therefore did not receive any “tangible” support.

The Armenian delegation, relying on the assurances and support of the German government, sent an extensive memorandum to official Berlin with the goal of influencing the Turkish military-political leadership in order to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories of Armenia, which were not secured by the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty⁵¹ (Mikayelyan 1995, 506-507; Badalyan and Harutyunyan 1970, 178). In another memorandum, the Armenian the diplomats asked for Germany’s support in organizing the return of 600.000 Armenian refugees deported as a result of the Armenian Genocide to their homes and so on⁵².

However, for some reasons, the Armenian delegation interrupted its diplomatic mission and on May 30 returned to Tbilisi from Berlin (Avetisyan 1997, 259). Moreover, a few days later, another delegation with a similar diplomatic mission, consisting of the representatives of the Armenian National Central Council in Tbilisi, H. Ohanjanyan and A. Zurabyan, at the suggestion of the German representative, who participated in the Batumi negotiations, General O. von Losov, visited with him Berlin on June 3, which, to our mind, was not at all accidental. At the invitation of H. Ohanjanyan, Greenfield (his mother was an ethnic Armenian), as well as the great poet, prose writer, and diplomat Avetik Isahakyan, joined the delegation⁵³. After some time, the delegation spoke on behalf of the government of the Republic of Armenia, began its active and difficult diplomatic mission in Berlin, Vienna and other European cities, regularly informing the Armenian delegation in Constantinople about this. The delegation acted in Berlin for about five months, from June to early November. Let us now return to the delegation of the Republic of Armenia headed by Av. Aharonyan in Constantinople, which was to conduct its complex and difficult diplomatic negotiations in consultation with the Armenian delegation in Berlin. Its purpose was to present and defend the Armenian Question at the conference.

The main composition of the delegation, on the evening of June 13, 1918, headed by Av. Aharonyan, left Tbilisi and on the 19th of the same month, arrived in Constantinople

⁴⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 13, sheet 4.

⁵⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 13, sheet 1.

⁵¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 11, sheets 100-101.

⁵² State Archive of the RF, fund 446, list 2, files 39, sheet 63; National Archives of Armenia, fund 222, list 1, file 24, Part III, sheet 398; National Archives of Armenia, fund 222, list 2, file 11, sheets 2, 80, 102-103.

⁵³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 656, sheets 121-124, 146-147; National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 11, sheets 100-101.

at 4 o'clock, and the rest of the Armenian diplomats arrived on June 24⁵⁴. On June 19, delegations from Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Highlanders of the Caucasus arrived in the capital of Ottoman Turkey⁵⁵. They were met by a special official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the former ambassador to Athens, Mukhtar Bey on the ship "General" in the port of Constantinople⁵⁶ (Zang 1918a).

According to the head of the delegation, First Secretary Hakob Kocharyan, Mukhtar Bey was instructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to "receive the delegations of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to take the necessary orders and take care of them."⁵⁷ It is also important to note that rooms have already been prepared for the delegations in the two best "Pera Palace" hotels. And "we were taken in their cars and made our check-in in the hotels, where we live with all conveniences. On the next day the same official informed us that two cars were at our disposal every day from morning to night, and two officials were also at our disposal to provide us with all kinds of conveniences"⁵⁸.

On June 23, Av. Aharonyan provided the National Central Council of Armenia with the following remarkable information. The arrival of the Armenian delegation to Constantinople makes a stunning impression on both Turkish and Armenian society. The news of the arrival is published in the newspapers as sensational news, completely unexpected for the whole of Istanbul, for the whole of Turkey (Zang 1918b).

The Turkish society was simply dumbfounded when they learned that an Armenian delegation was coming, because they are still used to reading that the Armenians were slaughtered in the Caucasus, that the entire Caucasus was subordinated to Turkey, and now they suddenly see that the Armenians were not completely slaughtered, but vice versa, this is a separate state, whose representatives arrived in Constantinople.

The Armenians of Constantinople are also shocked. They also thought that there was no longer an Armenian element in the Caucasus, that they were completely slaughtered, because the Turkish government and newspapers convinced them of this, and suddenly they find out that not only Armenians exist, but, on the contrary, they created their own state, sent a delegation to Constantinople. Armenians secretly go from house to house at night, whispering seemingly incredible news to each other and making sure of its veracity (Zang 1918b).

The conference, as already mentioned, was constantly postponed. The delegation of the Republic of Armenia had to stay in Constantinople from June 19 to November 1⁵⁹. Looking ahead, we should note that at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs Al. Khatisyan and other members of the delegation, as representatives of the diplomatic mission, also actively worked in Constantinople on the appointment of foreign consular representatives of the Republic of Armenia in remote countries and cities where a large number of Armenians lived. Before returning to Yerevan, on October 21, Av. Aharonyan

⁵⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117; National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheets 42.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheet 39.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 131.

sent a telegram to the Prime Minister, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Kajaznuni, proposing to appoint F. Takhtajyan as a temporary representative-translator of the Republic of Armenia in Constantinople⁶⁰.

On June 20, the German diplomatic mission in the capital of Ottoman Turkey handed over the Armenian delegation two telegrams from Berlin signed by H. Ohanjanyan and A. Zurabyan informing the Armenian diplomats that - a. the military and political leadership of imperial Germany “wants to improve its attitude towards the Armenian people... and they consider us friends”⁶¹, b. the holding of the Constantinople conference is being delayed, and it will probably start no earlier than three weeks⁶². In the conditions of the delay of the conference, it was acceptable to focus on the most important issues, which were subject to the upcoming discussions, during private meetings and separate diplomatic negotiations between the representatives of the Ottoman Turkey and the newly independent Transcaucasian republics⁶³. Al. Khatisyan notes that the strategic “main subjects of the many mutual meetings and diplomatic negotiations of the Armenian delegation in Constantinople were three in the period of four months: a) expedient borders for the creation of a viable Armenia, b) the Constantinople conference, c) the unbearable situation of Armenians in the Caucasus. We have talked about these issues continuously with all the official and unofficial persons we had the opportunity to meet in Constantinople” (Hairenik 1924, 100).

According to Al. Khatisyan in the conditions of postponed conference, the Armenian delegation pursued its strategic goals in three main diplomatic tactical directions: “a) our relations with the Turkish Council of Ministers, headed by Taleat Pasha and Enver Pasha, b) our relations with foreign ambassadors, the German ambassador Count von Bernstorff, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador Marquis Johann von Pallavicini and Bulgarian ambassador Kohlschef, as well as with the ambassadors of neutral states, Persia and Switzerland, c) our relations with the Committee of Young Turks, as well as influential Turkish state figures and representatives of press. Among them were Ahmet Riza Bey, editor of “Tanin” Huseyin Cahit Bey and Marine Minister Reuf Bey. We also had a meeting with the Sultan, to whom we were introduced by Enver Pasha. The subject of our conversation was the Armenian Question” (Hairenik 1924, 100). As mentioned, in coordination with the delegation of Constantinople, the Armenian delegation of Berlin carried out similar diplomatic, strategic and tactical difficult activities both in Germany and in other official European capitals. The delegation made diplomatic visits and held negotiations with the heads of states of the Central Powers, as well as the diplomatic representative of Soviet Russia in Berlin A. Ioffe and others. Accordingly, they regularly informed the Armenian delegation in Constantinople about their progress. It is important to note that due to the delay of the conference, all the most important issues related to the Armenian question and Transcaucasus in general were discussed mainly in Berlin⁶⁴, where each of the participants, in particular the main allies, German Empire and Ottoman

⁶⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 657, sheet 294; National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheet 102.

⁶¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117.

⁶² *ibid.*

⁶³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 275, list 5, file 68, sheets 1-4.

⁶⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheet 59.

Turkey, consistently and diligently, pursued their geopolitical and economic interests in the region. At the same time, issues of clarifying disputed borders between the Ottoman Empire and the newly independent Transcaucasian republics, etc., were discussed in Constantinople. In fact, the main diplomatic strategic and tactical goal of the Armenian delegations in Berlin and Constantinople was to solve the Armenian Question. After three days of rest in Constantinople and some diplomatic preparations, the Armenian delegation, from June 22 to July 3, held meetings and negotiated with a number of high-ranking officials of the military and political leadership of the Ottoman Empire, as well as with the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and ambassadors of neutral states Persia (Iran), Sweden, Spain, Denmark, Holland and other countries accredited to Turkey. Meetings were also held with influential Turkish political and state figures and well-known representatives of press⁶⁵. "In general, I have to say," writes A.I. Khatisyan, - that we used to divide the roles between each other and everyone would take it upon themselves to talk about some topics" (Hairenik 1924, 101).

The delegation first visited Grand Vizier Talaat and Minister of War of the Council of Ministers of Ottoman Turkey Enver Pasha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Nesimi Bey, Minister of Naval Forces Djemal Pasha, Minister of Justice Halil Bey⁶⁶ and others. "Of course, it is understandable," writes journalist of periodical "Zang", "the difficult mental state of our delegation at that moment" (Zang 1918b): visits, diplomatic negotiations with some of the planners and implementers of the mass genocide of more than one and a half million Armenians and the deprivation of the motherland of more than six hundred thousand Armenians in Western Armenia and many other Armenian-inhabited places in Western Armenia and in many other Armenian-inhabited areas of Ottoman Turkey as a result of the Ottoman Turkey's state policy, "who even today sought to exterminate the rest of Armenians by hunger within the borders of the small republic" (A-Do 2014, 540).

Undoubtedly, it is indisputable that Ottoman Turkey planned and implemented at the state level the strategy and tactics of mass genocide and statelessness in Western Armenia and many other Armenian-populated regions of the empire. The Turks viewed the Armenian population as a wedge separating Ottoman Turkey from the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Caucasus and preventing the implementation of Pan-Turkic, Pan-Turanian expansionist plans. The elimination of this obstacle became the goal of the Ottoman Turkish state policy towards the Armenian Genocide and statelessness, which was implemented during the First World War. In 1918, Ottoman Turkey, having invaded the Transcaucasus, continued the adopted policy of genocide against the Eastern Armenians.

It should be noted that on June 22, accompanied by a special representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ottoman Turkey, Mukhtar Bey, the chairman of the Armenian delegation Av. Aharonyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.I. Khatisyan and the military adviser of the delegation, General G. Korganyan visited Talaat Pasha⁶⁷. After mutual diplomatic compliments, Av. Aharonyan presented the main goals of the

⁶⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117; National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheets 40- 41.

⁶⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117.

⁶⁷ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 12, sheet 39.

delegation to the Grand Vizier: "Our territory is very narrow and limited... it will create an opportunity to secure territorial borders for our state, satisfying our legitimate aspirations, which, satisfying the principles of justice and ethnography, will make the new Armenian state viable and capable of political and economic development"⁶⁸. As a response, Talaat Pasha greeted the Armenian delegation with false kindness hidden under polite forms, assuring: "The imperial government fully shares the feelings and hopes of the Armenian people, and the young republic can be sure that the Ottoman Empire will support it in every way and do what is necessary so that this strong and hardworking nation can realize its plans"⁶⁹. Then answering the question raised by the delegation regarding the return of Armenian refugees who were deprived of their homeland as a result of the genocide and a number of problems of internal regulation, the Grand Vizier, openly falsifying the entire historical reality and the truth, publicly announced: "There were misunderstandings between the Armenian and Ottoman peoples, which led to very painful consequences"⁷⁰. This is how Talaat Pasha, one of the main figures who planned and implemented the mass Armenian genocide and deprivation of the motherland, expressed himself.

During the diplomatic discussions, Talaat Pasha deliberately avoided and diverted the main questions presented by the Armenian diplomats, again trying to falsify the entire historical truth. Delegation member Al. Khatisyan writes in this regard: "Of course, during the very first conversation he tried to throw off any responsibility for the massacre of Armenians. All the responsibility he assigned on the military government, Kurds and local authorities. "You should see for yourself," he said, "how sometimes the officials arbitrarily violate the orders from higher officials." He told how in the first days of the war he had asked the Member of Parliament Vardges to take the side of Turkey and how Vardges had remained silent in response. "Our enemies were the Russians," said Talaat, "but when they aimed their guns at our soldiers, their bullets hit our soldiers' feet. And when the Armenians, who were residents of the Ottoman Empire, the traitors of their homeland, started shooting, the bullets hit the hearts of our soldiers." (Hairenik 1924, 101). "This meeting," continues Al. Khatisyan - was a necessary torture for us. ... We worked to transfer the subject of our conversation from the past to the urgent issues of the present. ... The appearance of Talaat did not make a favorable impression: his haughty appearance, the face of an unintellectual one, his physical structure, his voice, which would emphasize a false friendship, could not be favorable. In the end, he asked to present the demands of Armenians to him in written form to send a report to the ministerial council, and promised to speak with the minister of foreign affairs. Talaat Pasha gave his approval to our demands in his speech, but he said that all issues will be decided by the conference (Hairenik 1924, 101-102). Talaat also informed the Armenian diplomats that "the conference will probably start in a week"⁷¹. It is clear that, it was no coincidence that Talaat Pasha clearly pushed the purposeful attempts of the Armenian delegation to a diplomatic impasse. The point is, as already said, that the diplomatic

⁶⁸ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 13, sheet 7.

⁶⁹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 13, sheet 7-8.

⁷⁰ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 13, sheet 8.

⁷¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 2, file 34, sheet 2.

tactics of the military and political leadership of the Ottoman Empire was to disrupt the conference to be convened in Constantinople.

The delegation then paid a diplomatic visit to Enver Pasha, Minister of War of Ottoman Turkey. The following eloquent fact mentioned by the member of our delegation Al. Khatisyan about the behavior and some peculiarities of Turkish diplomacy is noteworthy: "As we entered the great reception hall, our attention was drawn to a huge collection of swords hanging on the opposite wall, inscribed in Arabic in golden letters: "You will find your paradise under the chains of swords.""⁷² Al. Khatisyan continues: "Enver Pasha received us immediately. He was a middle-aged and handsome man, who at first sight left an impression of a shy and very moderate person. His face was very stern and calm; his eyes were insightful and thoughtful. He was generally attractive in appearance. Looking at this man, it was hard to believe that he was capable of sentencing to death hundreds of thousands of people to death with a calm heart. The appearance of the Turks is so deceptive. That is why the Europeans are so easily deceived by their sweet and attractive algorithm of actions" (Hairenik 1924, 102).

Chairman of the delegation Av. Aharonyan after welcoming Enver Pasha announced the main and key issues that he had presented to Talaat Pasha. Enver, thanking and expressing mutual welcoming remarks, said: "That is what they expected from you. The truth is that you had put your hope in Russia, and more - England. Turkey has now given you independence and given it after much consideration of your situation. My signature is there and will never be deleted. You can be not only our good friends but also our allies. You will also come to that conclusion and you will see that it will bring the best results for the public welfare.

The issue of refugees - it is true, it is very sad and painful, like the war, but everyone suffered from it. Armenians are strong, hardworking and energetic people. Owing to these qualities, whatever wounds your nation has received from war, are treatable and must be treated. We are sure that our troops in the Caucasus will behave completely correctly according to the given order. I can say that the Turkish population also fled from Trabzon and other cities to Urfa and Adana, so we also want peace and tranquility"⁷³. This is how Enver Pasha, the other figure who had planned and implemented the mass Armenian genocide and deprivation of the motherland, expressed his thoughts. As mentioned above, answering the delegation's chairman Av. Aharonyan, Enver Pasha, of course avoiding and ignoring the diplomatic discussion of the main demands presented by the Armenian diplomats, called not only to establish friendship, but also to ally. In fact, he again circulated the proposal to create a military alliance (entente) with Armenia⁷⁴. Still in 1918 at the beginning of June, during the diplomatic negotiations in Batumi, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army, Vehib Pasha, repeatedly requested the head of the Armenian delegation, Al. Khatisyan that "they will gladly enter into a military alliance with the Armenians, as they did with the Bulgarians, and that Armenia can benefit greatly from this"⁷⁵. In fact, the main purpose of the proposal was to include 10,000 Armenian soldiers in their forces to fight against the

⁷² National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117.

⁷³ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 13, sheets 5-6.

⁷⁴ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 117.

⁷⁵ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 8, sheet 116.

Entente states at a time when the imminent defeat of the Central Powers in the First World War was approaching. However, the Armenian delegation diplomatically avoided it, taking into consideration the highly harmful and irreversible consequences of that proposal for Armenians.

Enver Pasha, realizing the fear and mistrust of the Armenian diplomats towards the military and political leadership of the Ottoman Empire, proposed other conditions in Constantinople on which his assumed military alliance should be based. "We, becoming comrades-in-arms," he says, "can't ask you to fight against the British in our ranks together with us" (Zang 1918b). "We know you won't do it. But we want to be safe: the rear of our army, if it starts a campaign against the British side, Persia - will not be endangered by you" (Zang 1918b). However, the chairman of the Armenian delegation Av. Aharonyan diplomatically maneuvered, saying: "It is a problem about which he does not have instructions from his government, and without it he does not consider himself entitled to show any attitude towards the problem" (Zang 1918b).

This was the end of the first diplomatic visit of the Armenian delegation and the negotiations with Enver Pasha, the military minister of Ottoman Turkey. And yet, during the Armenian-Turkish diplomatic negotiations taking place in Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire diligently continued discussions on creating a military-political alliance with the Republic of Armenia. While in July of 1918, German Empire demanded from its ally, Ottoman Turkey, to stop the discussions on the creation of that alliance. The German side put forward the following justification: the Ottoman Empire cannot sign pacts and agreements separately with other countries without the mutual agreement of the Central Powers⁷⁶.

Conclusion and discussion

Deprived of statehood and political institutions for centuries, the Armenian people had the opportunity to build their independence. However, each territory and public sector of the republic had its own local groups that approached all problems in their favor, due to which their own interest became the priority instead of the national interest. That is why it became difficult for national political consolidation and active participation of all in the processes of strengthening the statehood, so that everyone would turn from an observer into a participant.

During that period, the fact that individual individuals or small groups who came to Armenia forcibly or voluntarily from different countries and brought with them many unrealistic programs that were incomprehensible to the Armenian society, government and parties, continued to be a concern. Each of them often contradicted the government's reform moves and realpolitik, trying to embed their visions in the complex reality of domestic and foreign politics. The partial attitude of the Armenians, who were forced out of the First Republic of Armenia, who, risking their existence, wanted to help the construction of statehood with everything, was helpless, but in realpolitik it was impossible.

⁷⁶ National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 657 (2nd part), sheets 121-127.

The complex internal and external political situation created in the First Republic caused an atmosphere of mistrust among the majority of the threatened people towards independent statehood and public authority. The decisive imperative to bring the country out of the dire situation was the effective functioning of the newly formed state system and political institutions, but the harmonious and interconnected work of the various branches of the state power bodies was still missing. During that period, there were many disagreements between the Council of Armenia (Parliament), the government and the ruling party of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.

The Prime Ministers of the First Republic adequately evaluated and imagined the solution to this complex problem, because they were carrying out consistent work for national unity so that the governing party of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation does not have a monopoly, but supports the increase of the role of the parliament and the government in the political field. Apparently, such a situation was inevitable, because the formation of a democratic political regime and state system was not an easy task in the conditions of such realpolitik. Thus, in the first months of the independence of the First Republic of Armenia, the country survived in socially, economically and politically destructive conditions, from overcoming the risks of which the main directions and priorities of the country's foreign policy strategy should be derived.

References

- A-Do [Ter-Martirosian, Hovhannes]. 2014. Throes of Birth of the Armenians. Yerevan: History Museum of Armenia.
- Avetisyan, Hrant. 1997. The Armenian Question in 1918. Yerevan: "High School" publishing house.
- Babalian, Artashes. 1959. Pages from the History of Armenian Independence [Ejer Hayastani ankakhutyun patmutyunits]. Cairo: Husaber.
- Badalyan, Khachatur, and Ashot, Harutyunyan, ed. 1970. From the History of Foreign Intervention in Armenia in 1918: Documents and Materials. Yerevan: Yerevan University Press (in Russian) [Бадалян, Хачатур, и Ашот, Арутюнян (ред.) 1970. Из истории иностранной интервенции в Армении в 1918 году: Документы и материалы. Ереван: Изд-во Ереванского университета].
- Beylerian, Arthur. 1983. Les Grandes Puissances L'Empire Ottoman et les Armeniens: dans les Archives Francaises, 1914-1918 (3 vols). Paris, France: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Beylerian, Arthur. 2005. The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Armenians in the French Archives (1914-1918), Vol. II. Yerevan: Hayastan (Grakan Hayrenik).
- Darbinyan, Ruben. 1991. The Russian Threat. Yerevan: Azat Khosk Publishing House.
- Ghaziyani, Alvard, and Sonya Mirzoyan, ed. 2003. The massacres of the Armenians in the provinces of Baku and Elizabetopol in 1918-1920: Collection of documents and materials. Yerevan: Archive of the history of the RA.
- Hairenik. 1924. "Hairenik" monthly (June). Boston.
- Hairenik. 1935. "Hairenik" monthly (February), Vol. 4. Boston.

- Hayruni, Ashot. 2013. *The Armenian Issue in German Foreign Policy in 1918*. Yerevan: YSU Publishing House.
- Kajaznuni, Hovhannes. 1990. *Open letter to Z: Turkey or Russia?* Yerevan.
- Katchaznoui, Hovhannes. 1923. *Dashnaksutiune anelik chuni ailevs [The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Any More]*. Vienna: Mechitarist Press.
- Khachatryan, Astvatur. 2010. *Eastern Armenian and Turkish diplomatic relations*. Yerevan: National Archives of Armenia, Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia.
- Leo [Babakhanyan, Arakel]. 1925. *From the Past. Memoirs, Papers, Judgments. Armenian Question. Armenian Revolutionary Federation. World War: Revolution*. Tbilisi: Soviet Caucasus.
- Ludendorff, Erich. 2014. *My War Memories 1914-1918*. Moscow: Veche [Людендорф, Эрих. 2014. *Мои воспоминания о войне 1914-1918 гг.* Москва: Вече].
- Melkonyan, Ashot. 2003. *Javakhk in the 19th Century and the First Quarter of the 20th Century*. Yerevan: Zangak-97.
- Mikayelyan, Vardges. 1995. *The Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide in Turkey (1913-1919): Materials of the Political Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kaiser's Germany: Collection*. Yerevan: Gitutyun [Микаелян, Вардгес. 1995. *Армянский вопрос и геноцид армян в Турции (1913-1919): Материалы Политического архива МИД Кайзеровской Германии: Сборник*. Ереван: Гитутюн].
- National Archives of Armenia. 2009. "Protocols of the sessions of the Parliament of the Republic of Armenia: 1918-1920." Yerevan.
- Ruben [Der Minasian, Ruben]. 1982. *Hai Heghapokhankani Me Hishatakneri [Memoirs of an Armenian revolutionary]*, Vol. E. Tehran.
- Sakartvelos Respublika. 1918a. Newspaper (July 8). Tbilisi, Georgia.
- Sakartvelos Respublika. 1918b. Newspaper (August 18). Tbilisi, Georgia.
- Sargsyan, Yervand. 1995. *Conspiracy Deal. Armenia-Russia-Turkey*. Yerevan: Hayastan.
- Tumanyan, Mikael. 2012. *Diplomatic History of the Republic of Armenia 1918-1920*. Yerevan: Institute of History of NAS RA, National Archives of Armenia [Туманян, Микаел. 2012. *Дипломатическая история Республики Армения 1918-1920 годов*. Ереван: Институт истории НАН РА, Национальный архив Армении].
- Vagharshyan, Arthur. 2012. *The System of the Executive Power of the First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920)*. Yerevan: YSU Publishing House.
- Vem. 1934. *Monthly (September-October)*. Paris.
- Vem. 1938. *Monthly (Vol.1)*. Paris.
- Vratsyan, Simon. 1924. *Disruptions. Regarding Hovhannes Kajazoun's book "ARF has Nothing to Do Anymore"*. Boston.
- Vratsyan, Simon. 1962. *Old Papers for a New History*. Beirut: Mshak.
- Zang. 1918a. Newspaper (August 7). Yerevan, Armenia.
- Zang. 1918b. Newspaper (December 1). Yerevan, Armenia.
- Zavriev, David. 1947. *Contemporary History of the North-East Vilayets of Turkey*. Tbilisi: Tbilisi State University named after Stalin (in Russian) [Завриев, Давид.

1947. К новейшей истории северо-восточных вилайетов Турции. Тбилиси: Тбилисский государственный университет имени Сталина].
- Zohrabyan, Edik. 2000. The Inter-Ethnic Battles in Yerevan Province in 1918. Yerevan: Hayagitak.

ERDOGAN AGAINST TURKEY: STALEMATE OF “PATRIOT-F-35-S-400” TRIANGLE

HAYK GABRIELIAN 

Abstract

After the attempted military coup in 2016, Turkey began to show interest in the Russian S-400 systems, and initially there was an impression that Turkey was only bluffing, was simply using Russia in its relations with the United States (as it had previously done with China (CPMIEC) in the same matter) and was seeking to show the US that it had an alternative (S-400). However, Turkey showed its persistence, and was able to buy these systems quite quickly, despite the fact that the United States strongly opposed it. In this context, this study aims to clarify the main reasons for Turkey's persistence on this issue, taking into account the personal factor of Erdogan.

The article also analyzes the authoritarian strengthening of militarism and Erdogan's personal factor for buying the S-400, who was the beneficiary of buying the S-400 systems. This article shows that sometimes Erdogan's personal interests and Turkey's state interests should be separated from each other, that in some cases Erdogan's personal interests and Turkey's state interests may or may not coincide partially or completely. It is emphasized that in each case of conflict of interests, Erdogan's personal interests prevail, that the problems should be examined first of all from the perspective of Erdogan's personal interests and not from Turkey's state interests, otherwise many things remain unclear and unexplained.

Focusing on Turkey's purchase of the S-400 systems, this study also asks why NATO member Turkey even after the purchase has not given up those Russian systems and why it still continues to persist. The topic is also actual for Armenia, as it is related to the sphere of the Turkish Air Force and the defense capability of Turkey in general, its prospects. The article describes the brief history of Turkey's purchase of S-400 systems, analyzes the motives of that move from territorial, temporal, cause-and-effect, and other perspectives, and presents Turkey's attempts to get out of the existing situation. This study aims to identify the main trends underlying the conflict between Erdogan and the Turkish political elite over the purchase of the S-400.

Keywords: *Turkish Air Force, Russia, USA, NATO, authoritarianism, July 15 coup attempt, historical memory, symbolism.*

* Hayk Gabrielyan is a PhD candidate of the Department for Political Science at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany. He works at the Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs.
Email: haykgabrielyan1981@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp.49-72



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 03.08.2022

Revised: 11.08.2022

Accepted: 14.08.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

Introduction

Authoritarianism based on charismatic leadership remains common in the Middle East and North Africa. When it comes to charismatic leadership, Western researchers traditionally turn to the work of Max Weber. Weber calls plebiscitary democracy, in which the leader is directly elected by the people, the most important type of leader's democracy (Magalhães 2022). The leader actually dominates by virtue of the loyalty and trust of political adherents to his personality as such. Initially, this is power over recruited supporters.

At the same time, the democracy of the leader is characterized by charismatic domination. It is based on the legitimacy of 'charismatic character', which is based on extraordinary manifestations of holiness or heroic strength, or exemplary personality and the order created by these manifestations. This legitimacy is maintained as long as the personal charisma of the leader is recognized and used by trusted people, students and followers. That is, we are talking about two types of legitimation - plebiscitary and charismatic (Klein 2016; Shaw 2008; Willner and Willner 1965).

The latter is of the greatest practical interest from the point of view of studying political regimes in the Middle East. A distinctive feature of charismatic domination is its revolutionary potential, and as you know, charismatic domination destroys the past in its field. In other words, a charismatic leader does not follow well-worn paths according to generally accepted rules. It breaks precedents and creates new ones, and in doing so it is revolutionary (Shcherbak 2021). Here, political phenomena are considered as special realities that have their own logic of development and, accordingly, their own history. Weber, in particular, believed that politics is determined not only by the division of labor or industrial relations, but equally by the influence of administrative structures. Weber's concepts of bureaucracy and plebiscitary leadership democracy were of great importance.

He also paid great attention to the figure of a parliamentary 'party leader' who grew up on the soil of a constitutional state. Weber connects the emergence of plebiscitary democracy with the emergence of 'party machines', when the leader (often over the head of parliament) becomes the one to whom the machine obeys. In other words, the creation of such machines means the advent of plebiscite democracy, writes Weber (Kilker 1989; Green 2008). As historical experience shows, during periods of social instability and social crises, the role of random factors that affect the entire social system increases significantly.

The sociologist describes the mechanism of the birth of a party leader as follows: the party elite expects that the demagogic effect of the leader's personality will provide the party with votes and mandates, therefore, adherence to the party is replaced by commitment to a specific person (not some abstract program of some party) and this is the charismatic element (Strom 1990; Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Cross and Blais 2012; Vicentini and Pritoni 2021).

Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as the founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), since the victory of his party on November 3, 2002 in the Parliamentary elections, has become the party of power has become the most influential political figure in modern Turkey. Another manifestation of this was his victory of Erdogan in the

presidential elections on August 10, 2014, thereby strengthening and spreading his influence. One of the evidence was the fact that Erdogan did everything to make the conservative agenda dominate domestic politics, initiating steps within the party to oust the people who stood at its origins. At the same time, there was a noticeable shift towards authoritarianism in Turkey, since the strengthening of the position of the AKP was accompanied by the persecution of its political opponents from among the secular and military elite. In the AKP, Erdogan has no potential competitors, and he himself has set a course for turning Turkey from a parliamentary republic into a presidential one. After the unsuccessful military coup of 2016 and the subsequent repressions against officers and intellectuals, Erdogan did not have any serious political opponents (Surkov 2020; Kaynar 2022).

I argue that during the 20 years of his rule, especially in the last years, Erdogan has repeatedly stood out with such steps, which not only did not come from the state interests of Turkey, but also significantly harmed him. Since the topic of the article is also from this series, we would like to present several such episodes in advance, to make it more convincing that in some cases Erdogan is guided by his own and not the state interests of Turkey. In this context Erdogan's symbolic strikes tactic is also very important, when he chooses specific dates for them, when historical memory as a tool influences the decisions made by him.

Methods of symbolic politics focused on the search for and strengthening of identity, mobilization of the masses, strengthening of power, etc., currently form an important part of scientific discourse. Rituals and myths contribute to the formation and consolidation of ideas about the special mission of a particular nation, the growth of its self-respect. The creation of new symbols or the return of old ones are becoming the most important tools in the current information age in the course of implementing domestic politics. Symbolism has also long become a fairly organic tool of foreign policy.

Historical memory plays a special role in the formation and implementation of foreign policy. In fact, this concept remains rather vague, since the past always appears in a mythologized version, and the further it is from us, the more vague and variable it seems. The tasks of the elites are centered on exploiting what might be called the politically 'usable' past. They are ready to use those historical facts, combined with myths and symbols, which should substantiate the models of foreign policy behavior, presenting the decisions made by the ruling elite as uncontested. The past, which testifies to past greatness, affects the current positioning of states on the world and regional arena.

The fact that modern Turkey is the symbolic successor of the great Ottoman Empire and Caliphate is reflected in its relations with the Arabs and to a large extent reinforces the "return" of the country to the East under Erdogan (Zvyagelskaya 2019).

Let's list a number of steps taken by Erdogan, which demonstrate his policy of 'being guided by his own interests' and 'symbolic strikes'. Both of these factors are also present in the main part of the research.

1) On November 24, 2015, the Turkish Air Force destroyed a Russian Su-24 bomber on the border with Syria, which, according to the Turkish side, violated Turkey's airspace for 17 seconds (The Turkish Air Force, the only NATO force to shoot down a Russian plane after the end of the Cold War). After the incident, the Turkish side

announced that it only shot down a border-violating plane, ‘did not know’ that the plane belonged to Russia, thought that the plane belonged to the Syrian aviation, emphasizing that the incident was registered on the Turkish-Syrian border and not on the Russian-Turkish border (despite that, days before the incident, the Russian ambassador to Ankara, Andrei Karlov¹ (Filipov, Fahim and Sly 2016), was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry for border air violations in the same area). And although Turkey subsequently avoided a military strike by Russia thanks to its membership in NATO, it was unable to escape Russia’s economic sanctions (tourism, agriculture, construction, logistics, visa, etc.) which affected hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Turkish citizens.

From my own point of view, it was not at all in Turkey’s state interest to shoot down the Russian plane, taking into account that the plane violated Turkish airspace only for a few seconds, and horizontally (not vertically), i.e it could stay in Turkish airspace for a few seconds - it did not move towards deep in the territory of Turkey. Erdogan may have shot down the Russian plane, because the violations of Turkish airspace by the Russian aviation since the beginning of October filled his patience and negatively affected his rating (Erdogan was used to Turkish aviation violating the airspace of other countries (e.g., Greece)). As for the time factor, in our opinion, Erdogan did not accidentally choose a day to shoot down the Russian plane. On November 24, 2009, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that Turkey is transitioning to the policy of neo-Ottomanism (on November 24, 1934, the Hagia Sophia Mosque was turned into a museum by order of Atatürk). Thus, Russia received an ‘Ottoman slap’ from Turkey.

2) Another similar case was registered less than 3 months after the 2016 military coup attempt. American pastor Andrew Brunson was arrested in Turkey, who was accused of having connections with the Gulen movement and the PKK. Erdogan was thus trying to exchange clerics with the US, hand over Brunson and get Fethullah Gülen instead, who, although he has been living in the US for a long time, has turned into Erdogans domestic number one enemy in recent years. After Turkish President Erdogan refused to release Brunson, on August 1, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on two senior Turkish government officials². Weeks later, Turkish-American relations began an economic struggle within the framework of international trade rules. As a result of Trump’s decision, the Turkish lira was significantly devalued, the consequences of which were felt by millions, if not tens of millions, of Turkish citizens. Finally, on October 12, 2018, Brunson was convicted, sentencing him to serve time, nevertheless accusing him of aiding terrorism³.

3) One of the clear examples of being guided by one’s own interests can be the implementation of the Istanbul Canal project, in which case Erdogan’s entourage will not

¹ Filipov, David, Kareem Fahim, and Liz Sly. 2016. “Turkish police officer, invoking Aleppo, guns down Russian ambassador in Ankara.” Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gunfire-wounds-russian-ambassador-in-turkey-reports-say/2016/12/19/ae32d1c8-c608-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html.

² U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2018. “Press Releases: Treasury Sanctions Turkish Officials with Leading Roles in Unjust Detention of U.S. Pastor Andrew Brunson.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm453>.

³ USCIRF. 2018. “Pastor Andrew Brunson.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.uscifr.gov/religious-prisoners-conscience/released-rpocs/pastor-andrew-brunson>.

only get the opportunity to get richer, but also, Erdogan will thereby increase his deep mark in the history of Turkey (Turks) and will perhaps become the implementer of the most expensive project in the history of Turkey (according to some data, the cost of the project may reach up to \$50 billion). In addition, Erdogan will implement the project dreamed by the most powerful Ottoman sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, and thereby surpass him to a certain extent. Obviously, there is no guarantee at the moment that foreign ships will prefer to forgo the free Bosphorus Strait and prefer to use the tolled Istanbul Canal. Besides, Erdogan has many options to ease the burden on the Black Sea straits, including the construction of 'Samsun-Ceyhan', so-called 'Turkish Stream' or 'Ignea-Sazlidere' (European part of Turkey) oil pipelines, etc (The Black Sea-Mediterranean high-speed highway and railway also contribute to the reduction of congestion in the Bosphorus). He could (has) made an agreement in advance with Putin, with whom he has warm relations, so that the Russian oil would not pass through the Black Sea straits, but through the land area of Turkey, through one of the pipelines mentioned by us (the construction of which is relatively cheap compared to the canal). In that case, he would have a guarantee before the start of the construction of the pipeline that it will be profitable for Turkey, while before the start of the construction of the Istanbul canal, he has no guarantee that it will be profitable.

4) The last episode that we would like to mention is the holding of the first prayer on July 24, 2020 in Hagia Sophia, which has already been converted into a mosque. In doing so, Erdogan thus became the 'Conqueror of Istanbul' and stood on the same level with the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II Fatih (the Conqueror), who captured Constantinople in 1453, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, whose army entered Istanbul abandoned by the Entente on October 6, 1923 (Ataturk is considered is the second conqueror of Istanbul). Erdogan turned Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020, when tourism in Turkey was just starting to recover after the coronavirus pandemic. Hagia Sophia is the most visited tourist destination in Turkey, with 3.7 million people a year (after becoming a mosque, the entrance to Hagia Sophia became free).

Regarding the time factor (symbolism), Erdogan scheduled the first prayer on July 24 (for first time in 86 years), which although coincides with the date of the signing of the Lausanne Agreement (1923), however, in our opinion, it had of secondary importance. On that day in 1999, Erdogan was released from prison, and we believe that appointing the first prayer of Hagia Sophia on that day, Erdogan was hinting that his release from prison brought great good to Turkey, just as the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque brought the Ottoman Empire in 1453. It is also interesting to turn Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020, because Erdogan could have done it in another year. Making Hagia Sophia a mosque in 2020 is perhaps related to the fact that July 24, 2020 was a Friday, which is convenient for the first Friday prayer. It is also interesting that Erdogan announced the date of first prayer (24 July) in Hagia Sophia on July 10 at 20:53. The latter symbolizes the year 2053, which Erdogan often speaks about in recent years as the 600th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans.

All this perhaps proves that Erdogan sometimes causes significant damage to Turkey with his unreasonable steps, guided by his own interests, goals and dreams. The research examines another similar episode, when Erdogan's actions simply weakened Turkey's defense capabilities and particularly its air force (Erdogan also did this as a result of

large-scale transformations and not reforms in the armed forces after the 2016 military coup attempt).

F-16 on the current agenda and the consequences of the purchase of S-400 systems

At the beginning of the 21st century, one of Turkey's weak points in the military sphere was the lack of long-range missile defense systems. In order to fill that gap, in the 2000s, the Turkish government gave the 'green light' to the T-LORAMIDS project (Long-range Air and Missile Defense System). T-LORAMIDS was designed to protect Turkey's strategically important infrastructures from medium-range ballistic missiles⁴ (Kibaroglu 2019; Guo 2017). It was emphasized that the project could also be useful for the local military industry. The promotion of the project was also connected with Iran's development of its own nuclear program and missile development.

The Turkish side justified this choice on different levels with 3 main criteria. The Chinese side agreed to the joint production of these systems (local production of the system in Turkey should be at least 50%), offered the cheapest price (\$3.44 billion, which is almost \$1 billion less than other options) and the most convenient time to hand over the systems to the Turkish side.

Thus, Turkey would become the first foreign buyer of HQ-9, but the US (also NATO) began to increase pressure on Turkey to reconsider the results of T-LORAMIDS. Turkey was forced to give way and canceled the results of T-LORAMIDS. In the fall of 2016, it became known that Turkey has decided to buy 4 divisions of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia, for which Turkey must pay Russia \$2.5 billion. Erdogan announced the signing of the corresponding agreement between the two countries on September 12, 2017. And on July 12, 2019, the Ministry of Defense of Turkey announced that the first batch of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles had already been received and showed the corresponding video. Thus, Turkey became the third country after Belarus and China to receive S-400 air defense systems. In fact, Turkey became the first NATO country to purchase S-400 air defense systems.

For the consequences of buying the S-400 systems from Turkey's point of view⁵, I have identified 4 main sectors, which have their own sub-sectors.

⁴ Darling, Dan. 2015. "Turkey's T-LORAMIDS Missile Defense System Edges Ever Further Away." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2015/09/16/turkeys-t-loramids-missile-defense-system-edges-ever-further-away/>.

⁵ Pamuk, Humeyra, and Andrea Shalal. 2022. "Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/biden-supports-f-16-sale-turkey-needs-congressional-approval-2022-06-30/>; Pamuk, Humeyra, and Mike Stone. 2021. "Turkey asks U.S. to buy 40 F-16 jets to upgrade Air Force-sources." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-seeks-40-f-16-jets-upgrade-air-force-sources-2021-10-07/>; Zengerle, Patricia. 2022 "U.S. House backs measure that would restrict sale of F-16s to Turkey." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-backs-measure-that-would-restrict-sale-f-16s-turkey-2022-07-14/>; Daily Sabah. 2022a. "US 'should sell' F-16s to Turkey, Biden says in strongest backing yet." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/us-should-sell-f-16s-to-turkey-biden-says-in-strongest-backing-yet>; Hurriyetdailynews.com. 2022. "US sale of F-16s to Türkiye cannot be conditional: Defense minister." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-sale-of-f-16s-to-turkiye-cannot-be-conditional-defense-minister->

1. Failure to receive Patriot systems

By buying S-400 systems from Russia, Turkey deprived itself of American Patriot systems. Were the S-400 systems better than the Patriot systems, or more precisely, was the most correct option from Turkey's point of view to buy the S-400 systems? This question is precisely answered by Turkish experts. In January 2019, The Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) published a report "Strategic weapon systems in the Turkey-Russia-US triangle" (Kasapoğlu and Ülgen 2019). They emphasize that due to security concerns, the Patriot package is compatible for a NATO member country⁶. This means that only for non-NATO countries can Russian air defense systems be a good option, that is, if the country has a Soviet/Russian air defense and missile defense architecture, seeking to deploy Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) assets (Radomyski 2021; Kemp 2020). Overall, while the S-400 appears to be a more powerful air defense system with superior A2/AD performance, the Patriot system, especially when combined with the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (NATO IAMD)⁷, offers more effective ballistic missile defense solutions (Kazan 2005; Dalsjö, Berglund and Jonsson 2019).

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) has great importance for Turkey and depends on a complex architecture⁸. S-400s cannot be integrated into Turkey's existing NATO-compatible command and control networks. This would greatly limit its BMD capability. The NATO-compatible Patriot systems will link Turkey's missile defense capabilities in a phase with the Allied architecture, enabling multi-layered interception. In the S-400 variant, this will not be possible. In autonomous mode, the Russian SAM will have only limited early warning, tracking and monitoring capabilities. Due to political, budgetary and technological constraints, Ankara cannot compensate for NATO's integrated air and missile defense architecture in the short to medium term. Therefore, the S-400 variant will be doomed to unrealized potential. Also, there is no reliable SAM configuration as there are no purchases that will operate at different layers with the S-400 (e.g., SA-17, SA-22 [Pantsir Family]). Without network-centric architecture and acceptable SAM configuration, a strategic weapon system such as the S-400 will not yield the desired results. Although the S-400 brings the experience of deployment under real conflict conditions, it has no combat record. Meanwhile, over the last three years, Patriot systems intercepted more than 100 ballistic missiles.

Turkish defense planners will be able to more easily manage their personnel needs for SAM systems compared to fighters. Theoretically, SAM systems have other advantages as well. In terms of defense economy, especially in a period when the transition from fourth generation to fifth generation aircraft is made, the operation of SAM systems can be less costly when compared to high technology aircraft. In operational terms, SAM systems have longer mission times than combat air patrols and

175470; Savunmasanayist.com. 2022a. "Başkan DEMİR'den 'İkinci Parti S-400' Açıklaması." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.savunmasanayist.com/baskan-demirden-ikinci-parti-s-400-aciklamasi/>.

⁶ NATO. 2022. "NATO Support to Türkiye." Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_92140.htm.

⁷ NATO. 2022. "NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence." Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm.

⁸ Erdurmaz, Ali Serdar. 2017. "NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Systems and Turkey." Accessed August 1, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.org.tr/nato-ballistic-missile-defence-systems-and-turkey/#_ftn1.

offer a continuous capability. In addition, these systems are less cumbersome and do not require or require less complex infrastructures required for fighter squadrons.

On the other hand, it should be noted that SAM systems play in a much narrower field in terms of their task flexibility. Warplanes, especially 5th generation aircraft, offer very different solutions to political-military decision makers - deep impact, power projection, air-ground missions, electronic warfare, intelligence and target detection, missions for surface platforms, destruction of enemy ballistic missiles launchers. Also, SAM-oriented force planning is not possible for countries such as Turkey, which have a wide geography and problematic geographical conditions in terms of radar systems in many places. In the air defense planning of the states in the aforementioned category, SAM systems can only be complementary elements that will work together with warplanes (Kasapoğlu 2021; Kasapoğlu and Ülgen 2019).

In addition, tests show that data from F-35 sensors can be transferred to the Patriot air & missile defense system in real-time via Northrop Grumman's new production IBCS (integrated air and missile defense battle command system) command & control network (in the 2018 package proposed to Turkey, there was no IBCS configuration, which was still under development for that period). This will mean that the superior sensors of the F-35 will also be a part of the missile defense network, with the right network-centric architecture planning. As a matter of fact, the tests show that the AN/APG-81 AESA radar and AN/AAQ-37 DAS (Distributed Aperture System) systems, which are the most important sensors of the F-35, can detect ballistic missiles. It seems difficult for Turkey to prepare a force and make a defense planning based on SAM systems, and especially the S-400, which it has recently added to its inventory, similar to the A2/AD concepts. First of all, the S-400 strategic SAM system, which has just entered the inventory and is currently undergoing firing tests, is not currently dependent on a network-centric architecture. Also, there is no reliable SAM configuration as there are no purchases that will operate at different layers with the S-400. Without network-centric architecture and acceptable SAM configuration, a strategic weapon system such as the S-400 will not yield the desired results.

The S-400 strategic SAM system in the Turkish Armed Forces inventory will be deprived of the network-centered architecture mentioned above with the relevant references. For this reason, it will not be possible to receive information from different sensors (for example, Peace Eagle AWACS aircraft in the Turkish Air Force inventory and NATO-compatible radar infrastructure); as well as enemy SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) activity, especially anti-radiation and cruise missile threats. Besides, (as shows the example of the Greek Air Force), air threat perception is shifting from 4th generation platforms to 5th generation platforms. Existing military science literature indicates that modern Russian strategic SAM systems, such as the S-300V4, S-400, built on the late Soviet experience, are extremely competitive against the 4th and 4.5th generation platforms of NATO countries - for example, the F-16, F/A18 and other similar ones. On the other hand, the situation is different against 5th generation platforms (e.g., F-35, F-22) and stealth design philosophy (Kasapoğlu 2021).

I think that, the above makes it obvious that it would be much more profitable and useful for NATO member Turkey, to buy American Patriot systems than to buy S-400 systems from (Putin's) Russia.

2. Failure to get F-35 fighter jets

By purchasing S-400 systems from Russia, Turkey created new *realpolitik*, as it actually created difficulties and deprived itself of American F-35 fighters (Kasapoğlu and Ülgen 2019). Between modern air defense systems and 5th generation stealth platforms, a hunt & hunter game played in the electromagnetic spectrum, which can only be grasped with a good understanding of radar theory, continues, and the roles of prey and hunter in the mentioned game change depending on different inputs. First of all, it should be known that the radars of modern SAM systems can detect some 5th generation platforms with a certain ambiguity. On the other hand, the military significance of the said 'detection' will basically depend on two parameters.

First of all, at what distance was the 5th generation fighter jet in the scenario detected? Because, aircraft such as the F-35 can hit SAM systems with very long-range smart missiles without entering the distances that they would be detected by SAM systems, and they can even direct missiles to be launched from other 4th or 4.5 generation friendly platforms to their targets. Therefore, in the case of Turkey, it is very difficult for the S-400 system, which will not be integrated into any network-centric architecture, to detect F-35s belonging to the Greek Air Force or the United Arab Emirates Air Force at a 'significant range'.

Platforms with low visibility and high electronic warfare capabilities, such as the F-35, can approach SAM systems more than 4th and 4.5 generation warplanes. Within the framework of the network-centric operation, the F-35 and similar warplanes can not only aim at their targets themselves, but also attack together with friendly warplanes and direct intelligent air-ground cruise missiles to the target.

Theoretically, it would be possible for F-35s belonging to the Greek Air Force or, more remotely, the United Arab Emirates Air Force to approach Turkish air defense without entering the 'meaningful detection' network of the S-400s. In this case, the F-35s in the relevant scenario, for example, will be able to perform network-centric operations with Rafale 4.5 generation warplanes and direct the air-to-ground cruise missiles carried by these aircraft. In summary, the F-35 is an information superiority value.

The second fundamental issue is the set of sensors required by a system such as the S-400 to detect and shoot down a fighter aircraft such as the F-35 in a meaningful way. Stealth planes are not invisible. The definition that best sums up the stealth quality can be described as a low-visibility design in the electromagnetic spectrum, in a certain radar band range. Especially low-visibility attributes on aircraft in the tactical military aviation framework are generally geared towards the electromagnetic spectrum between the S-band and Ku-band. In this case, the radar detectability of said platforms will be much more pronounced, for example for the VHF band; however, detection does not necessarily mean transmitting target data to the SAM system, where it will engage the target with precision.

However, as we have seen in the example of the Russian Federation, high-level structures such as the NEBO M that combine search systems in very different bands and

frequency segments are required to detect low-visibility warplanes. As can be seen from the open-source publications and the images of the tests carried out so far, Turkey's S-400 acquisition does not include the NEBO M-like anti-stealth radar array. For this reason, it does not seem possible to detect 5th generation platforms such as the F-35 at significant distances and with military value, and to make the said detection before the F-35 is close enough to attack with the weapon systems it carries.

Turkey has a serious ballistic missile problem in its regional security environment. It is of great importance to respond to the ballistic missile problem with offensive deep-impact deterrence as well as defensive strategic weapon systems. In this context, the F-35 is considered to be a serious loss.

Finally, it should be noted that the F-35 JSF is a very effective electronic warfare platform. Therefore, the acquisition of such a capability by the Greek Air Force will also pose a problem for Turkey's SAM-centered air defense planning. In summary, it is difficult for Turkey to compensate for the 5th generation warplane and 4.5 generation intermediate solution problem with SAM systems.

Essentially, the Republic of Turkey planned to purchase 100 F-35A variants for the Turkish Air Force. On the other hand, there were indications that an F-35B variant (Yenisafak.com 2022) could be purchased with TCG Anadolu to be used in the naval aviation capacity of the Turkish Navy. That's why another complication of Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 project is the obstacles to the use of the TCG Anadolu Amphibious Assault Ship as a 'mini-aircraft carrier'. Currently, there is no option for TCG Anadolu other than the F-35B. Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 project has been a potential loss not only for the Turkish Air Force, but also for the Turkish Navy's naval aviation capability. As it is known, Ankara has planned to add the TCG Anadolu Amphibious Assault Ship to its inventory as a mini-aircraft carrier with the addition of a ski-jump and other modifications. The only suitable candidate in the international arms market for the aforementioned plans is the F-35B, STOVL variant. Eliminating the possibility of the F-35B will mean that TCG Anadolu's mission capacity as a mini-aircraft carrier cannot be built in the short and medium term. As a power projection and amphibious attack platform, TCG Anadolu will certainly preserve its military value and will constitute one of the most important capabilities of the Turkish Naval Forces. On the other hand, if TCG Anadolu was armed with F-35Bs, its functions would be completely different, for example, in Libya, in the Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics struggle or in the Aegean (Kasapoğlu 2021).

It should be noted that Turkey currently develops the Bayraktar TB3 UAV, which is designed to be deployed on TCG Anadolu. According to the Turkish side, 30-50 attack UAV will be placed on the 232-meter long TCG Anadolu, and TCG Anadolu will become the first aircraft carrier armed with attack UAV in the world (the Turkish side was forced to make certain changes in TCG Anadolu)⁹. In addition, Turkey plans to

⁹ Yenisafak.com. 2022. "Türkiye dünyada bir ilke hazırlanıyor: Dev savaş gemisinden ilk uçuşunu yapacak." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.yenisafak.com/foto-galeri/ekonomi/turkiye-dunyada-bir-ilke-hazirlaniyor-bayraktar-tb3-siha-tcg-anadoludan-ilk-ucusunu-yapacak-2061337>.

deploy its Bayraktar Kızılelma (Red Apple) future unmanned fighter aircraft on Anadolu (according to Erdogan, no unmanned fighter aircraft exists in any country in the world)¹⁰.

In any case, it is obvious that both the Bayraktar TB3 UAV and the Kızıl Elma unmanned fighter aircraft are significantly inferior to the F-35B in their parameters, and there is no need to compare them. As a result, the scope and possibilities of TCG Anadolu's activities will be significantly limited. Turkish experts also emphasize this: "Many important experts today regard the Karabakh War as a historical turning point for robotic warfare and UAV systems. On the other hand, UAV's success will not yet mean that UAVs will prevail over manned platforms in air-air engagements and algorithms will leave the pilots completely out of the cockpit. Although there is a potential for change in artificial intelligence and algorithmic warfare in the coming years, air warfare parameters are still shaped around manned platforms. With current defense technologies, it is not possible for Turkey to fill the 5th generation air warfare gap with UAVs and light attack aircraft (Hürkuş-C)" (Kasapoğlu 2021).

Not getting F-35 fighter jets actually has quite a negative impact on the capabilities of both the Turkish Air Force and Navy, and the defense capability of the whole of Turkey in general. Turkey, which is considered a regional superpower, continues to have only fourth-generation fighter jets and thus gradually falls behind even the countries of the region, such as Israel, Greece, UAE, Qatar, Egypt.

The problem is especially acute in the case of Greece, with which Turkey's relations are regularly strained due to issues related to the Aegean Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus and a number of other issues. In recent years, Greece has begun to strengthen its air force, has begun to receive from France 24 Rafale fighter jets, including of the 4.5 generation, and plans to receive at least 20 F-35A from the United States in the current decade. The military strategic balance with Greece changes in favor of Athens in the air power segment.

Against the background of these steps of Greece, Turkey has difficulties in purchasing even 4.5 generation F-16 fighters and modernizing the F-16 fighters it has. As an intermediate solution, Turkey is also trying to buy Rafale fighter jets from France¹¹, or Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets from United Kingdom¹². It is also possible that Turkey will try to buy Saab JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters from Sweden (to achieve that goal, Turkey may create new obstacles regarding Sweden's NATO membership)¹³.

The experts of the SETA think tank, which is considered the brain of the ruling AKP party in Turkey, emphasize that in the armament program, Greece has emphasized the strengthening of its air force, because it considers that only thanks to the air force it is possible to quickly accumulate effective force in a certain area and thus overcome its

¹⁰ Ekonomi Haberleri. 2022. "KIZILELMA yeni bir dönem başlatacak! Sahadaki dengeler değişiyor." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://ekonomi.haber7.com/ekonomi/haber/3225322-kizilelma-yeni-bir-donem-baslatacak-sahadaki-dengeler-degisiyor>.

¹¹ Haber7.com. 2022. "Ta Nea: Türkiye Fransa'dan Rafale savaş uçaklarını istedi." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.haber7.com/dunya/haber/3242559-ta-nea-turkiye-fransadan-rafale-savas-ucaklarini-istedi>.

¹² CNN Türk. 2022. "Türkiye Eurofighter uçağı alacak mı?" Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.cnnturk.com/video/dunya/turkiye-eurofighter-ucagi-alacak-mi>.

¹³ Kurunç, Kamer. 2022. "Türkiye, İsveç'ten Gripen savaş uçağı alır mı?" Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://haber.gdh.digital/turkiye-isvecten-gripen-savas-ucagi-alir-mi/>.

own geographical vulnerability, which derives from the dispersion of its islands, their distance from the mainland, and their lack of territorial depth. Also, it is taken into account that only the Air Force is able to operate effectively both in the air, on land, and at sea and ensure qualitative excellence.

Greece believes that a possible military escalation with Turkey will initially be limited to the air/sea domain of the Aegean Sea, and this itself limits the overwhelming superiority of Turkish land power, allowing Greece to achieve a rough parity with Turkish military capabilities. For this reason, Greece has long perceived the achievement and maintenance of air superiority as a 'game-changing' factor against Turkey. Fighter jets play a particularly important role in achieving this goal.

SETA experts believe that Greece's ultimate goal is to achieve superiority over Turkey's armed forces and thereby change the status quo in the Aegean Sea, in the Eastern Mediterranean (to outplay Turkey in terms of energy reserves) and in Cyprus (to eliminate the Turkish military presence)¹⁴.

In their report titled 'The hardest ten years in Turkish airpower', EDAM experts note: "The Turkish Air Force and Turkey's air warfare capabilities are facing a serious test in the next 10 to 20 years. Although the title of the report includes the phrase 'the hardest decade', the 5th generation problem of the Turkish Air Force may continue in the 2030s. Given the regional trends in armament of the Turkish Air Force, which at this stage are overcoming complex geopolitical challenges, ahead of Turkey in combat aircraft.

Currently, many air forces around the world fly with 5th generation platforms (e.g., F-35) (e.g., UK, USA, Israel etc). Some other air forces are purchasing intermediate solutions that qualify as 4.5 or 4++ (e.g., Greece [Rafale], Egyptian Arab Air Force [Su-35]). Some countries that are manufacturers and operators of 4.5 generation platforms are also making 6th generation air power plans for the 2040s based on the mentioned intermediate solutions (e.g., France & Germany with their 6th generation projects and Sweden with the Tempest Project led by London).

While observing the trends outlined above in the world, the Turkish Air Force currently relies heavily on the 4th generation F-16s as fixed-wing combat platforms (though a smaller number of modernized F-4 2020s are nearing the end of their life in the inventory). Under normal conditions, while the 5th generation F-35 JSF would enter the inventory, it was not possible to acquire the said capability due to the purchase of the S-400 strategic SAM system from the Russian Federation. The entry of the National Combat Aircraft (MMU), another 5th generation project of Turkey, into the inventory and starting to create a meaningful deterrent force will find the window of 2030-2040 with various optimistic and pessimistic forecasts. In summary, if an intermediate solution is not found, Turkish air power will fall behind the trends in the world.

The roles of the 4th and 4.5 generation aircraft did not end with the entry of the 5th generation into the inventory. Modernization efforts, especially digital technological infrastructure developments, will continue to keep these platforms in inventory. Moreover, not every airspace may require 5th generation capabilities. The anti-DEAS coalition or air operations in Afghanistan are examples of this threat environment. On the other hand, it is clear that the 5th generation platforms will create a capability

¹⁴ Öncel, Rıfat. 2022. "Yunanistan'ın hava kuvvetleri modernizasyonu ve ittifak ilişkileri." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.setav.org/rapor-yunanistanin-hava-kuvvetleri-modernizasyonu-ve-ittifak-iliskileri/>.

multiplier effect for the 4th and 4.5 generation warplanes. To put it more clearly, great differences should be expected between the combat capacity of a force with only 4th generation inventory and the combat capacity of a force that has 4th and 5th generation aircraft together.

Air forces of many states within NATO have started to add fifth generation warplanes to their inventories. As in the case of France and Germany, some other countries also plan to move directly to sixth-generation capabilities, continuing to use 4.5-generation platforms as an interim solution. The Turkish Armed Forces does not have a separate air defense force. For this reason, as seen in the S-400 example, basic and strategic air defense missions are also gathered under the Turkish Air Force. Naval and land forces, on the other hand, have air defense capabilities commensurate with their mission portfolios and are being developed. Current defense economy trends and the situation in the international arms market make it difficult for Turkey to find an interim solution and make ready-made purchases for a 4.5 generation aircraft.

Various Turkish media sources stated that Ankara should follow an eclectic road map to compensate for the operational problems arising from its exit from the F-35 program. The aforementioned views focused on easing the burden on the F-16s, which constitute the deterrent center of the Turkish air power. For the aforementioned purpose, more intensive production/use of UAVs, delaying the retirement of the F-4 2020s and the use of light attack aircraft such as Hürkuş-C are listed. The F-35 is a 'deep strike' aircraft that will infiltrate enemy airspace and destroy high-value targets, especially when it carries intelligent air-to-ground cruise missiles with a range of hundreds of kilometers, such as the SOM-J. Neither the Hürkuş-C nor the 4th generation aircraft in the inventory will be capable of penetrating into sectors where the deep impact and intense enemy air defenses that the F-35 will bring along.

Scans from generally accepted military databases indicate that there are around 20 - 30 F-4 2020 variants and 230-260 F-16 variants in various blocks (Block 30, Block 50 and Block 50+) in the Turkish Air Force inventory. The Turkish Air Force's plan is (was) to gradually retire the said inventory (first the F-4 2020s and then the F-16s starting from Block 30) in the 2020s and 2030s, while at least 100 F-35A JSF and a large number of MMUs (National Combat Aircraft) were to create a force equipped with 5th generation platforms, numerically expressed in hundreds. In this context, Turkey is faced with a serious problem. Its withdrawal from the F-35 consortium greatly disrupted Ankara's defense planning. In addition, the domestic 5th generation fighter aircraft (TF-X - 'Turkish Fighter') project seems to begin to enter the inventory only in the 2030 - 2040 band. Various problems in MMU's project process, especially engine technology and its international cooperation portfolio in this context may extend the time to enter the inventory.

The risk that the Turkish Air Force will not be able to have as modern a capacity as the inventories of its competitors in the world and in the region in the next 10-20 years should be taken seriously. Fourth generation F-16s will continue to be the center of Turkey's air power in the coming period and will underline an unacceptable disadvantage for Turkey against countries that have switched to fifth generation technologies. Turkey's current defense economy and options in the international arms market also limit possible intermediate solutions.

In summary, as long as Ankara does not go to an urgent interim solution or there is no change in F-35 deliveries, we evaluate that the air power parity will change in favor of Athens in a period of 10 years with an optimistic forecast and up to 20 years in a pessimistic scenario. Although the MMU was shown as a substitute for the F-35, Turkey's main defense plan was to create a 5th generation air force based on MMU air superiority aircraft and F-35 multirole fighter jets. This fact should be kept in mind while planning defense. The 2020s and 2030s will bring a serious test for Turkish air power" (Kasapoğlu 2021).

The above proves that Turkey's failure to receive 120 units of F-35 (including the limitation of the capabilities of TCG Anadolu 'mini-aircraft carrier') is an extremely strong blow for both the country's air force and navy, and the defense ability of the whole of Turkey in general, its geopolitical role, and great foreign policy ambitions.

3. F-35 program withdrawal

The purchase of S-400 systems from Russia led to the fact that Turkey was excluded from the list of 9 countries involved in the production of the F-35. But this had a negative impact, as Turkish supplier companies, which contributed to the F-35 program by producing 937 types of parts, risk losing at least \$ 9 billion due to the exit¹⁵. By the way after Turkey's withdrawal from the F-35 program, Erdogan always announces that they will return the money spent within the framework of that program¹⁶. It is also bad news for Turkey that in July 2022 Greece has submitted a request letter to the United States to join its F-35 stealth fighter jet program and is lobbying for the bid in Washington while calling on officials to oppose Turkey's purchase of F-16s (Athens sent its official letter of request to buy 20 F-35As last month)¹⁷.

Thus, Turkey's withdrawal from the F-35 program is both a big blow to the production capacity of Turkish military-industrial companies, a financial blow to Turkey, and a big blow to Turkey's reputation, given the global importance of the F-35 project.

4. CAATSA

The decision of the Turkish political leadership to buy S-400 systems from Russia, however, Turkey came under US sanctions under CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)¹⁸.

CAATSA has listed various types of sanctions threats that can be given. There are at least twelve types of sanctions that can be imposed on Turkey based on CAATSA. Based on CAATSA's legal documents, the President of the United States is obligated to impose

¹⁵ Haber Türk. 2019. "F-35 kararı hangi Türk şirketleri etkileyecek?" Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.haberturk.com/f-35-karari-hangi-turk-sirketleri-etkileyecek-2505524-ekonomi>.

¹⁶ Al Arabiya Network. 2021. "Erdogan: Turkey will recoup \$1.4 bln paid to US for F-35 jets 'one way or another'." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2021/10/22/Erdogan-Turkey-will-recoup-1-4-bln-paid-to-US-for-F-35-jets-one-way-or-another->.

¹⁷ Ahvalnews.com. 2022. "Greece set to join F-35 programme as Turkey's F-16 purchase stalls." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://ahvalnews.com/greece-f35s/greece-set-join-f-35-programme-turkeys-f-16-purchase-stalls>.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State. 2020. "The United States Sanctions Turkey Under CAATSA 231: Press Statement Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/index.html>; Macias, Amanda. 2020. "U.S. sanctions Turkey over purchase of Russian S-400 missile system." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-s400.html>.

at least 5 kinds of sanctions out of a total of 12 possible sanctions. Senator Lindsey Graham stated that although Turkey continues to buy the S-400, none of the CAATSA sanctions should be imposed as long as the S-400 is not operationalized. Based on the timeline of Turkey's acquisition of the S-400 agreed in 2017, President Donald Trump did not immediately impose CAATSA sanctions. President Donald Trump and members of his cabinet seemed reluctant to impose sanctions on Turkey immediately. President Donald Trump and his cabinet's reluctance to immediately impose CAATSA sanctions and instead seem to protect Turkey can be seen on numerous occasions. Even after Turkey received the S-400 from Russia in mid-2019, President Trump's government has not imposed sanctions.

The bilateral meeting between President Trump and President Erdogan on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka in 2019 is evidence of President Trump's reluctance to impose CAATSA sanctions immediately. When asked by journalists after the bilateral meeting, President Trump explicitly stated that he would seek other solutions to resolve the issue. Erdogan believed that his good personal relations with President Trump are one of the reasons why the imposition of CAATSA sanctions is not imaginable. While previously the United States government demanded Turkey to cancel the planned acquisition, before the arrival of the S-400 to Turkey, the United States later demanded that Turkey not operationalize it. At the time United States Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo stated that the United States wanted Turkey to not operationalize the S-400. However, this claim was again rejected by Turkey (Triantama et al. 2022).

Likely the most damaging sanction is a prohibition on granting specific U.S. export licenses and authorizations for any goods or technology. This may directly impact billions of dollars' worth of potential business, as the United States historically has been the largest exporter of weapons to Turkey. Turkey's defense industry relies on imported parts to manufacture high-quality products for export. If parts can't be imported from America, companies will find alternatives - perhaps not as good as their Western counterparts, but significantly cheaper. By using such substitutes, Turkey might produce lower quality products and damage its brand, but it might also make cheaper products and open new markets. Where Turkish industries lack capacity, sanctions will undermine readiness, obstruct planned upgrades to the Turkish Armed Forces, and hamper the export-driven growth of the Turkish defense industry. For example, engine building has been one of the weaker elements of Turkish industries, especially for defense, but also for general aviation, as was vividly displayed in the Altay tank project, now delayed for years for lack of appropriate engines and transmissions¹⁹.

Here I would like to mention separately to the deal with Pakistan on the T129 ATAK helicopter pointed out by the Turkish expert, because it should have become the largest export deal of Turkey's military industry²⁰. Although the deal for the sale of 30 units of T129 ATAK helicopters between the parties was signed in 2018, it has not been

¹⁹ Işık, Yörük. 2021. "CAATSA sanctions are hurting Turkey's military readiness at a time when NATO can't afford it." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/caatsa-sanctions-are-hurting-turkeys-military-readiness-time-when-nato-cant-afford-it>.

²⁰ *ibid*.

implemented due to US sanctions. Pakistan regularly extends the implementation of the deal for Turkey by 6 months²¹.

In January 2022, Turkish pro-government media reported that Pakistan, due to the US embargo, backed out of a \$1.5 billion deal to acquire 30 attack helicopters from Turkey²².

Erdogan's motives for buying the S-400 systems

The above in essence proves that it was beneficial for Turkey, a member of NATO, not to buy the S-400 systems, because it deprived Turkey of Patriot systems that integrate with NATO systems, 100 units of F-35A for its air force and 20 units of F-35B for its navy. Besides, Turkey was officially kicked out from the F-35 program and came under US sanctions (CAATSA) with various consequences. In this context, the question arises as to why Turkey finally preferred to buy S-400 Russian systems.

The Turkish side could not be unaware of the consequences in case of buying the Russian systems, because the USA has repeatedly warned it at various levels in advance that Turkey cannot have both the S-400 and the F-35 on its territory at the same time, that Turkey has to make a choice between them. And Turkey made that choice in the summer of 2019 in favor of the S-400.

In our opinion, at the root of all this lies the personal factor of Erdogan, who bought S-400 air defense systems and thus deliberately thwarted the appearance of F-35s in Turkey. The problem is related to the attempted military coup of 2016, in which the rebels' aviation (F-16) played a major role. It carried out a total of 13 airstrikes in the direction of 6 important buildings, including the presidential residence (not the building itself, but its territory) and the country's parliament, and also chased the presidential plane²³.

As a result, Erdogan, who is internally convinced that the US orchestrated the attempted military coup, decided not to buy US-made Patriot air defense systems and to buy S-400s, which recognize US F-16s (also F-35s) as 'foe', while the Patriot 'friend' (IFF, Identification, friend or foe). Erdogan, perhaps, realized that if he buys F-35s, during the next possible military coup (or simply in the case of internal airstrikes) he can be threatened not by F-16, but by F-35, and for him will be much more difficult to avoid an assassination attempt (Erdogan perhaps was also wary of deploying the Patriot system near Ankara and Istanbul fearing a possible missile strike).

²¹ Euronews. 2021. "Türkiye'nin Pakistan'a ATAK helikopter satışı ABD engelini aşamıyor: Ankara'ya 6 ay süre." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://tr.euronews.com/2021/03/16/turkiye-nin-pakistan-a-atak-helikopter-sat-s-abd-engelini-asam-yor-ankara-ya-6-ay-sure>.

²² Daily Sabah. 2022b. "Pakistan cancels Turkish chopper deal amid US license deadlock." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/pakistan-cancels-turkish-chopper-deal-amid-us-license-deadlock>; TRT World. 2022. "Pakistan denies cancellation of helicopter deal with Türkiye." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.trtworld.com/asia/pakistan-denies-cancellation-of-helicopter-deal-with-turkiye-53408>.

²³ Sabah.com.tr. 2016. "6 ayrı noktaya 13 bomba atılmış." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/08/21/6-ayri-noktaya-13-bomba-atilmis>.

In addition, Erdogan may have feared that Turkish pilots training on F-35s in the US could be recruited by the US (Gülenists) and used against him. Half a month after the purchase of the first batch of S-400s by Turkey, it became known that the Turkish pilots who appropriated the 4 F-35 given to Turkey in the US territory are returning to Turkey, and those 4 fighters remain in Arizona²⁴.

About a month before the delivery date of the S-400 defense system, the US administration ended the training of forty-two Turkish citizens who were trained in the use of F-35 aircraft. Students continuing their education at Luke Military Air Base in Arizona, USA, and Eglin Military Air Base in Florida, were asked to leave the country by July 31, 2019. Former Deputy Minister Shanahan sent the corresponding letter to his counterpart Hulusi Akar on 6 June 2019 (Yücel 2020).

It is nameable that Erdogan immediately deployed the purchased S-400s in Istanbul and Ankara (where he is usually based) and began testing these systems on F-16s flying at various altitudes (despite the fact that the US had called after the purchase not to use those systems)²⁵. In this context, we would like to quote the following words of Kibaroglu: “Due to the limited number of S-400 battalions and the extent of the area each one of them would cover, the system can only operate on “stand alone” mode, and therefore, only the strategic locations of major cities, selected military installations, and critical infrastructure and industrial sites would be protected” (Kibaroglu 2019).

In order to understand the whole problem, it is important to emphasize the importance of the time factor, as well as Erdogan’s ‘symbolic strikes’ tactics. In this context, I have identified four factors:

The fact that Turkey decided to buy 4 divisions of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia became known in November 2016²⁶, in other words, shortly after the attempted military coup.

Erdogan announced the signing of the agreement on the purchase of S-400 systems on September 12, 2017, in a conversation with journalists on the plane returning from Kazakhstan to Turkey. And it coincides with the day of the bloodiest military coup in the history of Turkey (1980), whose organizers (former Chief of the General Staff) Kenan Evren and Tahsin Shahinkaya (former commander of the Turkish Air Force) were sentenced to life imprisonment during the reign of Erdogan (in 2014). Erdogan thus tried to show that even such crimes committed more than 30 years ago cannot go unpunished. By the way, it is the first time in the history of Turkey that the former president of the country stands before the court (Evren became the president of Turkey after the military coup, and he is the only president who was not elected by the Turkish parliament or the people).

²⁴ Diken.com.tr. 2019. “Türk F-35 pilotları ABD’den dönüyor: Satın alınan dört F-35 Arizona’da kaldı.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.diken.com.tr/turk-f-35-pilotlari-abdden-donuyor-satin-alinan-dort-f-35-arizonada-kaldi/>.

²⁵ Bir Gün. 2020. “S-400 sistemlerinin Türkiye’de Amerikan savaş uçaklarına karşı test edildiği iddia edildi.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.birgun.net/haber/s-400-sistemlerinin-turkiye-de-amerikan-savas-ucaklarina-karsi-test-edildi-iddia-edildi-307770>.

²⁶ Kısacık, Sina. 2017. “S-400 hava savunma sistemi: Türk-Rus ilişkilerinde yeni bir işbirliği sahası mı?” Accessed August 1, 2022. <http://politikaakademisi.org/2017/03/23/s-400-hava-savunma-sistemi-turk-rus-iliskilerinde-yeni-bir-isbirligi-sahasi-mi/>.

The first batch of S-400s was delivered to Turkey on July 12, 2019, and in our opinion, this is not a coincidence either. On July 12, 1947, the first agreement (on military aid) was signed between the USA and Turkey. Thus Erdogan hints at the anti-American direction of buying S-400s.

And finally, the history of T-LORAMIDS shows that in the past, Erdogan was not in a hurry to buy long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, but after the July 15 coup attempt, he suddenly began rushing and completed the whole deal in less than three years (autumn 2016 - summer 2019).

After the purchase of the first batch of S-400s, the purchase of the second batch of S-400s by Turkey also appeared on the agenda. The new military deal with Russia is extremely important for Turkey, because otherwise it will not get the technologies for the production of S-400s. In the past, the U.S. has refused to give Turkey production technology for the Patriot (as well as software codes for the F-35s), and Turkey has seen Russia as more willing to provide technology for the S-400. However, it turned out that Turkey, which bought the first batch of S-400s, will receive them only if it buys the second batch of S-400s. As a result, Erdogan was also deprived of a partial justification as to why he bought S-400s and began to falsify, claiming that the US refused to sell Patriot systems to Turkey. However, it is obvious that if Turkey buys the second batch of S-400s after all this, the sanctions will be significantly tightened.

Erdogan was trying to create the impression that due to the actions of the USA, he is also "forced" to buy Su-35 and Su-57 fighter jets from Russia²⁷. However, Turkish experts are sure that it is a bluff. They emphasize that equipping the fighter aviation of Turkey with Russian planes will mean changing the entire system, infrastructure, which was created in line with NATO standards in recent decades, and that process will take 30-40 years and cost hundreds of billions of dollars, meanwhile, Turkey has neither that much time nor that much money²⁸. In addition, it is obvious that in this case too, Turkey will come under new American sanctions.

Thus Erdogan's steps have put Turkey in a dead end situation, which cannot equip its air force with American planes (F-35) on the one hand, and Russian (perhaps also Chinese) planes (Su-35, Su-57) on the other (plus the complications involved in creating the TF-X). Buying S-400s and thereby weakening Turkey's defense capability is one of the clearest examples that Erdogan is primarily guided by his personal and not Turkey's state interests. In July 2017 Turkish, French and Italian companies signed the first agreement within the scope of the project to develop Turkey's own air and missile defense system and Minister of National Defense of Turkey Fikri Işık announced during that ceremony that the S-400 was purchased for Turkey's urgent needs: "The work we started with EUROSAM is the cooperation that Turkey will make in the

²⁷ DW.com. 2019a. "Erdogan'dan Su-57 açıklaması." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdoğandan-su-57-açıklaması-abd-tutumunu-sürdürürse-başımızın-çaresine-bakarız/a-50233789>.

²⁸ DW.com. 2019b. "Türkiye'yi zorlayan tercih: F-35 mi, Su-57 mi?" Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyeyi-zorlayan-tercih-f-35-mi-su-57-mi/a-50241510>.

development of its own air and missile defense system.” he said²⁹. Işık’s words prove that the purchase of S-400s is intended to solve short-term, and cooperation with Eurosam - middle/long-term problems in the sector of air and missile defense system.

The state interest of Turkey, a member of NATO, demanded to buy Patriot air defense systems and thus also get F-35s, to stay in their production program, not to receive American sanctions and not to join the ranks of the US’s adversaries, not to get problems within the framework of NATO. However, Erdogan’s personal interest demanded the purchase of S-400s (including without the technology to manufacture them), and Erdogan went ahead with it without any hesitation. He did the same, when without any hesitation fired hundreds of ‘Gülen pilots’ from the air force after the July 15 coup attempt. As a result, the Turkish Air Force faced a serious pilot shortage following the July 15 coup attempt and was forced to rely on ‘Turkish Airlines’ (‘6 months in the Turkish Armed Forces, 6 months in Turkish Airlines’ model) and Pakistani pilots³⁰.

Conclusion and discussion

In the summer of 2019 President Erdogan said that Turkey’s preference for the S-400 air defense system was influenced not only by the ‘affordable prices’, but also by the opportunity to start joint production with Russia³¹. In another case, after the arrival of the S-400s, President Erdogan said, “We are not preparing for war. We guarantee peace and our national security. It was imperative to buy the S-400s”³². Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stressed that Turkey needs Russian S-400 missiles to strengthen its national security, since NATO protects only one third of Turkish airspace (Buhari Gulmez 2020).

In March 2019, Anadolu news agency published an article on Turkey’s reasons for buying S-400 systems and not choosing Patriot systems. “Why is Turkey buying the S-400 and not the Patriot? Due to the USA’s refusal to share the technical specifications of the Patriots with Turkey and the high cost of the system, Ankara started to work on the purchase of air defense systems from different countries. After Russia met Turkey’s expectations in terms of price, delivery, joint production and technology transfer, Ankara

²⁹ Yeniasya.com.tr. 2017. “Bakan Işık açıkladı: Hava ve füze savunma sistemi hakkında yeni gelişme.” Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.yeniasya.com.tr/gundem/bakan-isik-acikladi-hava-ve-fuze-savunma-sistemi-hakkinda-yeni-gelisme_437945.

³⁰ Airporthaber. 2017. “THY ve TSK pilot geçişleri için protokol imzaladı.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.airporthaber.com/thy-haberleri/thy-ve-tsk-pilot-gecisleri-icin-protokol-imzaladi.html>; Cumhuriyet.com.tr. 2017. “TSK’de pilot krizi büyüyor... Pakistan’dan eğitmen olarak üç F16 pilotu istendi.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/tskde-pilot-krizi-buyuyor-pakistandan-egitmen-olarak-uc-f16-pilotu-istendi-812841>; Haberturk.com. 2019. “Son dakika: Savaş pilotları için 6 ay TSK, 6 ay THY modeli.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.haberturk.com/son-dakika-haberleri-savas-pilotlari-icin-6-ay-tsk-6-ay-thy-modeli-haberler-2525623>.

³¹ DW.com. 2019c. “Erdoğan: S-400 işi bitmiştir.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdogan-s-400-isi-bitmistir/a-49168113>.

³² Sozcu.com.tr. 2019. ““400’leri almak zorunluluktan” açıklamasını yaptı.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/son-dakika-erdogandan-s-400-aciklamasi-5229776/>.

approached the S-400 procurement studies positively, which can detect the threat from 600 kilometers away”³³.

Summarizing all this, the arguments officially presented by the Turkish side regarding the purchase of S-400s can be classified into 3 main parts: a) Provision of production technologies and possibility of joint production; b) Affordable prices; c) The claim/hint that the S-400 is a more powerful weapon.

Our counterarguments:

a) When Turkey received the first batch of S-400 systems, as it turned out, it did not receive the technologies for their production, and it will receive them only if it buys the second batch, and this is fraught with great dangers for Turkey.

b) We could not find figures on how much it would cost for Turkey to buy Patriot systems, but for a country like Turkey, half or one billion dollars could hardly have a serious role, considering also the financial consequences of buying S-400 systems for Turkey. According to Ellen Lord, Undersecretary of the US Department of Defense Turkey would lose \$9 billion by leaving F-35 program (Yücel 2020).

c) According to “Anadolu” agency, the S-400 is a much stronger weapon than the Patriot, but it has already been mentioned that, unlike the Patriot, the S-400 must operate alone in Turkey and cannot be integrated into NATO systems, as well as it is not a weapon tested in combat conditions.

The S-400 procurement process can be divided into four chronological stages:

a) November 2016 - September 2017 - during this period, the topic of S-400s came to Turkey's agenda for the first time, the parties held negotiations and a corresponding agreement was signed.

b) October 2017 - July 2019 - After the signing of that agreement, Turkey received the Russian systems in the summer of 2019.

c) August 2019 - October 2020 - After receiving the Russian systems, Turkey, despite all the warnings of the USA, began to test S-400's radar on American F-16 fighters first (in early July 2020 - before the 4th anniversary of the 2016 military coup attempt), then conducted the fire test of those systems in October 2020³⁴.

d) From November 2020 to now - When Erdogan continues to insist that it is impossible to backtrack on the issue of S-400s, that the topic was closed to them from the beginning, and the purchase of the second batch of S-400s is still on the agenda³⁵.

The main question raised by us is exactly this: why does Erdogan show such persistence and determination regarding the S-400 systems after all? In this context, the following sub-questions emerge more specifically:

³³ Demirci, Zuhail. 2019. “10 soruda Türkiye neden S-400 alıyor.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/10-soruda-turkiye-neden-s-400-aliyor/1412408>.

³⁴ Ahaber.com.tr. 2020. “S-400 hava savunma sistemi füzesi Sinop'ta test edildi! İşte o görüntüler.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.ahaber.com.tr/gundem/2020/10/16/s-400-hava-savunma-sistemi-fuzesi-sinopta-test-edildi-iste-o-goruntuler>.

³⁵ BBC.com. 2022. “Erdogan: S-400 konusu bizim için kapanmıştır, ABD ile F-16'lara ilişkin olumlu süreç devam ediyor.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-60872588>; Savunmasanayist.com. 2022b. “Çavuşoğlu'ndan F-16 Cevabı: “Evet dememiz mümkün değil”.” Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.savunmasanayist.com/cavusoglundan-f-16-cevabi-evet-dememiz-mumkun-degil/>.

a) Why did Erdogan not content with just bluffing and blackmailing the US on the S-400 issue, as was the case with the CPMIEC, but instead insisted on his point of view and achieved the purchase of Russian systems?

b) Why did Erdogan continue to persist on the S-400s after purchasing those systems and the subsequent US countermeasures/sanctions, began testing them, and is still not abandoning those systems, jeopardizing the defense capability of Turkey in general and the combat capability of the Turkish Air Force in particular?

I argue that the answer is obvious, since the reason for such insistence is that the issue is related to Erdogan's personal security, and this is why Erdogan regularly refuses to back down on this issue. By the way in the Turkish press materials about the purchase of the first batch of S-400s, the phrase 'acil ihtiyaç' in Turkish (urgent need) is often found and it is emphasized that the Turkish side bought Russian systems for that reason. However, the Turkish press does not elaborate on what kind of 'acil ihtiyaç' it is talking about.

Due to this choice of Erdogan, Turkey, which is considered a regional superpower and has global ambitions, is currently faced with the danger of being left behind in the air force sector by regional countries that are inferior to it in a number of other aspects. Meanwhile, in December 2010 (during Erdogan's prime ministership), the head of the Turkish Air Force, Hasan Aksay announced the goal of having the strongest Air Force in the region by 2050, emphasizing that significant steps are planned for this purpose in the coming years, and in this context, he first mentioned the purchase of F-35 fighter jets³⁶. As a result, with his choice (and a number of other decisions), Erdogan caused great damage to Turkey's defense in general and the Air Force in particular, and the situation was 'Erdogan won, Turkey lost'.

Commenting on the opinion of EDAM experts that the next 10 and maybe 20 years will be the most difficult years for the Turkish Air Force, we believe that it will depend on the term of Erdogan's tenure in Turkey. If he loses the upcoming presidential elections, we believe that the new Turkish president will shortly abandon the S-400 systems, instead buy Patriot (or SAMP/T) systems, start receiving F-35 fighter jets, restore Turkey's place in the F-35 program (Turkey will again become a production partner), and the corresponding American sanctions will be removed from Turkey (and all this in the 2020s). In other words, for us, the problem in this matter is related to Erdogan himself.

Meanwhile, if Erdogan continues to rule Turkey and also buys the second batch of S-400 systems, then the American sanctions against Turkey will undoubtedly become more severe and Turkey's defense capability will suffer more. However, in our opinion, this is only one of the scenarios in case of continuation of Erdogan's rule. There is also another scenario, in which Erdogan himself may abandon the S-400 systems. Four factors can contribute to this:

a) Erdogan may consider the risk of a new military coup to be negligible because he has managed to carry out a 'major purge' of the Turkish armed forces (we consider all this unlikely, because Erdogan cannot 100% rule out the possibility of a new attempt at a military coup if he remains in power).

³⁶ Sabah.com.tr. 2010. "Bir hayal gerçek oluyor." Accessed August 1, 2022. https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2010/12/20/bir_hayal_gercek_oluyor.

b) In recent years, Turkey has developed/is developing various long-range air defense systems, the most promising of which is the Siper system³⁷. Erdogan may one day consider that he can already be reliably protected by the Siper system and as a result he may abandon the S-400 systems, which will have fulfilled their role in solving the intermediate problem (Erdogan's temporary security).

c) The current Russian-Ukrainian war perhaps proves that the Russian air defense systems, including the S-400 systems, do not live up to expectations (it has already been mentioned that Turkey bought S-400 systems that have not been tested in combat conditions). Erdogan may consider that their capabilities are exaggerated and cannot reliably ensure his security.

d) It has already been mentioned that Turkey is looking for an intermediate task (F-16 Block 70, Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, Gripen and so on) in the context of the Air Force. If Turkey fails in this matter as well, it may force Erdogan to take a step back regarding the S-400 systems (the solution of this question can be contributed by the factor that the weakening of Turkey in the air force plan also means the weakening of NATO, its southeastern wing, although the US is trying to solve the problem by increasing its military presence in Greece). It can also be contributed to by the regional events, the rate of arming by the countries of the region in the sector of air force and other fields.

References

- Cross, William, and André Blais. 2012. "Who selects the party leader?" *Party Politics* 18 (2): 127-150. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810382935>.
- Green, Jeffrey Edward. 2008. "Max Weber and the Reinvention of Popular Power." *Max Weber Studies* 8 (2): 187-224.
- Gulmez, Didem Buhari. 2020. "The resilience of the US-Turkey alliance: divergent threat perceptions and worldviews." *Contemporary Politics* 26 (4): 475-492. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777038>.
- Guo, Xiaoli. 2017. "Is Turkey Acting Fairly? - Turkey's Choice in T-LORAMIDS." *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* 11 (2): 69-89. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2017.12023302>.
- Harmel, Robert, and Lars Svåsand. 1993. "Party leadership and party institutionalisation: Three phases of development." *West European Politics* 16 (2): 67-88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389308424961>.
- Kasapoğlu, Can, and Sinan Ülgen. 2019. "Strategic weapons systems in the Turkey-Russia-US triangle." *EDAM, Foreign Policy & Security* 2 (January): 1-9.
- Kasapoğlu, Can. 2021. "Türk Hava gücünün en zor on yılı: Hava harp trendleri, tehdit ortamı analizi ve türk hava kuvvetleri'nin 5. nesil geleceği." *EDAM, Dış Politika & Güvenlik* 2 (Ocak): 1-29.

³⁷ Savunmasanayist.com. 2022c. "SİPER Hava Savunma Sistemi ve Özellikleri." Accessed August 1, 2022. <https://www.savunmasanayist.com/siper-hava-savunma-sistemi-ozellikleri/>.

- Kaynar, Ayşegül Kars. 2022. "Post-2016 military restructuring in Turkey from the perspective of coup-proofing." *Turkish Studies* 23 (3): 383-406. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2021.1977631>.
- Kazan, Isil. 2005. "Turkey: Where Geopolitics still matters." *Contemporary Security Policy* 26 (3): 588-604. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260500500906>.
- Kemp, Herb. 2020. "Strategic Security in Northern Europe: The Implications of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Developing Complex Threat Environments." *Journal of Strategic Security* 14 (1): 78-91.
- Kibaroglu, Mustafa. 2019. "On Turkey's Missile Defense Strategy: The Four Faces of the S-400 Deal between Turkey and Russia." *PERCEPTIONS* (Autumn-Winter) XXIV (2-3): 159-174.
- Kilker, Ernest. 1989. "Max Weber and Plebiscitarian Democracy: A Critique of the Mommsen Thesis." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 2 (4): 429-465.
- Klein, Steven. 2016. "Between Charisma and Domination: On Max Weber's Critique of Democracy." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (1): 179-192. <http://doi.org/10.1086/687323>.
- Magalhães, Pedro T. 2022. "Charisma and Democracy: Max Weber on the Riddle of Political Change in Modern Societies." *Topoi* 41: 69-78. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09761-2>.
- Radomyski, Adam. 2021. "Development of the russian anti access/anti denial (A2/AD) concept as a threat to NATO and Poland." *Torun Internatonal Studies* 1 (14): 41-54. <https://doi.org/10.12775/TIS.2021.004575/TIS.2021.004>.
- Shaw, Tamsin. 2008. "Max Weber on Democracy: Can the People Have Political Power in Modern States?" *Constellations* 15 (1): 33-45. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2008.00472.x>.
- Shcherbak, Svetlana. 2021. "Max Weber and the Modern Plebiscitary Democracy: Weber's legacy: at the crossroads of traditions." *Filosofska Dumka* 1: 135-148. <https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2021.01.135>.
- Strom, Kaare. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (2): 565-98. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111461>.
- Surkov, Nikolay Yu. 2020. "Charismatic Leadership in the Middle East and North Africa in the 21 st Century: Regional Specifics and Prospects for the Evolution of the Phenomenon." *MGIMO Review of International Relations* 13 (2): 123-140 (Russian). <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-2-71-123-140>.
- Triantama, Febry, Cancera Triane Berliana, and Muhammad Yusril I'za. 2022. "The failure of the United States coercive diplomacy in the era of President Donald Trump: Turkey's persistence in buying S-400." *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik* 35 (1): 58-68. <https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.V35I12022.58-68>.
- Vicentini, Giulia, and Andrea Pritoni. 2021. "The Rise and Fall of Party Leaders: Exploring Leadership Selection, Re-Selection, and De-Selection Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis." *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica* 51 (3): 373-388. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2021.6>.

- Willner, Ann Ruth, and Dorothy Willner. 1965 "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 358: 77-88.
- Zvyagelskaya, Irina. 2019. "Symbols and Values in International Relations in the Middle East." *Polis. Political Studies* 1: 105-123.

MAPPING POLITICAL POPULISM IN THE EUROPEAN POST-TRANSITIONAL PERIPHERY

NANE ALEKSANYAN  *

Abstract

This article comparatively analyzes the manifestations and various factors of political populism in the European post-transitional periphery. The main difficulty in mapping political populism in the European post-transitional periphery and defining populist parties most accurately is that, unlike most political forces in developed democracies, such parties do not belong to traditional parties. Moreover, their ideology combines the positions of both right and left parties, which makes it extremely difficult to place them on the classical right-left scale of the party spectrum. The political agenda of the populist parties of the European post-transition peripheral countries has a different content, but it usually comes down to updating issues that are hushed up by the political establishment: protecting national and cultural identity, taking tough measures aimed at combating corruption and crime, protecting traditional family values, and even harsh criticism of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the EU and their institutions. A distinctive feature of the populist forces was also that in their majority they called for the protection of the rights and interests of ordinary people and the wider use of the instruments of direct democracy, and thus directly opposed one of the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, taking into account the opinion of the minority.

The article analyzes the emergence of a populist environment, where the responsibility, trust and dignity of politicians are distorted, which in turn leads to a crisis of understanding and civilizational culture. The influence of populist parties has grown and most European post-transitional peripheral countries have at least one successful populist party, and populists are among the most influential parties. It is noteworthy that civil society organizations have identified the activities of populist leaders and their parties as the main threat facing the Eastern Partnership countries. Using populist technologies, mainly in the context of an election campaign, leaders and their political groups seek to manipulate public opinion and change the alignment of political parties in the European post-transitional periphery.

Keywords: *European periphery, illiberal democracy, Eastern Partnership, Russian hegemony, European integration, Euro-Atlantic integration.*

* Nane Aleksanyan is an Erasmus+ mobility MA student in the Department of Political Science at Paris Lodron Universität Salzburg, Austria. She is a MA student of Public Administration at Yerevan State University, Armenia.

Email: nane.alexanyan@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 73-91



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 09.07.2022

Revised: 20.07.2022

Accepted: 30.07.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

Introduction:

The successes of populist forces in the European peripheries of the post-Soviet states are predominantly local in nature, since this is mainly due to the weakness of political institutions, the multi-party system, civil society organizations (CSOs), social media, civic culture, etc. Illiberal democracy, consolidated authoritarian regimes, and populist electoral successes have given rise to a public discourse about the root causes of this phenomenon and the factors that explain differences in the level of popularity of populist leaders and groups in different political parties and movements that influence support for populists. With the development of democracy and CSOs in the European peripheral countries, public opinion acquires new opportunities and becomes a special tool for regulating political relations. The possibilities of its expression and transmission to the highest levels of power increase with the development of social networks and the media, which enhances its influence on the political sphere and stimulates the development of democracy.

The study of the history of populist political parties in the EaP countries and Russia will allow not only to analyze the various factors that influenced the electoral support of populists in each of the countries, but also to compare the impact of these factors in these states. The main difficulty in finding the most accurate definition of populist parties in European peripheral and post-peripheral countries is that, unlike most political forces in developed democratic systems of EU member states, such parties do not belong to European traditional party structures and ideologies. Moreover, their ideologies and values combine many contradictions and distorted positions inherent in both right-wing and left-wing parties, which makes it extremely difficult to group them on the classical scale of the party spectrum.

Within the framework of this chapter, the identifying the factors that influenced the electoral activity of populist parties in the European peripheral and post-peripheral countries is solved through a comparative study of the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) mechanism. Multilevel cooperation within the framework of the EaP is carried out in the political, social and economic spheres, which determined the EU's relations with the countries of the European peripheral countries since 2008-2009. As part of the analysis of the EU Agreements with Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, areas of relations will be identified and an assessment will be given, on the one hand, of the effectiveness of ongoing programs on the dynamics of statehood and the evolution of nation and state building, the quality of democracy, political parties, CSOs, social networks and movements, and on the other hand, at the level of populist rhetoric of political actors.

The Leap from Post-Soviet Sovereignty to a European Transit Periphery

The agenda of populist parties in the European peripheral and post-peripheral countries has a different content and boiled down to popularizing such issues that are hushed up by the political establishment: the protection of national, religious and cultural identity, the adoption of tough measures aimed at combating political corruption and crime, the protection of traditional family values, the maximum restriction of gender policy, the

tightening of the policy of LGTB groups, sharp criticism of public institutions. A distinctive feature of the populist forces was also that in their majority they called for the protection of the rights and interests of ordinary people and the wider use of the tools of direct democracy, and thus directly opposed one of the fundamental principles of Western liberal democracy, that is, taking into account the opinion of the minority (Arato and Cohen 2021; Arditi 2005).

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century were marked by significant structural changes in the system of international relations. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and EaP was understood by the political elites of the countries of the post-Soviet countries as an opportunity to return to Europe from the post-totalitarian system, the center of which was Russia (Breyfogle, Schrader and Sunderland 2007). The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and in 2007 once again demonstrated the attractiveness of the political, social and economic model embodied by the European Community for the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The mechanisms of enlargement, neighborhood and partnership brought the EU geographically closer to Russia, which lays claim to its special role in the new world order. Between them are countries that have long been part of the Soviet Union and belong to Europe. In the conditions of difficult economic, political and social transformations in the post-Soviet countries, as well as their growing interaction with the EU, the European model is of interest to them (Berend 2020; Kim 2021). The common historical past is a factor both bringing together and repelling the European peripheral countries from Russia, and close economic ties with it in the conditions of the raw material nature of the Russian economy do not contribute to the successful social and economic transformation of the countries neighboring Russia.

A new alignment of geopolitical forces in which the role of centers of gravity will be played not only by Western European countries, but also by peripheral countries and regions close to this center (Kinsella 2012; Klobucka 1997; Krekó 2021). In the context of the deepening process of globalization and Euro-Atlantic integration, the geopolitical aspirations of many developed modern states, to a certain extent, are intensifying. In this regard, some actors of international relations are purposefully expanding their influence on various states of the post-Soviet space, given their geopolitical and geostrategic significance. It is quite obvious that the post-Soviet sovereign states, regardless of their geographical location and level of development, always need external assistance and cooperation with other countries (Di Nucci 2021).

The transformation of the geopolitical and regional stability of the post-Soviet countries, the political delayed consequences of the collapse of the totalitarian political system of the Soviet Union are observed even 30 years later. For several decades, the post-Soviet sovereign states, in opposition to Russian hegemony, have tried to strengthen their bilateral relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Turkey, and actively participate in the UN, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, EU and other international and regional organizations.

The hardest thing was and is for those states that took real steps towards the democratization of the political regime, European and Euro-Atlantic integration, thereby planning to become full members of the EU and NATO in the near future. Therefore, the European integration of the post-Soviet countries has become for the Russian political

elite as one of the indicators of the challenge of global political and economic processes. The aspirations of geopolitical actors and small states towards the EU led to the fact that European integration went far beyond Europe and gave rise to an integration core of different power, influencing not only the countries of the European periphery, but also North and Latin America, East and South Asia (Kim 2021).

The European trend requires a global understanding, which is impossible without a comparison of the integration cores and processes in order to identify their particular features and general patterns. Without a comparative study of such similarities and differences, it is impossible to evaluate the stability of the Newly Independent States (NIS) and the effectiveness of the regional order of the European periphery (Huber and Schimpf 2017). The integration and enlargement of the EU, as a result of which post-Soviet and post-communist countries entered the EU, brought its borders closer to the to the Russian Federation. The democratic dimension of the EU enlargement policy has determined the new priorities of the EU's Eastern policy in the form of a belt of neighborhood with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova¹.

The EU uses all the levers of soft power available to it to attract the six post-Soviet EaP countries into its sphere of influence and oust Russia from this region. Russia is trying to resist these EU efforts and, in opposition to the EaP program, is actively developing Eurasian integration projects. In 2014, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed Association Agreements (AA), as well as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU².

The AA/DCFTA with the EU for Russia poses a threat to the interests of the Customs Union and the free trade area within the CIS, and warns of a possible change in the trade regime with the EU's peripheral countries. An essential part of the AA/DCFTA is the commitment to carry out political and economic reforms, in particular to increase the transparency of the economy, introduce a clear mechanism for holding competitions for government orders, take measures against monopoly and corruption in the economy, and approve European banking standards. The result of the transformations should be bringing the political and economic environment of the three states closer to European norms and eliminating the most obvious flaws in the existing political and economic

¹ Delegation of the EU to Georgia. 2021. "Georgia and the EU." Accessed July 10, 2022. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/49070/georgia-and-eu_en; Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Moldova. 2021. "The Republic of Moldova and the EU." Accessed July 10, 2022. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/1538/republic-moldova-and-eu_en; Delegation of the EU to Ukraine. 2021. "Ukraine and the EU." Accessed July 10, 2022. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/1937/ukraine-and-eu_en.

² EUR-Lex. 2014a. "Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part." *Official Journal of the European Union* L161/3: 3-2137. Accessed July 10, 2022. http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj; EUR-Lex. 2014b. "Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part." *Official Journal of the European Union* L261/1, 57: 4-742. Accessed July 10, 2022. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:261:FULL&from=EN>; EUR-Lex. 2014c. "Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part." *Official Journal of the European Union* L260/4: 4-738. Accessed July 10, 2022. http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj.

systems. Despite the fact that Armenia is the most important strategic ally of Russia. The development of close cooperation with Armenia is the most important priority of Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space, especially in light of the deterioration of relations with Georgia during the presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukraine since 2014. In 2017, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Armenia and the EU was signed³. Although Armenia made its so-called 'integration turn' in favor of cooperation with Russia back in 2013, refusing to sign the AA with the EU, the further development of relations between the EU and Armenia deserves the closest attention from all interested parties, including Russia.

Given the complexity of sustainable European integration, frozen conflicts and conditions of neither war nor peace, the EU is also committed to promoting the peaceful resolution of ethno-political conflicts, in connection with which the commitment of the EU to support the efforts and approaches of the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO is confirmed. These mechanisms for delineating its preferred countries bring the EU's multilateral and bilateral relations with Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova to a new level, regulating dialogue in both political and economic spheres. The effective implementation of these agreements will bring tangible results to the citizens of the European periphery countries, contributing to the strengthening of democracy, political, economic and social stability through large-scale reforms (Lane 2012), and over time having a positive impact on the quality of life of citizens (Gabrisch, Orlowski and Pusch 2012).

The situation is different for the two European peripheral countries, since Azerbaijan and Belarus are fundamentally different in their national models of European and Eurasian integration. If Azerbaijan distances itself from European and Eurasian integration, and seeks to pursue an independent policy in the post-Soviet space, aimed at developing regional relations with Turkey and sovereign interests. The EaP Platform on energy security is a key place in the cooperation between Azerbaijan and the EU, aimed at the joint development of economic strategy and other issues between the EU and its eastern neighbors. By this, Azerbaijan considers its importance for the energy security of the EU and its role in the Southern Gas Corridor, having signed contracts for the extraction and transportation of gas to European markets.

The growing geopolitical turbulence associated with the intensified confrontation between Russia and Western countries has created new circumstances that have significantly influenced the strategy of European integration of Belarus since 2014. Although a number of unifying organizations have been created in the post-Soviet space over the past few years under the hegemony of Russia, it is the Russian-Belarusian integration relations that have received the greatest development. For the political elite of Belarus, it has become important to implement strategic tasks within the framework of the Russian-Belarusian integration and the Union State of Belarus and Russia. Thus, the consolidated authoritarian regimes in Belarus and Azerbaijan, contrary to their

³ EUR-Lex. 2018. "Comprehensive and enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part." *Official Journal of the European Union* L 23, 26.1.2018: 4-466. Accessed August 8, 2022. http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2018/104/oj.

European integration obligations as European peripheral countries, made integration with Russia and Turkey their strategic orientation in their foreign policy.

Sources and dimension of political populism

In the conditions of erosion of liberalism and democracy in the post-Soviet countries, when political parties are in the making and do not represent a number of electoral groups, and their party programs practically copy each other, new political groups constantly appear that proclaim themselves the so-called true voice of the people. Some fertile soil is needed for populist leaders and groups to emerge. In the post-Soviet space, democratization is accompanied by strong populist elements, and that every time the government and parliament do not maintain a mechanism for dialogue with CSOs, when a structural contradiction forms in political discourse, populist elements are strengthened, ideologized combinations arise, and corresponding political actors (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016; Heinisch, Massetti, and Mazzoleni 2020). After a comparative analysis of the history of political populism in the European peripheral post-Soviet countries, three waves can be distinguished in its development, drawing a clear line between spontaneous nationwide movements and organizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s (the first wave), the so-called ‘privatization groups’ and new political parties liberal reforms that achieved limited success in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the countries of the South Caucasus in the 1990s (second wave), and the actual populist leaders and their parties that entered the political arena in the 2000s (third wave). This does not apply to the Baltic countries, since, unlike other post-Soviet states that later joined the CIS and retained their overall economic, social and political orientation towards Russia, the Baltic countries immediately declared their goal of integration into Western military, political and economic structures.

The entry of the Baltic States into the main Euro-Atlantic integration structures of the EU and NATO in 2004, that is, the implementation of the key foreign policy task for the previous decade, the symbol of which was the slogan ‘return to Europe’ (Graney 2019: 171-200). This put before the political elites and parliamentary parties the question of finding new goals in the field of European foreign policy, becoming the most important factor of legitimization in their domestic and foreign policies.

Due to the high geopoliticization of European integration, the tendency to perceive the activity of European peripheral countries through the prism of a balance of interests in areas subject to the influence of major players in world politics has intensified. Under these conditions, the paradigm in which small and medium-sized states are unable to influence the world order due to incomparable resource potential has undergone natural transformations. The European peripheral countries, having found themselves in the epicenter of geopolitical confrontation, began to take into account the nature and state of geopolitical processes more fully in order to protect national interests. It became possible to talk about the relevance of developing a geostrategy for European peripheral countries as an auxiliary tool in building foreign policy in the geopolitical environment (Gabrisch, Orłowski and Toralf 2012).

Populism is a threat to the democratization of the political institutions, cultures, values and norms of the European peripheral countries, which become tools for populist leaders, groups and parties to limit or freeze liberal and democratic processes (Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016; Heinisch, Massetti, and Mazzoleni 2020). One of the main challenges associated with political populism arises from attempts to define what is the people that populists claim to represent. As a result, some significant items were included in the party programs, and groups arose that were dissatisfied with such a universalist approach. It is they who become the target audience of populists in the post-Soviet space (Huber and Schimpf 2017).

Political populists actually express only the demands of narrow groups, although they represent them as the 'whole people'. In this way they construct a single, homogeneous people with a single set of requirements. In order to construct it, it must be somehow marked, limited, and this is usually done through negative identification, that is, pointing out some vulnerable groups as destroyers of unity (strategy 'we are not them').

In fact, a comparative study of the phenomenon of the popularity of populist parties in post-Soviet countries is possible through the study of the institutional experience of the West European states of the party and electoral systems, the characteristics of the populist party itself and its leader, and the interaction of the populist party with other political forces. In this context, it is possible to identify features that examine populist groups and parties through the prism of the evolution of the multi-party system (Van Herpen 2021; Vorländer 2019). Since it is obvious that the key influence on voting for populist parties is provided by institutional factors, as well as the characteristics of the populist leader and group itself.

In modern European peripheral political life, there is a common denominator, which is the populist core, consisting of antagonistic relations between the 'good (clean) people' and the 'bad (corrupt) elite'. An aspect of populism is the opposition of 'the people' to the imaginary 'other'. This 'other' may include individual representatives of power or the entire political elite, the top of a financial corporation or business, but also immigrants, economic refugees. Sometimes this 'other' turns out to be the starting point for the construction of 'the people': 'the people' is defined, first of all, through the denial of what it is not.

Playing on the opposition of 'the people' and 'others' is the foundation of European peripheral countries populism. In the ideological dimension, populism protects virtuous and equal people from various elites and dangerous 'others', who in turn can deprive (or try to deprive) a sovereign people of civilized and political development, political rights, values, voice.

The European peripheral countries populists embrace the ideas and mentality of the people, identifying themselves with them. Populist groups and leaders do not represent the interests of the people, but consider themselves an integral part of them, that is, they are the people. For their part, people welcome the populist leader as their own, but at the same time consider him better than themselves, and recognize that he is endowed with often allegedly charismatic qualities that give the right to rule (Stengel, MacDonald and Nabers 2019).

The strategic importance of populism in the European peripheral political process can be revealed through the concept of a 'median voter', that is, an average voter who does

not belong only to the right or left spectrum of political ideology, and the following statements are proved (Schwörer 2021). *First*, politics will be populist when the likelihood of a politician and leader being re-elected is high, since in this case both a moderate and a right-wing politician will try to shape the electorate by choosing a left-wing and conservative political course. *Secondly*, populist politics is also more likely when the politician and leader is truly a conservative, appealing to the already established traditions and values of the potential electorate. *Thirdly*, a politician and leader will use populism when there is a high probability that he is corrupt, for example, by the political elite. *Finally*, populist politics are most likely when there is a high polarization of society, which means a larger gap between the median voter point and the moderate politician on the one hand, and right-wing politics on the other. In other words, populist politics signals the choice of a strategy in which the candidate will build an election campaign in accordance with the interests of the median voter.

The instrumental nature of European peripheral populism causes an appeal to the values and traditions of the masses, language simplification, anti-elitist and people-centric demagoguery, that is, populism is one of the driving forces for the formation of electoral behavior of voters (Gregor 2021). Thus, populist rhetoric includes technological operations (language, image, events) to influence the electoral process. On the one hand, electoral behavior is a system of interrelated reactions, actions or inactions of citizens carried out in order to adapt to the conditions for holding political elections, on the other hand, electoral behavior is a set of objectively determined and subjectively motivated actions of voters who exercise their right to choose in electoral practice, their internal attitudes, their own understanding of the pre-election situation. The objective factors are age, social origin, status, education, domestic and foreign policy, and the subjective factors are the individual psychological qualities of the voter, his upbringing, culture, the impact of social networks and the media, the specifics of the influence of political groups and leaders. In this context, post-Soviet electoral preferences can be defined through the motivational component of the electorate, which consists of three elements: emotional, rational and evaluative. The emotional element is characterized by the voters' perception of the ways in which candidates behave and communicate. In turn, the rational component is based on the expectation of certain behavior from the candidate based on knowledge of the program and the strategy that he represents. As for the evaluative element, it includes the opinion of the electorate about the significant qualities of a political figure. In real political practice, the motivation for electoral choice is a combination of the above elements in various proportions.

Given the heterogeneity and discontinuity of the political space of the European peripheral countries, the use of populist approaches in modern transformational societies is impossible, because when studying electoral processes, one should take into account the specifics of the historical development of these countries, which is inextricably linked with ethnic, cultural and territorial communities that stand out for their individuality, having their own social, economic and cultural identity, regional identity. Electoral orientations are subjective-objective in nature, indicating that the political preferences of the population are objective and stable, while there is an impact on them from party candidates, groups and leaders (Kaltwasser and Zanotti 2021).

The discourse about the preferences of the European peripheral countries of the electorate, it is obvious that electoral behavior is based not only on the social and economic basis, but also on the value and cultural paradigm of transit communities. That is, the electoral preferences of the voters of these countries determine the cultural archetype that exists in the political practice of their state. Thus, in the electoral political space of the European peripheral countries, there are the following types of electoral behavior: patriarchal, traditional, clientele, protest and marginal. It should be noted that the electoral preferences of citizens of European peripheral countries are determined by a combination of objective and subjective factors with a predominance of the irrational principle. Through the articulation of populist rhetoric and demagoguery in their programs, the creation of a populist image and behavior, parties and politicians can manipulate political expectations, and subsequently electoral preferences, both at the national and regional levels.

The ruling party as a populist phenomenon

The modern understanding of the phenomenon of the ruling party, parliamentary parties and extra-parliamentary parties lies in the fact that the political party is seen not only as an institution of the political system of society, but also as an element of the social system and as a special kind of social organization community.

In the life of post-Soviet society, regardless of the type of social structure and political system, the party in power plays an important role and parliamentary parties play a partial role. Even in post-Soviet countries where coalition governments have been formed and where there are several political parties in the parliament, nevertheless they are not able to influence the activities of the ruling party and the executive branch (Gräbner and Hafele 2020).

It is obvious that even in the post-Soviet ruling parties and parliamentary parties there are many shortcomings and inconsistencies between the mechanisms for updating the leadership of these parties with democratic principles, the non-transparent distribution of powers between the levels of organizational management in the party, the collective and its structure, the inconsistency of a particular party system with the social and cultural conditions of communities and middle layers. There is a lot of manipulation and shadow mechanism in the system of party bodies, principles of organization and activities that negatively affect the formation and competence of leading party bodies, as well as the procedures for nominating candidates for elected public office, party membership, etc.

The ruling party, firmly entrenched in the modern post-Soviet political system, is not the key means of aggregation, articulation and representation of the interests of citizens in power structures, both on a national scale and in the regional, and even in the local segment of politics. The post-Soviet ruling parties, by their nature, perform unique functions of controlling state power from CSOs, ensuring the representation of the interests of their interests, and not public groups, limiting the mechanism of political responsibility and accountability of the authorities, recruiting the political elite and institutions of political mobilization, structuring the political space according to their

own considerations (Csehi 2021; Ghaplanyan 2018; Payaslian 2011). With the change in the functions of the ruling parties and organizations controlled by them, they are transformed according to their group capabilities, which directly depend on the type of political regime. The projection of the political reality in which the ruling parties function is associated with the embodiment of the respective capabilities of the leaders and groups of these organizations, primarily in terms of maintaining their position in public power from the influence of opposition forces and CSOs (Carrion 2022; Glenn 2019).

Post-Soviet ruling parties of this or that type and subtype arise under certain conditions. The conditions for the formation of a moderately dominant subtype of the ruling party arose in Russia after the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on December 19, 1999, and have changed since the coming to power of Vladimir Putin. In the Russian party-political system, a peculiar subtype of the ruling party in power was regularly reproduced based on the results of the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2018, as well as the State Duma elections of 2003, 2007, 2011, 2016 and 2021.

When studying the populist typology of the ruling parties, as well as when comparing the political and party systems of the post-Soviet and modern periods, it becomes obvious that, for example, Russia is characterized by a Russian-centric populist type of ruling parties. It is noteworthy that the main mechanisms of Russian-centric populist activity are aimed not only at the internal, but at the external political spheres. For the ruling United Russia party, the slogans 'Russian Abroad' and 'Compatriot Abroad' have become a new populist element in the successful development of the Russian World in order to preserve the Russian geopolitical and cultural space due to many factors, including public diplomacy or hard-soft power.

At present, the United Russia party clearly dominates in comparison with other parties, but only President Putin has a special place in the political system of Russia, and his position has been shifted to the top of the power pyramid. In this type of political system, President Putin, with the help of the so-called 'populist Iron Curtain' party United Russia, controls the branches of public power, in contrast to the post-Soviet type of party-political system in which the ruling party occupies a central position and directly controls all political institutions.

The functioning of the modern ruling party United Russia, in comparison with other parties of the State Duma, is based on softer populist methods of leadership, stimulating the activity and promotion of initiatives by pro-government federal and regional CSOs. Common to the post-Soviet and modern types of Russian ruling parties is their reliance on the President of Russia, and not on public power, and only through the consent of the President of Russia they gain access to the use of state resources and other advantages arising from their position in Russian society.

The level of interaction of the parent state with the diaspora of Russian peripheral countries of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, with the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltics, is largely an indicator of its and their stability and development. The issues of Russia's 'violent and threatening cooperation' with foreign compatriots in Russian peripheral countries have become part of populist rhetoric and are often heard in the speeches of President Putin, members of the government and top officials of the state. In these populist introductions and strategies of Russia's foreign

policy, taking into account the Soviet past and post-Soviet heritage, very often citizens and territories of the NIS, Russia considers its periphery (backyard), and people as permanently residing abroad, that is, compatriots, thereby considering their demographic resource of Russia, which for a long time remained without attention (Pejović and Nikolovski 2022; Gamkrelidze 2019; Gamkrelidze 2022).

According to the Russian ruling elite, the effective use of the potential of the Russian World will gradually lead to the strengthening of Russia's influence on the Eurasian integration of the NIS⁴, highlighting their Euro-Atlantic integration and other international processes, fighting against the so-called 'Russophobia' (Luostarinen 1989; Lieven 2000; Diesen 2022), thereby preserving the civilizational and cultural identity of the Russian ethnos (HURI 2021).

The processes of institutionalization of new Russian political parties led to populist activation after the legal reforms of 2011-2012. Since the underrepresentation of some public groups in the Russian political process, the political alienation of some segments of Russian society, such as CSOs receiving grants from Western European countries (foreign agents) and opposition leaders and movements (de la Torre 2021; Fieschi 2019). All this makes the issue of further reforming the Russian system of restrictions on political competition very topical. As a result, there is a need to study not only the historical and political and legal foundations of party activity, but also contemporary problems and contradictions observed in the framework of the institutionalization of Russian parties in conditions of limited electoral competition.

The problem of a comparative study of post-Soviet populism is the contradiction between the priorities of domestic and foreign policy declared at the conceptual level, as well as the executive foreign policy practice of Russia since 2000. The activation of the ENP since 2003 and the EaP since 2009, with the development of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, special attention in the fundamental foreign policy strategies and national security doctrines of Russia has traditionally been paid to hard-soft power in relations with Ukraine, Moldova, the countries of the South Caucasus and the Baltics, taking into account even the internal political agenda of these countries. Since 2003, the so-called populist problems of the European peripheral countries have been the subject of the ruling United Russia party and other parliamentary parties (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)). The traditionally populist issues of the European peripheral countries are also discussed in President Putin's programmatic pre-election articles.

Three spheres (military-strategic, political and cultural-ideological) are closely linked with the problem of populism and mythologization of the past and, as a result, the ideologization of the present by the ruling party United Russia, the LDPR and the CPRF. A wide range of problems complicating relations in these areas is largely associated with the negative image of Russia in the mass consciousness of the societies of the European peripheral countries. In an attempt to increase the dependence of the post-Soviet countries on Russia, President Putin and the ruling United Russia party formulated for themselves a populist discourse around answers to the following questions about the role

⁴ Kremlin.ru. 2021. "Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"." Accessed August 8, 2022. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>.

of Russia in the transforming system of international relations: 1) Is Russia the periphery of Europe or the center of Eurasia?, 2) How is Russia fighting for the periphery of Europe or Eurasia?, 3) Why does the European post-transitional periphery need a new strategy?, 4) How sovereign are the peripheries of Europe?.

In fact, since 2003, after the elections to the State Duma, when the country's parliament included United Russia as the ruling party, the CPRF and the LDPR, Russian-centric populism at the state level has become ideology and began to legally limit electoral competition, carrying the threat of the usurpation of political power, the destruction of the opposition, the lack of civil dialogue in the search for solutions to social problems. The accumulation of social contradictions and the underrepresentation of public interests in the political system can lead to destabilization, the emergence of non-systemic parties and movements, and the radicalization of the opposition. Creating opportunities and conditions for the institutionalization of political parties, on the contrary, helps to stabilize the political process, to include all social forces in a constructive political dialogue (Manucci 2022).

In many ways, Russian populist rhetoric persists in the political discourse of Belarus, hiding contradictions regarding the perception of consolidated authoritarianism, the state system and the style of political leadership of President Alexander Lukashenko. The geopolitical position of Belarus, the closest political, economic, social and cultural ties with Russia, the presence of a long and open border between the two states serve as the foundation for various integration projects between Russia and Belarus. The populist agenda of the Belarusian political elite includes the formation of the strategic vector of Belarus' foreign policy, the mechanisms of its maneuvering between the EU and Russia, China and neighboring countries. The phenomenon of political leadership of President Lukashenko, which largely influences the formation of both domestic and foreign policy of the state, also deserves a separate analysis. This is important for clarifying the specifics of the correlation of internal problems in the political and economic development of Belarus with its populist foreign policy strategy. To predict the model of interaction between Russia and Belarus, even in the short term, it is possible to reconstruct in detail the political populist experience of the Belarusian elites, the resources and potential of their influence in world politics and at the regional level. In addition, populist rhetoric is part of the public speeches of President Lukashenko and other senior officials of the Republic of Belarus and the Union State of Russia-Belarus, related to Belarusian foreign policy.

Since 2013, when Belarus, under the influence of Russia, did not sign an association agreement with the EU, it began a new stage of populist rhetoric against the EaP and European integration. Anti-Western propaganda and anti-European populism became part of the election campaign of President Lukashenko in the Presidential elections of 2015 and 2020, as well as in the Parliamentary elections of 2016 and 2019 among non-partisan candidates for deputies. And since 2021, President Lukashenko has suspended Belarus' participation in the EU's EaP initiative in response to EU sanctions.

The Constitution, introduced by President Lukashenko as a mechanism for an illegal republican referendum, grants the president huge powers under populist considerations and turns the principle of separation of powers into a fiction. But the president's populist actions to usurp power limit even the checks and balances that the Constitution provides.

Parliament is not an independent institution of power and is completely subordinate to the president, while the constitutional majority of deputies are non-partisan. Local power belongs to the presidential vertical, appointed by the head of state. The main part of the populist rhetoric of President Lukashenko is Soviet nostalgia, about which he frankly expressed regret about the destruction of the USSR and restored its most significant elements (an administrative pyramid with strict hierarchical subordination, personnel policy, attitude to law, the role of the KGB, etc.). Such a model of government is based not even on the Constitution officially proclaimed by him, not on laws providing for the separation of powers, guarantees of human rights, the presence of opposition, independent media, but on the unlimited power of the executive branch of the state. By refusing to carry out reforms, the authorities deliberately conserve the old social model of society. The majority of the population is united in the former structures, which, in a somewhat modified form, continue to play the role of a totalitarian framework. For example, labor collectives, as before, perform not only socio-economic, but also political functions. The conscious politicization of the former semi-totalitarian structures is taking place in parallel with the restriction and neutralization of political and public functions that appeared during the years of reforms of non-state organizations. Lukashenko began to interpret the development of CSOs and civil initiatives as anarchy and anarchy, and any criticism of CSOs is viewed as hostile, destabilizing actions. The current ruling team is creating a populist model of a kind of authoritarian corporatism, a controlled market and a controlled democracy. To maintain communication between the government and society, political representation is replaced by functional representation. Politics is reduced to the interaction between the executive branch and a limited circle of influential corporate unions. In exchange for obedience and agreement to play according to the rules approved by government agencies, these corporate organizations are artificially granted a monopoly to represent the interests of the relevant segments of the population, sectors of the economy, etc. Moreover, these corporate unions are put in such a position that they do not so much represent the interests of the relevant segments of society in relations with the state, but rather carry out public policy in these segments, layers, industries (Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, Republican Public Association "Belaya Rus").

The deep crisis in Russian-American and Russian-European relations that erupted in 2014 as a result of the change of power and the armed conflict in Ukraine had a significant impact on the foreign policy of Belarus. Its president, long and not unreasonably dissatisfied with the state of relations with Russia, saw in the current situation an opportunity to unfreeze relations with the West and extract political and financial dividends from a surge of tension in Europe. Belarus has not recognized Russian sovereignty over Crimea, but has taken an anti-Ukrainian stance on the conflict in Donbass. Of course, Russia and Belarus still remain allies, held together by multi-level interdependence and the structures of the Union State, the CSTO and the EAEU, and the dynamics of bilateral relations have resembled pendulum swings before, although not of such a wide amplitude.

Conclusion and discussion

The comparative study confirmed the hypothesis that the agenda of populism in the countries of the European transitional periphery is a consequence of Russia's direct and indirect interference in domestic political life, trying to divide societies into pro-Russian and pro-Western parts.

The European neoliberal tradition is based on the thesis of the interdependence of countries and their political parties and CSOs and the resulting possibility of their rational choice in favor of long-term peace for the European peripheral countries. The EU succeeds in influencing the political processes in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia through the formation in these European transitional peripheral countries of the norms of democratic governance, the growth of the welfare of citizens, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the European values of human rights. Mainly, the conducted analysis testifies to the limitations of such an impact of the European transitional peripheral countries, taking into account the frozen conflicts, military security factors, the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the risks of annexation of the territory and military intervention in Ukraine since 2014.

The EU mechanisms for cooperation and communication among political parties and CSOs of the European transitional peripheral countries were supposed to create opportunities for reviewing national interests and borrowing the practices of successful state-building and nation-building. Strategies of the ideological influence of Russia's foreign policy on the European transitional peripheral countries, including hard-soft power, carry the risk of monopolization and restrictions from the Euro-Atlantic integration processes, imposing the ideas of the Russian political elite on the norms of the world order by one or another actor, thereby imposing them from above on the so-called 'countries-partners' or 'allied countries' in the absence of a discussion of possible alternatives. The CIS, the CSTO, the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space and the Eurasian Economic Union are Russia's peculiar so-called 'integration trap' and 'security trap', which President Putin, the ruling United Russia party, the LDPR, the CPRF and other Russian actors use to deter post-Soviet countries from Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The populist rhetoric of the Russian political elite, who call their integration initiatives in the Eurasian space of epochal significance, a fundamentally new level of integration, fully preserving sovereignty while ensuring national security, closer and more harmonious economic cooperation, etc.

Russia, destabilizing the European transitional peripheral countries and regions, determines its own external and internal political vector of development precisely with the help of hard power. It is no coincidence that conflicts have sharply escalated in different regions of the European transitional peripheral countries, military clashes and war have occurred, and new risks of war are still emerging (the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the Russian peacekeeping forces in Transnistria, an active military conflict and the threat of war in Ukraine since 2014, Second Karabakh War 2020, the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh). Therefore, for the political elite, political parties and CSOs of these countries, the question arose of the need to maintain stability and preserve peace through joint efforts to develop experience in coordinated actions. It is no coincidence that in the conditions of neither war nor peace, as well as the

securitization of the political agenda among the political parties of these countries, populist rhetoric refers specifically to pro-Russian and Russophobic issues. This stage is rather difficult, but extremely dynamic, creating new opportunities, new risks and new trajectories for the development of the ruling party, the multi-party system and CSOs in these countries, including Russia's populist agenda. To identify these new risks, opportunities and development options is the subject of political discourse among the political elites of the European transitional peripheral countries.

The change in the populist agenda in the field of national security of these countries lies in the increasing importance of social and economic threats. These include the lack of vital resources (primarily food, water and energy); demographic problems; global poverty; unemployment, as well as the low level of education and health care; environmental and epidemiological problems; climate change. To a large extent, the emergence of these threats is the result of ineffective counteraction to military-political challenges and the expansion of the populist agenda of these countries.

Another Russian populist rhetoric in relation to confronting a wide range of threats and challenges in the field of national security of these countries by the Euro-Atlantic community is the so-called 'Collective West'. With the exception of Russia, China and India, most of the leading countries of the world are part of the Euro-Atlantic community (Collective West), which not only has enormous economic potential and political influence, but has also achieved a significant advantage in the field of military security since the early 1990s over most countries in the world. In this context, the formation of the Russian world in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration and globalization is of particular importance, in the light of the strengthening of the Russian positions of supranational organizations, the development of ideas and concepts of the future world order in the post-Soviet space.

At this stage, for the European transitional peripheral countries, populist rhetoric is the Russian world, the core of which is Russia, thus trying to unite (by force and hard power) compatriots of the post-Soviet countries and the Russian abroad living around its political center. If for the Duma political parties and the elite, the Russian world as a cultural and civilizational phenomenon united on the basis of the Russianness of its members and their self-identification with Russia, knowledge of the Russian language, belonging to Russian culture and a special type of mentality, then for the political elite and parliamentary parties and CSOs of the European transitional peripheral countries, this is a threat and a challenge to the loss of sovereignty, and only for the pro-Russian leaders and groups of these countries is the populist agenda. Paradoxically, in fact, the rallying of compatriots means the forced consolidation of representatives of the diaspora of European transitional peripheral countries, interference in the internal affairs of these countries, creating a transcontinental entity. In this regard, the populist side of the idea of the Russian world lies in the fact that it is not promoting the unity of Russians or Russian-speaking citizens of other countries with common roots, culture and strengthening ties with their historical homeland, preserving their civilizational identity, but on the contrary, this is an occasion to create real threats and geopolitical difficulties for these countries.

The political parties of the European transitional peripheral countries are in development and shifts are taking place, which can lead to the strengthening of the party

oligarchy, personalized politics, and ultimately to the establishment of authoritarianism in the party leadership. Along with the phenomenon of personalization of politics, the phenomenon of personalization of the voter also arose. The behavior of the voter, under the influence of a number of mechanisms, has led personalized parties to great electoral success. The populist party landscape in these countries is a two-pronged process: domestication of parties by business and, at the same time, domestication of business by parties. In this regard, despite the fact that these countries have ruling parties, however, they have not yet become the dominant party. The outcome of this process depends on the ability to find a balance point between politics and business, between electoral and personalized parties, between political leaders and groups. The evolution since 2014 of the multi-party systems of Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia shows that there has been a crisis of stability in Euro-Atlantic integration. The parties of the European transitional peripheral countries are facing not only new political and communication technologies, but also growing populism and disillusionment in their societies, widespread criticism of their structures and the processes taking place in them, which is accompanied by the loss of many party members and electorates. Meanwhile, the stability of the transitional democracies of the European transitional peripheral countries directly depends on the quality of the work of the ruling and parliamentary parties. In the course of political dialogue and partnership with CSOs and intra-party discussions, they reduce the level of populist rhetoric and broadcast the political positions, wishes and needs of their members and voters, realizing the function of articulating social interests. The electoral programs of the ruling and parliamentary parties of these countries represent strict political rationality, the most important political tool that gives voters the opportunity to make an informed choice, and gives the parties themselves special responsibility for their declarations. Each of them outlines the vision of key points, five of which are related to domestic politics: culture and education; proper social policy (including labor policy and employment, family, pension policy and health care); integration policy; national security policy; tax and financial policy.

The ruling and parliamentary parties of the European transitional peripheral countries, in search of a further balanced path for the development of their countries, under the influence of the Russian threat and national security, initiated the polarization of society into supporters and opponents of its political and cultural modernization. And this, in turn, initiates the emergence and success of populist new and small parties, which, under certain circumstances, can become full-fledged political players. This is important for understanding the possibilities of further transformations of the party system of these countries and their way out of the crisis of stability, the trap of security and integration, accompanied by a tendency to blur the center and the emergence of new effective parties. In addition to the general requirements for the ruling and parliamentary party activities, populist contradictions and inconsistencies between state requirements and party capabilities are natural. So, there are three groups of populist defects of the ruling and parliamentary parties of the European transitional peripheral countries: 1) institutional contradictions that arise in intra-party relations; 2) systemic collisions, in which there is a conflict between parties and authorized executive bodies, as well as with institutions responsible for organizing the electoral process; 3) defects in state foreign policy, when contradictions are observed at the strategic level between public authorities and parties.

In general, issues of national security and the growing confrontation of Russia undoubtedly have a populist and destabilizing effect on the party system of the European transitional peripheral countries. The reasons for this process include: an excessive emphasis on exclusivity and no alternative to guarantees of Russia's security and liberal values as a platform for the country's political life. These accents have dominated and continue to dominate both the domestic and foreign policies of these countries; the growth of nationalism, the mood of political nativism; a split within the centrist and center-left parties; the success of populism as a response to voter sentiment; euroscepticism, Russophobia and criticism of the elites; the outflow of members from parties, the arrival of new and young politicians; security issues; social tension.

References

- Albertazzi, Daniele, Bonansinga, Donatella, and Davide Vampa. 2021. "Introduction." In: *Populism and new patterns of political competition in Western Europe*, edited by Daniele Albertazzi and Davide Vampa, 1-18. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Arato, Andrew, and Jean L. Cohen. 2021. *Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Constitutional Democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Arditi, Benjamin. 2005. "Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics." In: *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, edited by Francisco Panizza, 72-98. New York, London: Verso.
- Berend, Ivan T. 2020. *The Economics and Politics of European Integration: Populism, Nationalism and the History of the EU*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Breyfogle, Nicholas B., Schrader, Abby, and Willard Sunderland. 2007. "Russian colonizations: an introduction." In: *Peopling the Russian periphery: borderland colonization in Eurasian history*, edited by Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland, 1-18. London and New York: Routledge.
- Carrion, Julio F. 2022. *A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power: The Andes in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford University Press.
- Csehi, Robert. 2021. *Routledge Studies in Anti-Politics and Democratic Crisis*. London and New York: Routledge.
- de la Torre, Carlos. 2021. "What do we mean by populism?" In: *The Routledge Companion to Media Disinformation and Populism*, edited by Howard Tumber and Silvio Waisbord, 29-37. London and New York: Routledge.
- Di Nucci, Ezio. 2021. *The Control Paradox: From AI to Populism*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Diesen, Glenn. 2022. *Russophobia: Propaganda in International Politics*. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1468-3_10.
- Fieschi, Catherine. 2019. *Populocracy. The Tyranny of Authenticity and the Rise of Populism*. Agenda Publishing.
- Gabrisch, Hubert, Lucjan T. Orlowski, and Toralf Pusch. 2012. "Sovereign default Risk in the Euro-Periphery and the Euro-Candidate Countries." *MPRA Paper* 41265. Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41265/>.

- Gamkrelidze, Tamar. 2019. "The project of Europe: a robust attempt to redefine Georgian identity." *East European Politics* 35 (3): 351-371. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2019.1613645>.
- Gamkrelidze, Tamar. 2022. "Georgia's external frontier on Russia sedimented and unmalleable: engagement politics and the impact of the three-tier warfare." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*: 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.2023485>.
- Ghaplanyan, Irina. 2018. *Post-Soviet Armenia. The New National Elite and the New National Narrative*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Glenn, John G. 2019. *Foucault and Post-Financial Crises: Governmentality, Discipline and Resistance*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan: 153-191. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77188-5_6.
- Gräbner, Claudius, and Jakob Hafele. 2020. "The emergence of coreperiphery structures in the European Union: A complexity perspective." *ZOE Discussion Papers* 6. ZOE: Institut für zukunftsfähige Ökonomien, Bonn. Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/224134/1/172895116X.pdf>.
- Graney, Katherine. 2019. *Russia, the Former Soviet Republics, and Europe Since 1989: Transformation and Tragedy*. New York: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190055080.001.0001>.
- Gregor, A. James. 2021. "Populism of the Russian Federation." In: *Political Populism In The Twenty-First Century: We The People*, edited by Maria Hsia Chang, and A. James Gregor, 21-39. Cambridge Scholars Publishing,.
- Heinisch, Reinhard, and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2016. "Introduction." In: *Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe*, edited by Reinhard Heinisch, and Oscar Mazzoleni, 1-18. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-58197-6_1.
- Heinisch, Reinhard, Massetti, Emanuele, and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2020. "Populism and ethno-territorial politics - conclusions: bridging legacies in understanding party mobilization." In: *The people and the nation: populism and ethno-territorial politics in Europe*, edited by Reinhard Heinisch, Emanuele Massetti, and Oscar Mazzoleni, 280-290. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Huber, Robert A., and Christian H. Schimpf. 2017. "Populism and democracy - theoretical and empirical considerations." In: *Political Populism: A Handbook*, ed. by Reinhard C. Heinisch, Christina Holtz-Bacha, and Oscar Mazzoleni, 329-344. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- HURI. 2021. "Contextualizing Putin's "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." *Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University*. Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://huri.harvard.edu/news/putin-historical-unity>.
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, and Lisa Zanotti. 2021. "Populism and the welfare state." In: *Handbook on Austerity, Populism and the Welfare State*, edited by Bent Greve, 41-53. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kim, Seongcheol. 2021. *Discourse, Hegemony, and Populism in the Visegrád Four*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kinsella, Stephen. 2012. "Conventions and the European Periphery." Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2155577>.

- Klobucka, Anna. 1997. "Theorizing The European Periphery." *Symplokē* 5 (1/2): 119-35.
- Krekó, Péter. 2021. "Populism in Power: The Tribal Challenge." In: *The Psychology of Populism: The Tribal Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, William D. Crano, and Klaus Fiedler, 240-257. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lane, Philip R. 2012. "The European Sovereign Debt Crisis." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26 (3): 49-68. <http://doi.org/10.1257/jep.26.3.49>.
- Lieven, Anatol. 2000. "Against Russophobia." *World Policy Journal* 17 (4): 25-32.
- Luostarinen, Heikki. 1989. "Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image." *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (2): 123-37.
- Manucci, Luca. 2022. "Populism and Collective Memory." In: *The Palgrave Handbook of Populism*, edited by Michael Oswald, 451-468. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_28.
- Payaslian, Simon. 2011. *The political economy of human rights in Armenia: Authoritarianism and Democracy in a Former Soviet Republic*. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Pejović, Astrea, and Dimitar Nikolovski. 2022. "Introduction: Memory politics and populism in Southeastern Europe - toward an ethnographic understanding of enmity." In: *Memory politics and populism in Southeastern Europe*, edited by Jody Jensen. 1-11. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Schwörer, Jacob. 2021. *The Growth of Populism in the Political Mainstream: The Contagion Effect of Populist Messages on Mainstream Parties' Communication*. Cham, Switzerland. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72449-8>.
- Stengel, Frank A., MacDonald, David B., and Dirk Nabers. 2019. "Conclusion: Populism, Foreign Policy, and World Politics." In: *Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions*, edited by Frank A. Stengel, David B. MacDonald, and Dirk Nabers, 365-372. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04621-7_14.
- Van Herpen, Marcel H. 2021. *The end of populism: Twenty proposals to defend liberal democracy*. Manchester University Press.
- Vorländer, Hans. 2019. "Populism and Modern Democracy - An Outline." In: *The Comeback of Populism: Transatlantic Perspectives*, edited by Jürgen Gebhardt, Heike Paul, and Ursula Prutsch, 13-27. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter GmbH.
- Wilson, Carter A. 2021. *Trumpism: Race, Class, Populism, and Public Policy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

REFLECTIONS ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD ORDER: EMERGING TRENDS AND IMPENDING PERSPECTIVES

KARINE KHOJAYAN 

Abstract

The article analyzes the latest trends of the started process of transformation of world order, trying to explain it by various concepts, bringing forward by researchers and scientists, substantiating for many decades the urgent need for the existence of a dominant state - a hegemon which plays a role of a stabilizer of the international relations. The article focuses on the concept of hegemonic stability, arguing that existence of hegemon especially in the political and economic system is a necessary condition for maintaining global peace and stability. Special attention is paid to the conditions that contribute to the decline of hegemony. Drawing parallels between today's realities and the concepts, highlighted by Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Immanuel Wallerstein and other researchers, the article proves that even based on the concepts of the mentioned researchers who for many years justified the "stabilizing role" of the US hegemony, after the global fanatical crisis of 2008 a new phase of development is becoming more and more noticeable. Referring to the point of view of I. Wallerstein, the article concludes that even maintaining dominance to a certain extent in a number of areas, such as military, political, the unipolar world order has already gone down in history.

Keywords: *transformation, world order, hegemony, decline, financial landscape, China, the USA, Bretton-Wood institutions, US dollar, military.*

Introduction

One of the most discussed topics on the international political agenda of the last several decades has been the issue of transformation of the existing political system, widely called as the neoliberal paradigm or liberal international order shift, which finally took shape as a result of the collapse of the bipolar world.

While it is still fairly difficult to confirm that the era of liberal democracy has given way once and for all to the new order, in the meantime, the first sprouts of the coming changes are becoming more then visible - the emergence of new global powers, current

* Karine Khojayan is an Associate Professor, PhD in Political Science of the Chair of Political Science of the Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University. She also works as a Program Coordinator at the United Nations.

Email: karine.khojayan@ysu.am

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp.92-105



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 24.08.2022

Revised: 30.08.2022

Accepted: 03.09.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

and anticipated changes in global economic and financial landscape, the ongoing transformations in the political and security environment, the emergence of new challenges such as environmental issues, epidemiological issues affecting the established order and rules, as well as escalation of conflicts and erupted proxy wars around the world.

Brief overview of hegemonic stability theory

The theoretical foundations of a unipolar world order, which to most extent has proven its viability over several decades, are built around the studies of researchers and research institutions, putting forward several theories in different historical periods, in most cases substantiating the role of the United States as the only world hegemon.

During the Cold War so-called Western political science was mostly influenced by the concept of Hegemonic Stability, a theory propounded and articulated by Dr. Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane and others, which was arguing that the presence of a hegemon in the world political and economic system is a necessary condition for maintaining global peace and stability. The existence of one dominant state was seen as a guarantee of international stability. As Kindleberger mentions “Great Depression, a market failure of monumental proportions, was caused by the absence of a lender of last resort in the international financial system. There could only be a lender of last resort if there were a single dominant power in the international system. Only a hegemon would have the capacity and interest to provide the public good of financial stability” (Kindleberger 1973, 96). Moreover, Kindleberger argues that absence of a hegemon in the international system was the reason of failure to build an international economic regime during interwar period between two world wars (Kindleberger 1973, 24). The hegemon also plays a role as a stabilizer of the financial system as well, and as Kindleberger notes, “financial crises can be followed by prolonged depressions as happened in the 1930s” (Kindleberger 1973, 205).

Robert Gilpin, a Professor at Princeton University and one of the sectaries of hegemonic stability theory, believed that even if hypothetically stable liberal international order could be established through cooperation without the presence of delineated hegemon state, this never happened (Gilpin 2001, 93). Gilpin explicitly prioritizes the economic aspects of international development over political and military successes and justifies his concept with the example of West Germany and Japan - defeated countries, rapidly recovering and “recouping their international positions by creating strong economies” (Gilpin 1981, 33). Gilpin believes that the success of states is mostly determined by their position in international trade, by volume of foreign investments and by world monetary affairs, which ultimately provide them with a basis for turning economic opportunities into military power, as West Germany and Japan did (Gilpin 1981, 33).

Stephen Krasner, a Sandford Professor, also relies on economics and open trading system for global a hegemon, which increases its aggregate national income, while further strengthening his political power. Moreover, Krasner argues that the dominate state has “symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure” (Krasner 1976, 322).

Nobel Prize Laureate Robert Mundell also notes that the presence of a dominant country provides strong guarantees for maintaining the stability of the international

financial and monetary system. (Gilpin, *Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economic Order* 2001, 96).


Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein although acknowledged that hegemony operates primarily through the market, at the same time they firmly believe that military-political and cultural components should not be overlooked (Hopkins 1982, 52).

In defining hegemonic power, Immanuel Wallerstein accepts that it usually happens when one state imposes its rules on the interstate system thereby creating a world political order of its own accord (Wallerstein 1980, 23). Wallerstein attributes the decline of hegemonies to their inability to maintain “quasi monopoly of world geopolitical power” (Wallerstein 1980, 24). In order to maintain the established international order, hegemonic powers begin to invest in military structures for the periodic use of armed forces, which requires additional costs and diverts finance from economic investments. (Wallerstein 1980, 24).

As per Wallerstein’s theory, the period of decline of the hegemon power can last certain time and the decline does not happen instantly. Having lost absolute hegemony, countries still continue to maintain their political and military, but not economic dominance (Wallerstein 1980, 24).

Wallerstein put forward the idea that “during the ‘balance of power’ period, the declining hegemonic power began to invest heavily in the economic activities of the rising power with which it became an ally as a junior partner” (Wallerstein 1980, 25). This concept is confirmed when analyzing relationships between the United States and China, as well as the US and Japan. US investment in China’s market has opened up since 1980s, when it was rather modest. Meanwhile, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 boosted US direct investment in China, which in 2008 exceeded \$20 billion and followed by global crises, they fluctuate between 13 and 16 billion dollars a year (Hanemann et al. 2021, 13). Another rising power was Japan, the main US partner in the Asia-Pacific region, where the US has been a major investor for many years (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. US Foreign Direct Investments (mln USD)⁵



⁵ Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2022. “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data.” Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal>.

Gilpin attributes the decline of the state to the erosion of its economic base, which directly affects the military sector, increasing its costs and the overall costs of wars (Gilpin 1981, 161-162). According to Gilpin's theory, a new international system is usually created through hegemonic wars arising from a growing imbalance between the burden of maintaining a hegemonic position and the availability of resources (Gilpin 1981, 210).

This concept was partly proved in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the collapse of the bipolar world and the establishment of neoliberal world order, which is in most extend based on international financial and monetary system, eventually formed after Bretton-Wood and Jamaka conferences. The new neoliberal world order was based primarily on the military and economic superiority of the United States, arising after the early 1990s, which eventually handed over the reins of political power in international affairs to the latter. At the same time it's becoming obvious that the international order has transformed into the new phase of global development. The started process of transformation is characterized by appearance of new actors of international relations, as well as by emerging trends in the monetary, financial, economic and overall political spheres. It is also relevant in the context of the ongoing geopolitical confrontation, as well as military actions, taking place in the eastern part of Europe, aimed at accelerating the processes of the transformation of existing international system through hegemonic war between so called Western democracies and new emerging powers.

Transformations in international monetary-financial system

Many scholars (Kindleberger, Mundell and others) believe that one of the first indications of hegemonic power decline are reflected in financial and economic sectors. Signs of started transformation in these sectors become visible particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis.

It is widely known that the current international financial and monetary system was established as a result of Bretton Woods conference, where the international monetary system with fixed exchange rates to US dollar was created. The established system and the strengthening role of the US dollar was heavily enhanced by Marshall and Dodge plans, providing financial support in US dollars for the recovery and reconstruction of the post-war economy of Europe and Japan, thus taking one of the first steps towards internationalization of US currency. The political role of the US dollar was further enhanced by creation of so-called Bretton Woods institutions, which continuously provide financial and technical supports to developing and less developed countries for addressing their social and economic problems. Moreover, the institutions of World Bank Group⁶ and other financial organizations, including regional financial corporations, such as the European Investment bank, the Asian Development Bank, and others mostly focus on supporting economic policies and stimulating economic growth of the member states through the provision of loans and credits, thereby indirectly setting

⁶ World Bank Group includes 5 financial institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

the overall development vector of the developing countries. At the same time, in the overwhelming majority of cases, this policy has brought to the additional increase of the US dollar reserves, and to the expansion of the demand for US dollars around the world.

It's worth mentioning the role of the United States and its allies in the established Bretton Woods institutions, where they have a dominant role including in the voting system, thereby setting priorities and in certain cases preferences when granting loans and other forms of financial support to less developed and developing countries. Such *modus operandi* seems quite logical given the overall share of the US GDP in global economy, where the US has been the absolute leader for several decades. Moreover, it is more than obvious that the international financial system was formed on the dominant role of the United States, which also explains the efforts of leading American institutions and researchers who emphasize the exceptional importance of the existence of a dominant state as a stabilizer of the financial system (Kindleberger, Mundell, and others).

Meanwhile, since the post-financial crisis of 2008, the growing role of the People's Republic of China has signaled the beginning of a transformation in the global international financial system. In early 2010, for the first time in history, China's nominal GDP passed the USD 6 trillion mark, making China the second largest economy after the United States (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Nominal Gross Domestic Product (World Bank data 2022)

| Country | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 |
|----------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| United States | 10,252,345 | 13,036,640 | 14,992,053 | 18,238,300 | 20,953,030 |
| China | 1,211,347 | 2,285,966 | 6,087,164 | 11,061,553 | 14,722,731 |
| Japan | 4,968,359 | 4,831,467 | 5,759,072 | 4,444,931 | 5,057,759 |

Moreover, data on the annual GDP growth of the world's leading economies clearly indicate the emerging role and prospects for further growth of developing countries, primarily China and India, in the coming years (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. GDP Annual Growth (World Bank data 2022)

| Country | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| United States | 4.1% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 3.1% | 1.7% | 2.3% | 3.0% | 2.2% | -3.4% |
| China | 8.5% | 11.4% | 10.6% | 7.0% | 6.8% | 6.9% | 6.7% | 5.9% | 2.3% |
| Japan | 2.8% | 1.8% | 4.1% | 1.6% | 0.8% | 1.7% | 0.6% | 0.3% | -4.6% |
| India | 3.8% | 7.9% | 8.5% | 8.0% | 8.3% | 6.8% | 6.5% | 4.0% | -7.3% |
| Germany | 2.9% | 0.7% | 4.2% | 1.5% | 2.2% | 2.7% | 1.1% | 1.1% | -4.6% |
| Russian Federation | 10.0% | 6.4% | 4.5% | -2.0% | 0.2% | 1.8% | 2.8% | 2.0% | -3.0% |

Princeton professor R. Gilpin goes further than his colleagues Kindleberger and Mundell and connects the success of countries with their position in international trade, with foreign investment and the share of their currency in the world's monetary reserves (Gilpin 1981, 33).

Even the brief overview of the global trends in international trade demonstrates that over the past 7 years, China has already surpassed the United States in terms of the share of its national exports in world exports. Today, more than 19% of international exports go to China, which significantly enhances China's role in international trade.

Figure 4. Share of national exports in world's export (in %) (Eurostat 2022)





Figure 5. Share of national import in world import (in %) (Eurostat 2022)



Moreover, China is already at the forefront position in terms of the share of national imports in world imports. Although China still lags behind the United States, the world's leading importer, China's share of global imports is growing significantly and steadily, giving it every chance to surpass the world leader in the coming years. Even in 2021,

during the Covid-19 pandemic, China's imports increased significantly, which allowed it to have a positive trade balance in contrast to competing countries (see Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 6. Foreign investments 2017-2021 (mln USD) (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2022, 210)

| Country/ Region | FDI inflows | | | | | FDI outflows | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| European Union | 274 904 | 366 347 | 401 677 | 209 509 | 137 541 | 347 293 | 293 339 | 368 335 | 66 412 | 397 637 |
| India | 39 904 | 42 156 | 50 558 | 64 072 | 44 735 | 11 141 | 11 447 | 13 144 | 11 109 | 15 522 |
| Brazil | 66 585 | 59 802 | 65 386 | 28 318 | 50 367 | 19 040 | -16 336 | 19 031 | -12 935 | 23 083 |
| Russian Federation | 25 954 | 13 228 | 32 076 | 10 410 | 38 240 | 34 153 | 35 820 | 22 024 | 6 778 | 63 602 |
| China | 136 315 | 138 305 | 141 225 | 149 342 | 180 957 | 158 288 | 143 037 | 136 905 | 153 710 | 145 190 |
| United States | 308 956 | 203 234 | 225 108 | 150 828 | 367 376 | 327 780 | -157 406 | 28 596 | 234 919 | 403 101 |

The flow of foreign direct investments (FDI), which is also one of the indicators, highlighted by Gilpin for characterizing the role and dominance of hegemonic states, demonstrates the existing trends of increase of FDI especially in rapidly developing countries. In terms of FDI inflows alone, the increase of China's economy seems to be more than tangible, indicating about a 25% increase in FDI in 2021 compared to 2015, when the same figure for the United States over the same period is about 16%. (see Figure 6). Though the United States still remains in dominant position by FDI inflows, but its growth rates are relatively slow. This clearly indicates that the US still needs to make more efforts to maintain its leading role in the world.

Figure 7. Foreign exchange reserves by currency (International Monetary Fund 2022)

| Currency | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 (Q1) |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| US dollars | 65,36% | 62,73% | 61,76% | 60,75% | 58,92% | 58,86% | 58,88% |
| Euro | 19,14% | 20,17% | 20,67% | 20,59% | 21,29% | 20,58% | 20,06% |
| Japanese yen | 3,95% | 4,90% | 5,19% | 5,87% | 6,03% | 5,52% | 5,36% |
| Chinese renminbi | 1,08% | 1,23% | 1,89% | 1,94% | 2,29% | 2,80% | 2,88% |

The situation is similar in foreign exchange reserves market - another indicator, stressed by R. Gilpin for hegemonies. The IMF data on currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER) also point to a rising trend for Chinese renminbi. Renminbi internationalization began years ago. China's policy towards its currency internationalization can be considered as a logical response to its growing economy. Since 2010, China has been promoting direct currency trading with renminbi, concluding such agreements with Malaysia (August 2010), the Russian Federation (November 2010), Japan (December 2011), Australia (April 2013) (Eichengreen B. 2015, 8).

Already in 2015 renminbi was included in the basket of five international currencies and together with the US dollar, the Euro, the Japanese yen and the British pound sterling constitute the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).⁷ (International Monetary Fund 2021)

One of the major political milestones in terms of renminbi internationalization was the introduction in 2015 initiated and established by China Cross-border Interbank Payments System (CIPS). CIPS acts as an alternative to the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) international financial transactions and payment system. In line with the implementation of the China initiated and led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the growing prospect of the CIPS, encompassing at least the countries included in BRI, as well as China's trade partners in the region and worldwide, is more than visible. China is keen for further expansion of the CIPS not only from economic but also from larger political perspective, considering also the lessons learned from the recent crisis in Ukraine and earlier in Iran, where the Western sections imposed a ban on international transactions of these countries, made via SWIFT system.

It is also important to note that today SWIFT is no longer the only system for financial transactions and payments. In addition to China, similar systems have been developed by Iran called electronic financial messaging system in response to sanctions (SERAM) imposed on the Islamic Republic. The Russian Financial Message Translation System (SPFS) is another alternative to SWIFT, developed in early 2014. Since 2019 the discussions have been started regarding setup of interconnections between Russian, Chinese, Iranian payment systems. India - another rapidly growing economy, is interested to join these relatively recently developed systems, which will eventually let India bypass SWIFT (Daye 2019). Further intensifications and initiated steps taken will defiantly have knock-on impact on transformation of global financial affairs.

The started process of transformation of international financial landscape has been strengthened by creation of international financial development institutions, such as New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which play a leading role in financing of China's proposed and implemented Road and Belt Initiative (BRI). For many years financial development institutions have proven their role as effective tools of "soft power" in international affairs, providing financial support, technical assistance and expertise to developing and least developed countries for their further socio-economic development and welfare, thereby setting the development vector and the main priorities, including the political priorities of the latter.

International financial development institutions were created immediately after the conclusion of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1944, aiming to support countries overcome the socio-economic consequences of the Second World War. Meanwhile, in addition to the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, a number of other international and regional financial development institutions have been created, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank. bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, etc. In a meantime the overwhelming majority of quotas, which become crucial in decision-making process are with so-called Western block and its allies led by the United States,

⁷ SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF to supplements its member states' official reserves.

the European Union, Japan. In this regard, the main vectors of international development, at least for those countries that are beneficiaries of the mentioned institutions, are established and supported by them. The general tack has changed with the advent of Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), commonly known as BRICS Bank. The established AIIB is comparable with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. When established, AIIB total capital amounts 2/3 capital of the ADB and half of that of the WB (Mishra 2016, 166).

Moreover, being a member of the World Bank Group, China has also strengthened its role as a member of World Bank by increasing its quotes, which let increasing its voting power in overall decision-making process, which put China behind the United States and Japan (World Bank 2022).

Thus, the overall international financial and monetary landscape has entered a new stage of transformation. The general *modus operandi*, essential for functioning of global financial system and grounded on the concept of one country dominance, has changed significantly. The emergence of new global actors in form of countries, blocs and international development institutions through the gauntlet to the ‘rules of the game’, giving a clear sign for its change.

Military and political aspects of ongoing transformations

An incontestable observation put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein, arguing that hegemonic powers are usually trying to maintain the established international order by investing in military structures, becomes more and more visible. The annual military spending data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)⁸ confirm Wallerstein’s view that “losing absolute hegemony, countries still continue to maintain their political and military superiority” (Kwon 2011; Winecoff 2020).

In terms of the share of military spending in the country’s GDP, as well as in terms of military spending by both the United States and China over the past 5 years (2017-2021), the United States demonstrates a clear superiority over China⁹.

⁸ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2021. “Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) Military Expenditure Database.” Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.

⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. “Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) Arms Industry Database.” Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry>.

Figure 8. Share of Military Expenditure in countries' GDP





Figure 9. Share of Military Expenditure in government spending



Only in 2021, US military spending exceeds that of China by more than 63%. By this indicator the United States hold a dominant position among other permanent members of the UN Security Council as well¹⁰.

The share of military spending in the total US GDP is constantly increasing (see Figure 9). The United States, while keeping its military presence around the world, still continues to maintain its position as the dominant power. Meanwhile, the military-industrial complex of competing countries is consistently developing. The same SIPRI data indicate that, along with American companies producing and selling weapons, the

¹⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2021. "Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) Military Expenditure Database." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.

number of such companies from Europe, China, Russia, and other countries is increasing¹¹.

Hence, in line with started transformation in the economic sector, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic (see Figure 3), the United States still continues to keep its dominant position in military sector, which also confirms Wallerstein's point stating that the period of the decline of hegemon power takes time and countries still continue to maintain their political and military but not economic dominance (Wallerstein 1980, 24).

The political landscape has been significantly changed due to started transformation of one of the major bedrocks of the existing financial system, laid down in early 1974 by an agreement, made by the Nixon administration with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after the Yom Kippur War and the 1973 oil crisis¹². The agreement provided for the payment of oil exported from Saudi Arabia in US dollars in exchange for military assistance and security guarantees, including from the State of Israel. Moreover, the Saudis have pledged to put the proceeds of petrodollars back into the US Treasury and finance the US debt, hit hard by the oil crisis. Soon, other OPEC countries joined this deal, selling oil exclusively for US dollars¹³.

The agreement concluded between the Nixon administration and Saudi Arabia, and later other OPEC countries, secured the role of the main reserve currency for the US dollar for many years.

The foundations of the established US dollar dominated geopolitical order were shaken when Saudi Arabia, the world's largest crude oil exporter¹⁴, began active negotiations with China, the world's leading crude oil importer¹⁵, to sell Saudi oil to China in yuan (McNally 2022). Such developments, coupled with Russia's demand to sell gas to EU countries in rubles, is definitely a serious challenge for the United States, and in particular for American global financial hegemony, especially given that Saudi Arabia, together with the Russian Federation, is one of the two top oil suppliers over the last 2 years¹⁶.

The started process of rapprochement between the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia, despite the existing disagreements between the countries on a set of issues on Syrian conflict, the nuclear deal with Iran and other issues is one of the challenges to the established world order. Over and above, Saudi Arabia also doubled Russian imports of

¹¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. "Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIRPI) Arms Industry Database." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry>.

¹² The Economic Times. 2016. "The untold story behind Saudi Arabia's 41-year US debt secret." Accessed July 26, 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/the-untold-story-behind-saudi-arabias-41-year-us-debt-secret/articleshow/52528470.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ World's Top Exports. 2022. "Crude oil export by countries." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country/>.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Arab News. 2022. "Saudi Arabia is top oil supplier to China in 2021." Accessed July 26, 2022. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2008206/business-economy>; Business Standard. 2022. "Russia replaces Saudi Arabia as China's biggest crude oil supplier." Accessed July 26, 2022. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/russia-replaces-saudi-arabia-as-china-s-biggest-crude-oil-supplier-122062000745_1.html.

fuel oil for the feed of power plants¹⁷. Being for many decades the US main partner in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is one of those 3 countries, planning to join BRICS¹⁸, thereby changing the balance of interest in over the Middle East region.

Conclusion and discussion

The transformations, that have begun years ago, are now an inevitable process. The started process is already noticeable in global financial and economic landscape, in the meantime its beginnings have also been reflected in global military and military-political affairs. The results of the started process of transformation directly indicate that the unipolar world order has gone down in history. Wallerstein's thesis that states retain their military and political dominance for a certain period after losing economic hegemony today illustrates the existing state of affairs. In a meantime, transformations are beginning to appear in both the political and geopolitical spheres. Emergence of new powers, new alliances and integration formats, new partnerships and infrastructural megaprojects is fundamentally changing the existing landscape. They clearly point to a new world order that is still in the process of structural transformation and development.

The concepts put forward by scholars and researchers, justifying the urgent need to have a hegemon country for stabilizing the international order are gradually losing their relevance. By a set of indicators, substantiating for many years the leading role of the United States in international relations, such as countries position in international trade, the over volume of foreign direct investments, growth of nominal GDP, and even by the share of currencies in world monetary reserves (through the US still keeps its leading positions) the existing state of affairs is changing.

The establishment of new international financial institutions, such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank comes to transform the existing financial landscape. The international monetary and financial system has been embedded mainly into the Bretton Woods institutions, but also into other regional entities where the so-called 'Western bloc' led by the US and its allies (such as the EU and Japan) has all the reins of power to influence international development trends in developing and least developed countries by setting preconditions for the provision of loans, grants and other types of financial support.

Transformations in international economic and financial sectors have a direct impact on political and geopolitical situation. ranging from East Asia, such as RCEP - Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, to Eurasia, Africa and Latin America (BRICS). As an alternative to SWIFT, new payment systems for financial transactions have already been created to cover China (CIPS), Iran (SERAM), Russia (SPFS), as well as India.

¹⁷ Reuters. 2022. "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia doubles second-quarter Russian fuel oil imports for power generation." Accessed July 26, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-saudi-arabia-doubles-q2-russian-fuel-oil-imports-power-generation-2022-07-14/>.

¹⁸ Memo Middle East Monitor. 2022. "BRICS expects Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to join group soon." Accessed July 26, 2022. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220714-brics-expects-egypt-saudi-arabia-and-turkey-to-join-group-soon/>.

Although the US dollar continues to hold its leading position as an international reserve currency, its position has begun to falter. Its first sprouts began to appear when Saudi Arabia, the world's largest exporter of crude oil, began active negotiations with China, the world's leading importer of crude oil, to sell Saudi oil to China in yuan. Another major oil supplier, the Russian Federation, demands that Russian gas be sold to EU countries for rubles. This is indeed a serious challenge to US global financial hegemony, which proves that the US-Saudi oil agreement, which also includes other members of OPEC, is no longer valid.

Thus, international relations have already entered a new phase of development. The new order is still in the process of restructuring. In the meantime, we can already state that the liberal international order is giving way to a new world order, which, indeed, will be far from being unipolar.

References

- Daye, Chu. 2019. "Russia and India can challenge SWIFT hegemony." *Global Times*, October 22. Accessed July 26, 2022. <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1168382.shtml>.
- Eichengreen, Barry, and Masahiro Kawai, ed. 2015. *Renminbi Internationalization. Achievements, Perspectives and Challenges*. Tokyo, Washington, D.C.: Asian Development Bank Institution, Brookings Institution.
- Eurostat. 2022. "Share of European Union EU27 in world trade." Accessed July 27, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EXT_LT_INTROEU27_2020__custom_3009927/settings_1/table?lang=en.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, Robert. 2001. *Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economic Order*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Hanemann, Thilo, Daniel H. Rosen, Mark Witzke, Steve Bennion, and Emma Smith. 2021. *Two-Way Street: 2021 Update US-China Investment Trends*. The US-China Investment Project Report, New York: Rhodium Group, National Committee on US-China Relations.
- Hopkins, Terence K., and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1982. *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications.
- International Monetary Fund. 2021. "Special drawing rights (SDR)." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR>.
- International Monetary Fund. 2022. "International financial statistics. Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER)." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=41175>.
- Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929-39*. Berkley: University of California Press.

- Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28 (3): 317-347. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009974>
- Kwon, Roy. 2011. "Hegemonies in the World-System: An Empirical Assessment of Hegemonic Sequences from the 16th to 20th Century." *Sociological Perspectives* 54 (4): 593-617. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sop.2011.54.4.593>.
- McNally, Christopher A. 2022. "Saudi Arabia's Oil Exports and the Yuan." Accessed July 26, 2022. <https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/saudi-arabias-oil-exports-and-the-yuan>.
- Mishra, Rahul. 2016. "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: An Assessment." *India Quarterly* 72 (2): 163-176. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928416643582>.
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2022. "World Investment Report 2022, FDI flows, by region and economy, 2016-2021." New York: UNCTD. Accessed July 27, 2022. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2022_en.pdf.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1980. *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750*. New York: New York Academy Press.
- Winecoff, William K. 2020. "'The persistent myth of lost hegemony,' revisited: structural power as a complex network phenomenon." *European Journal of International Relations* 26 (1): 209-252. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120952876>.
- World Bank data. 2022. "GDP annual growth." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators#>.
- World Bank data. 2022. "Nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=US-CN-JP&start=1960&view=chart>.
- World Bank. 2022. "World Bank Group Finances. Top 8 countries voting power." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://finances.worldbank.org/Shareholder-Equity/Top-8-countries-voting-power/udm3-vzz9>.
- World's Top Exports. 2022. "Crude oil export by countries." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country/>.
- World's Top Exports. 2022. "Crude oil import by countries." Accessed July 27, 2022. <https://www.worldstopexports.com/crude-oil-imports-by-country/>.

CIVIC JOURNALISM AS A PHENOMENON OF DIGITAL CIVILIZATION

GRETA GEVORGYAN **Abstract**

This article explores the role of citizen journalism in terms of promoting civil society and democracy. Civic journalists, as well as citizen journalists, contribute to public discussion and try to voice and address many issues that have been ignored by traditional journalism. This study aims to explore the relevance of citizen journalism in the modern world. In addition, a negative phenomenon that is widespread in social networks and infringes on human rights, fake news and hate speech on social networks is investigated. Combining qualitative discourse analysis, comparison and description, the study shows that the role of citizen journalism is growing in many countries. However, hate speech and fake news on social media hinder the development of citizen journalism. To this end, further legislative and democratic measures must be taken. However, the most effective way to combat the obstacles to citizen journalism is to promote media literacy, which will enable everyone to comparatively analyze information, check the message and develop critical thinking.

Keywords: *Civic journalism, citizen journalism, public journalism, disinformation, misinformation, mal-information, social media, freedom of speech, fake news, democracy, mediocracy.*

Introduction

“Whoever controls the media, controls the mind.”
Jim Morrison

Political leaders tend to think that they are in control of everything that takes place in political life. In fact, with the advent of new media, which have emerged as powerful platforms for political communication, the role of political leaders has changed to a great extent. It is thought that media tools often guide politicians to plan the strategy that will help them to achieve their goals. Serving this goal, nevertheless, new media tools make their beneficiaries act according to their rules and principles, which considerably change the dynamics of political communication. It has commonly been assumed that nowadays

* Greta Gevorgyan is an MA in Human Rights and Democratization in the Caucasus of the Center of European Studies at Yerevan State University.

Email: gretagevorgyan@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp.106-120



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 08.07.2022

Revised: 18.07.2022

Accepted: 22.07.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

neither political actors nor political procedures influence the behaviour of citizens but mainly the information that is conveyed through the internet.

Recently, there has been renewed interest in social media because they made a revolution in the sphere of information communication technologies. Some years ago, internet was considered the source that aimed to provide its users with information, but today the relation between the internet and its users has changed due to Web 2 tools. Nowadays people not only receive information through the internet but also share the information, concerns, or opinions they have. There is some evidence to suggest that social media give opportunity to citizens directly or indirectly become active participants of the events taking place in political life.

Civic journalism is a major area of interest within the field of new media. A great deal of previous research into civic journalism has focused on the fact that the main aim of democracy is to develop genuine society, which can be implemented through the development of civic journalism. In its early stage of its formation civic journalism related to elections and electoral campaigns, but later, when the usage of internet became widespread, other community issues have been drawn attention to as well (Ruusunoksa 2006, 4; Nuernbergk 2022).

Ahmad, Popa, Kulesha, and Romero showed in their study that social media and web technologies play an important role in the life and work of a transformational society (Ahmad and Popa 2014; Kulesza 2014; Romero 2014). There is a growing body of literature that recognises the novelty of these technologies to transform broadcast media monologues (one to many) into social media dialogues (many to many) (Ahmad and Popa 2014; Kulesza 2014; Romero 2014).

Since the fast proliferation of the internet technologies the number of the internet users has drastically increased. Every day millions of people make use of social media for both communicating with each other and exchanging information. The topicality of the research is that social media have turned into a powerful tool, which influence both everyday life and political life. Evidence suggests that civic journalism is among the most important factors for mobilizing and guiding the society, influencing upon electoral behaviour, and shaping public opinion.

While social media contribute to transparency and accountability of political actors and serve as a significant platform for public debates, they also contribute to the incitement of violence, hatred, and defamation through fake news and hate speech.

The aim of the research is to assess the importance of civic journalism in the modern world and reveal the border between the freedom of speech and fake news.

This paper consists of two parts focusing on the differences between civic journalism and citizen journalism as well as freedom of speech and fake news.

Basic Definitions of the Terms “Civic Journalism” and “Citizen Journalism”

The emergence of the internet and new technologies has greatly influenced the forms of communication. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in non-traditional type of journalism. The latter has a pivotal role in modern information societies. In order to understand and analyse the essence, potential, and scopes of influence of non-

traditional forms of journalism, it is necessary to study definitions of the terms “civic journalism” and “citizen journalism.”

There are a wide range of definitions on civic journalism. In some sources the term “public journalism” is used instead of civic journalism. Civic journalism can be defined as socially active journalism. Its goal is not limited to covering news or presenting certain facts. The ultimate goal of civic journalism is to influence the life of the society (Predmerská 2019). It is thought that this new kind of journalism has the mission of raising some issues that are vital to society and finding solutions to those issues.

In an analysis of public journalism, researchers found that the role of public journalism will be more significant when it obtains the potential of influencing news audiences and persuading citizens to be more active in civic sphere. Civic journalism unites the efforts of the citizens and fosters discussions on the problems that are important for the society (Walters 2011, 8). In general terms, this means that the active engagement of citizens in civic life is of key importance for the development of civic journalism in the country.

Another significant aspect of civic journalism is that it is a platform, which has a goal to build strong relation and communication, on the one hand, between journalists and their audience, on the other hand, between the audience and civic life (Ahva 2011, 119). In this chain audience plays a significant role because it makes the struggle of the journalists more democratic, citizen-centered, and effective. It has commonly been assumed that without the active participation of citizens in the journalistic activities, the latter would be conceived as biased. A possible explanation for this might be that traditional journalists are to be impartial and neutral, and the active engagement of citizens in their activities proves that journalists express the voice of the society and they do not pursue their own interests.

Ahva notes that civic journalism should provide citizens with the information, which is perceivable and practical. In this light, civic journalism turns into a service for the readers that are viewed as citizens. Civic journalism is aimed at engaging citizens in public life. As regards the information source of civic journalism, it is quite different compared to conventional journalism. The latter mainly concentrates on elite, whereas for civic journalism everyday life of the citizens is the main source of information. Moreover, citizens get the opportunity to create topics and design an agenda themselves (2013, 10).

In view of all that has been mentioned so far, one may suppose that civic journalism is one of the important factors contributing to the development of civic society and democracy. It is a very good platform for people to present their interests, complaints, or demands.

Having defined what is meant by civic journalism, it is necessary now to move on to discuss the essence of citizen journalism. People who collect information and disseminate it, can be considered as citizen journalists. There are two main expressions introduced by National Association of Citizen Journalists: accidental journalist and citizen journalist. Accidental journalist is the person who witnesses events and shares information including photos and videos on social media platforms. The people who take actions on investigating some occurrence on their own, writing reports about it online, or expressing their anxiety, are considered to be citizen journalists. The latter sometimes

act like professional journalists. That is the reason why they are often called enthusiastic citizen journalists (Macharashvili 2012, 8-9).

It is thought that the aforementioned differentiation of citizen journalist and accidental journalist is quite appropriate. There is some evidence that not all the citizens who have taken part in some events once decide to publish materials online pertaining to the event, are citizen journalists. The latter should be actively engaged in civic life, be interested in its different issues, and aspire to share information with other citizens. It has been reported that regularity is one of the key aspects of citizen journalism. Without this element, the activities of citizens can be perceived not more than information transfer.

Citizen journalism can also be defined as an activity when nonjournalists collect, write, and report news. Nowadays people are granted a great opportunity to make use of the internet, get information, and provide others with information. This means that people can become their own journalists. But here another interesting question arises. When everyone can write and share information, how nonjournalists will differ from professional journalists. One of the main differences between these two types of journalism is that unlike citizen journalism in case of traditional journalism the content of the materials is edited before dissemination (Walters 2011, 24).

In his analysis of citizen journalism, Örnebring notes that any blogger, any person who is active on social media, comments on some posts can be considered as a citizen journalist. Citizen journalism is the first stage of the institutionalization of new media. It is defined by the author as an activity of socially biased journalists who aspire to make reforms in the country and make it more progressive (Örnebring 2013, 35-38).

In the countries where mass media is under the control of political authorities, citizens often get information that is not credible and tends to manipulate public opinion. In such countries the activities of citizen journalists are viewed by the political elite as cyberdissidence (Bentley 2011; Mutsvairo and Salgado 2022; Noor 2017).

It is thought that in the countries where the freedom of internet is high, consequently, social media are not controlled by the state, it is much easier to organize civic disobedience and implement revolutions. Thus, it is quite possible to make changes in the country thanks to citizen journalism. It gives a great opportunity to citizens for self-organization and self-regulation (Wu and Wall 2019).

Lastly, civic journalism and citizen journalism are strongly interrelated. They are modern manifestations of traditional journalism. Although different methods are used by the aforementioned types of journalism, their ultimate goal is the same - to inform citizens, to find solutions (Barnes 2012; Campbell 2015; Simons 2016).

Mediocracy: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Information Manipulation

The issue of citizen journalism responsibility is intrinsically complex. Its essence lies in the awareness and desire to maximally effectively realize the national interests, the disposition to solve the problems of the region, country, and the world in the interests of all citizens, of all humankind. But due to social differences and the unequal understanding by various social forces, the media and individual journalists of the essence of the civic duty, they are recognized differently in a concrete and meaningful

way during real journalistic actions. However, for all social and political differences, there is a framework of civic behaviour that requires a responsible approach. Their essence is connected with the development of an audience of civic consciousness, the formation of an adequate citizen, responsible and active. First of all, the journalist is responsible for developing their civic position, a system of socio-political guidelines, and a set of attitudes in the sphere of their narrow specialization. The question is what this position will be: as close as possible to the objective or subjectively serving the private egoistic interests of any group that stands apart from social development or even interferes with it? Of course, under conditions of pluralism, in ideology, politics, culture, when the range of opinions is extremely wide, the journalist has the right to take any position. But a responsible choice requires serious consideration of the position from the point of view of how it meets the interests of the people and the general humanistic requirements of social development, how much protection of the needs of the "unit" is combined with the requirements of the "whole." In other words, civil liability is high when these two groups of interests are compatible and combined in a position. Therefore, the choice of media with its direction and features of the information policy also refers to the sphere of civil liability. The journalist then works fruitfully and behaves responsibly when they are "in their circle" of like-minded colleagues, when there is no conflict between their convictions and the direction of the media. Can the journalist's behaviour be called responsible if they draw a line in their works with which they do not internally agree? It is the agreement with the editorial staff on fundamental issues that allows them to be creatively independent, work without regard to possible rejection, not to act as a conformist or non-conformist to the direction adopted by the editorial board, but to be a convinced defender of the accepted common line. Of course, when carrying out the chosen line, various nuances may arise, certain "correction factors" may be proposed, which appear as a result of an independent unexplored study of life. And since the "world view" is different in different media and different journalists, then, of course, they are also responsible for what and how they report on other approaches and opinions. Responsible behaviour is the antithesis of silence and, all the more, distortion of other positions, rudeness, phrase-mongering, verbal tricks in the debate. A journalist's civil duty is the need to speak out against publications and programs if deviations from the truth, false "moves" in argumentation and conclusions, and other violations of the requirements of objectivity are found in them. In this case, it is important to respect the dignity and sense of proportion, to prevent literary horsemanship, and even less to elevate minor errors of other journalists to the rank of fundamental errors. The point is not to turn from a critic in the name of truth into a critic, from a responsible politician to a cheap politician, when the place of concern for public needs is counted on easy popularity. In this case, both the controversy and the discussions, no matter how sharp they may be, should be conducted from the standpoint of high civic responsibility: after all, the difference of views has a common solid foundation - this is concern for the development of the country and the world. Responsibly formed in this vein, the civic position during implementation has another important consequence. In the course of comparison of views, in the process of polemics and discussions, positions and approaches, ideas and decisions will come closer and are increasingly filled with constructive content for the benefit of both "the parts" and the "whole" in the long term of the humanistic development of society as a whole. Consequently, for journalism and a journalist, responsibility to society is put in the first place for the measure of conformity

of the position and the nature of its implementation to the objective needs of social development. Hence, the responsibility of the journalist for the full awareness of the audience about what is happening in the world, for the system of assessments and conclusions.

Recently, there has been renewed interest in fake news. The latter, unfortunately, has become an indispensable part of media, politics, and everyday life of information recipients. This phenomenon has become so influential and widespread that a comprehensive investigation should be carried out in order to understand where the border is between fake news and freedom of speech.

The term “fake news” can be traced back to the 19th century when the word “fake” was a novelty. In Merriam–Webster Dictionary it is written that before the 18th century, instead of “fake news” the collocation of “false news” was used (Bayer et al. 2019, 22).

The phenomenon of fake news has been discussed more widely since the US presidential election in 2016 when the electoral campaigns were accompanied by offense and ugly name-calling. For instance, during the presidential debate on the Fox news television channel, Donald Trump accused Ted Cruz's father, Rafael, who was a Christian clergyman, of having relations with Lee Harvey Oswald. As it is known, on 22 November, 1963, the abovementioned person killed John F. Kennedy who was one of the favourite leaders of the American people. The death of beloved President was a real tragedy for millions of Americans who watched President's funeral live on TV.

Donald Trump arose questions about the association of Rafael Cruz and Lee Harvey Oswald and assassination of John F. Kennedy. Trump referred to one of the newspaper reports stating there had been a collaboration between the father of the competing candidate and Oswald before the assassination of the President. The newspaper also published a photo of Oswald with a person who was thought to be Rafael Cruz.

Although the National Enquirer is the newspaper popular with its false information, many voters believed in that story and decided not to vote for Cruz. In fact, the story was fictional. It was a bright example of fake news (Miller 2019, Chapter 1).

Several definitions of fake news have been proposed. Fake news is defined by Allcott and Gentzkow as “to be news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers” (2017, 213). The definition by the authors rules out certain cases that can be considered as fake news:

1. Reporting mistakes that were not made on purpose, such as the inaccurate report that the President of the USA took out the bust of Martin Luther King Jr., and it was no longer on display in the Oval Office in the White House;
2. Rumors that do not have any specific source or do not stem from a certain news article;
3. Conspiracy theories, which are not easy to confirm as right or wrong, and they come from individuals who think that they are right;
4. Satire that is unlikely to be misinterpreted as true;
5. Incorrect contentions made by political actors;
6. Reports that are biased and confusing but not completely falsified (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 214).


The data reported here appear to support the assumption that intention is the most important element in differentiating fake news from the news or information that may

contain inaccuracy. The agents of fake news represent the information they provide as objective reality, they insist on having factually correct information. It is a widely held view that reporters usually apply fake news in order to cast doubt on the news sources that have the reputation of being reliable, distort reality and as a consequence appear in a favourable position.

The notion of fake news is even more vague in the legislative documents, as proved by latest discussions on the efforts to implement the legislation of national anti-fake news. For instance, in France the law on “manipulation of information” defines fake news as “any allegation of a fact that is inaccurate or misleading”, which is likely to “distort the fairness of the election,” if the dissemination of the information on the internet has been “deliberately” and “in an artificial or automatized and massive way.” In Italy, in 2017 there was a huge discussion on the bill against fake news, which was defined as following “false, exaggerated, or biased” news articles online. However, the bill was not adopted. In Germany in the same year NetzDG law did not provide a clear definition of fake news, nonetheless, it inspired many countries to elaborate and adopt anti-fake laws (Bayer et al. 2019, 23-4).

Since the term “fake news” is vague and often times it is too difficult to realize if the reports containing incorrect information might be considered as fake news or not, Wardle and Derakhshan tried to differentiate types of information that are not factually correct.

Figure 1: Types of information disorders



Source: Wardle and Derakhshan 2017

As shown in Figure 1, all the three types of information are interrelated. The main distinction between them refers to the intention of dissemination information and the veracity and authenticity of the information or news provided.

Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) use examples from the 2017 French Presidential election and show the differences between disinformation, misinformation, and mal-information.

One of the biggest deceptions of electoral campaign in 2017 was the emergence of the duplicated version of *Le Soir*, Belgian newspaper with a fake article stating that Saudi Arabia was funding Emmanuel Macron. Another example relates to the dissemination of the false reports that Macron opened an offshore bank account in the Bahamas. Lastly, in Twitter some users shared articles with identical hashtags and rumors that Macron was in a secret relationship with his step-daughter.

The abovementioned examples are considered to be disinformation because they are not based on reality and have the intention of decreasing the political image of the candidate during the electoral campaign and drive potential voters away from a candidate.

The attack on the Champs Elysees in 2017 brought about a lot of misinformation as usually occurs during the emergency situations. Many internet users unwittingly posted lots of false information, such as the news about the murder of a second policeman. In this case the individuals who shared misinformation, did not have any intention to harm anyone, on the contrary, they attempted to be helpful.

One of the evident instances of mal-information refers to the email leaks of Emmanuel Macron two days before the final vote. The information in the emails was genuine, but during the campaign Macron and his team apparently used incorrect data to eliminate any negative consequences of the information leak (Wardle and Derakhshan 2017, 21).

The aforementioned examples prove that it is not so easy even for European Union member countries to decide on the definition of fake news and find certain mechanisms to struggle against this sinister phenomenon. It is thought that the main causes and goals of the fake news should be examined in order to diminish it or at least reduce the level of its wide application and dissemination.

The following is a brief description of the reasons why fake news is created. The first motivation of creating fake news is pecuniary - to earn money. They run advertising-supported websites. The sum of the money depends on the number of people visiting websites. The more visitors are, the more money advertisers give the websites. Hence, the sites try to attract internet users to visit their sites and read those stories with sensational headings. Some headlines are too abusive and fierce, nevertheless, site operators state that reports having such titles are more clicked and read by visitors. It is interesting that even the people who know that the headline is likely false, they also continue reading the article containing fake news.

Another reason why fake news has been created is to have an impact on voting behavior of the citizens. For example, during the US presidential election in 2016, a host of fake news reports appeared about the Democratic candidate, the former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. One of the articles was titled "FBI Agent Suspected in Hillary Email Leaks Found Dead in Apartment Murder-Suicide." The main aim of such fake news is to influence the opinions of voters, either taking them out of the electorate of a certain candidate, or convincing them of being in the electorate of the candidate's opponent (Miller 2019).

This strategy is typical to electoral campaigns when different political parties and candidates struggle for the political power. Even if they are not able to receive the votes

by particular voters, due to fake news articles they try to drive potential voters from a political party or a candidate, thus increasing their chances of receiving more support.

It is thought that the dissemination of fake news can also pursue social and psychological aims. Some agents of fake news, such as individuals, news organizations, official, or nonofficial actors aspire to obtain a big audience and supporters, for that reason they disseminate fake news. Others apply fake news in order to become famous and prestigious.

It is interesting that freedom of expression, information access are considered to be one of the crucial factors contributing to democracy. Currently, when media and especially new media play an important role in all the spheres of our life, we can contend that new form of democracy has emerged - media democracy. Thanks to the internet and social media, all the people are given the opportunity to create, impart and disseminate information, express their opinions on certain issues. It means that media grant people the opportunity to have a certain type of authority, which we can call mediocracy.

A range of fake news stories that have political content sometimes might seem to be accurate. However, when one carefully reads, notices that the article is at best misleading or at worst destructively incorrect. In spite of this, many people believe in fake news articles because they strengthen the convictions people had before. For instance, if some people thought falsely that US president Barack Obama was a Muslim, they would not cast doubt on a fake news article titled "NYC Muslim Terrorist Donated Thousands to Barack Obama's Campaigns." For other people, fake news stories may seem true just because they read it in their news feed or the person they trust, shared it.

A great deal of previous research into fake news has focused on the fact that conservative political parties are more inclined to create and disseminate fake news than liberal political parties. Conservatives are more beware of risks and threats that is why fake news, which usually contain confidential information, crimes, or other sensational information attract the attention of conservatives more than that of liberals (Miller 2019).

Special attention should be paid to the correlation between fake news and partisan media. Partisan media tend to represent the news in a way that fosters the formation of a particular political agenda. Some years ago partisan media could disseminate news only through TV and radio. Nowadays, with the advent of the internet, new forms of partisan media appeared in online platforms. The latter give much more opportunities to cover partisan news more than ever. In addition, new media platforms promote the dissemination of misinformation through automated, anonymous accounts targeting people already involved in a specific subject discussion. The evidence presented in this section suggests that partisan media is inclined to allow dissemination of false news and information (Vargo et al. 2018).

Although partisan media and fake news are strongly interrelated, there are some discrepancies between them. It is thought that partisan media works for a certain political power or an organization and has the goal to create or reinforce their positive image within society. Partisan media do not have the intention to cause harm to other actors, it is rather inclined to create favourable conditions for a certain political agenda sometimes using biased information.

As to fake news, its intention is quite different and it is not concentrated on a particular agenda. Agents of fake news, unlike partisan media do not have the aim of

enhancing any actor, they are in an attempt to gain pecuniary or sometimes nonpecuniary profit.

Another significant aspect of fake news relates to freedom of speech. A question arises whether dissemination of misinformation can be viewed as a right to freedom of expression or unlawful act that has to be punished.

Freedom of expression is aimed at searching for truth. It is about developing and contesting thoughts to achieve a greater level of comprehension and knowledge and make fewer mistakes. Although truth itself is relative and elusive, the method resulting in it is a goal itself and must be followed.

In its case law, European Court of Human Rights emphasizes that all the people including bloggers, investigative journalists, scholars, civil society organizations, and their members should have the opportunity to be engaged in public discussions. They are especially vital for journalists and news organizations as it is connected with their profession and capacity to impart information, thus fostering the formation of public opinion. They have the mission of spreading information and thoughts about the issues that are within the interests of the society. Journalists, news organizations, and an increasing number of other actors can also function as public gatekeepers by shedding light on information and revealing all the misdeeds and corruption by the authorities.

Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not restricted to correct information. It is not restricted to factual information as well. The article also includes views or value judgements. It is important to note that facts and views are not identical: the existence of facts can be proven, but views or value judgements are not susceptible of proof. Views or opinions are not to be proved because this requirement would breach the right to freedom of opinion.

Anyone who applies the right to freedom of speech, in any situation has certain obligations, which differ in various cases. Especially journalists and media should be careful while imparting information in order not to infringe other people's rights or reputation. Their activities should be in conformity with journalistic ethics and aimed at good faith. The latter is not about the responsibility to tell the truth. Even when reporters act in good faith, dissemination of false news may happen (McGonagle 2017, 208).

In summary, these results show that people have the right to create and impart information both in online and offline platforms only when they act in good faith and do not have any intention to cause harm or infringe other's rights or reputation.

In light of recent developments in media sphere, it is becoming extremely difficult to ignore the existence of misinformation and its different manifestations in political communication, journalism, and even in our routine life. Both traditional and new media are filled with false information so much that sometimes many people prefer not to face the truth that is written in media but call it fake news. It is an irrefutable fact that nowadays fake news stories are quite widespread, but at the same time there are many cases when political actors attempting to avoid accountability or transparency, claim that all statements about them are fabricated or fake. It is important to note that facts cannot become less accurate because a certain person denies its existence or simply does not like it.

Many researchers put emphasis on the power of fake news and its capacity to influence political life. They state that as a result of fake news some candidates can get

more votes during the elections, some political forces can lose their political power, even revolutions can happen.

However, some authors think that it is uncertain how much it matters. Although the majority of people believe in misinformation, we cannot know for sure if this influences their voting behavior.

New generation should be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past and overestimate the capacity of media of saving democracy. For example, in Germany free media did not have the ability to prevent the establishment of Nazi Party. American commentator Walter Lippmann thought that media cannot unilaterally rescue or destroy democracy. Nevertheless, one survey showed that the journalists and not the politicians decide which issues should be included and discussed in political agenda. In fact, media form the elusive force, which is called public opinion (Tworek 2017, 8-9).

It is thought that the relations between media and government mainly depend on the democratization level of the states. The states that are democratic, media platforms are less supervised by the governments, but in the countries that have authoritarian regime, both traditional and new media face some restrictions and obstacles in their activities, especially when trying to criticize the authorities.

According to McNair, some countries, for example Russia tries to serve social media and internet to its own state interests. In information warfare social media is an important instrument. Some countries, for example Turkey has tried by presidential fiat to remove media outlets off the map. China has set up its own alternatives that are carefully monitored by the state. Some countries including Germany have threatened huge penalties unless Facebook removes offensive posts within a day. Threats or problems of the social media primarily depend on a certain state (2018, 82).

It has previously been observed that many authorities around the globe are in an attempt to manipulate information, thus threatening the role of the internet as a platform for exercising right to freedom of speech and expression. Dissemination of false information and online manipulation have a huge impact especially during the elections. Fake news and information confuse citizens to elect their leaders.

Turning now to the experimental evidence on how to combat fake news, it is of key importance to represent the stance of UNESCO on this issue. The concept of “Media and Information Literacy” is introduced by UNESCO to highlight the interrelationship between information competencies and media competencies. These include education on human rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression, as a right to search, obtain, and impart information or opinion, news literacy, advertising literacy, computer literacy and so on (Posetti et al. 2018, 70).

It is a widely held view that media literacy is very important in the process of struggling against fake news. Nowadays, when every and each person can be an information producer, the volume of information is huge, and it is very difficult to understand which source of information can provide genuine information. So, media literacy teaches information consumers how to make use of the online sources and minimize the possibility of being deceived.

Countering fake news can be through legislative and nonlegislative means. Legislations of some countries hold technology companies responsible for imparting false information, calling for the quicker removal of the content that is not based on

reality. They threaten with heavy penalties and even imprisonment for the dissemination of fake news. For instance, the German Network Enforcement Act imposes penalties up to 50 Euros on social media companies if they do not agree to remove the content that is obviously illegal within 24 hours of after being warned.

Technology companies, in their turn, make efforts to struggle against fake news. For instance, Facebook removes fake accounts and promised to add more than 1000 individuals to its worldwide ad review teams to examine political ad purchases.

In some legislations not only technology companies, but also individuals are held accountable for spreading disinformation. For example, in the Philippines the Senate bill suggests fining individuals from 1950 dollars up to 97,587 dollars for creating and imparting fake information or from one to five years of imprisonment. The punishment is much stricter when the offender is a public figure. In this case the period of imprisonment and the amount of fine is doubled.

In some countries nonlegislative means, including fact-checking and counter fake news websites are used to combat fake news. For instance, Malaysia established a website for data verification.

Media literacy and critical thinking are also amongst nonlegislative measures of combating fake news. Canada, Italy, and Taiwan introduced school curriculum to teach students how to differentiate correct and incorrect information (Haciyakupoglu et al. 2018, 5-12).

Some specialists think that the struggle against fake news can be successful only in the case when state regulators and government will be engaged in this struggle. Although in some countries there are special laws or regulations that restrict the dissemination of disinformation, we can hardly be confident that these restrictions will wholly tackle the issue. The problem is that in some cases political actors or state regulators are creators and disseminators of the information that has false content. Furthermore, if the information both in online and offline platforms is controlled by state institutions, there will be a big question mark over people's right to freedom of expression as it will lead to political censorship (McNair 2018, 81).

The results of this research support the idea that new media have become an important element fostering democracy. Social media are the platform, where direct democracy can be applied. Nevertheless, the dissemination of fake news articles proves that some new struggle should be initiated to prevent the transformation of mediocracy to so-called fakeocracy.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study has shown that social media and civic journalism have influenced upon the form of life of modern societies. Due to social networking sites, communication opportunities for people have become quite big and diverse. Thanks to new technologies and social sites, each person can become a civic or citizen journalist and exercise his or her right of creating, imparting, and receiving information. This means that social media are the platform where people can exercise their right to freedom of expression. But at

the same time, exploiting the aforementioned right can lead to the dissemination of dangerous phenomena, such as fake news and hate speech.

The article outlines some specific conclusions as follows:

1. Civic journalism gives an opportunity to draw attention to the issues that would never be discussed in traditional media. It promotes public debates, consequently, contributes to the formation of public opinion. It is a modern means for people to directly communicate with different political actors and present their interests, complaints, or demands.

2. Another important finding was that civic journalism gives a great opportunity to citizens for self-organization and self-regulation, organize civic disobedience, and implement revolutions. Hence, civic journalism is one of the important factors fostering the development of civic society and democracy.

3. The current study found that on the one hand, citizen journalism gives a great opportunity to the public to express their ideas, stories, opinions, in a word, exercise their right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, too much freedom of speech in social media may lead to human rights violations.

4. Social media and civic journalism are strongly interrelated. Social media are the platform due to which civic journalism is applied. The content of social media can be different, and its goals are not always justified. Whereas, civic journalism pursues goals that contribute to public good.

5. The research has also shown that intention is the most important element in differentiating fake news from the news or information that may contain inaccuracy. The dissemination of fake news can have pecuniary, nonpecuniary, social, and psychological aims.

6. The most effective mechanism for struggling against fake news and hate speech are education and media literacy. Controlling all the information that is online, is against democratic values, that is why the best solution to cope with fake news and hate speech is to educate citizens.

7. Social networking sites make the activities of political actors, parties, and institutions more transparent, thus making political powers responsible for and accountable for their activities before the citizens. Furthermore, the majority of politicians can be considered to be civic journalists whose publications serve as a source of information for traditional media.

It has been reported that civic journalism and its significance implicate a formation of a new type of democracy, that is networking democracy. The reason for the existence and development of networking democracy is that nowadays social media are the very platforms where citizens freely express their opinions, organize mass events, and influence political decisions. It is thought that citizens apply their power through social media and civic journalism.

The article attempted to illustrate some issues regarding social media, nonetheless, there are still many unanswered questions about the positive and negative influences of it. This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. It would be interesting to assess the effects of civic journalism and social media during the electoral campaigns in the countries where online campaigns are more popular than offline ones.

References

- Ahmad, Nyarwi, and Ioan-Lucian Popa. 2014. "The Social Media Usage and the Transformation of Political Marketing and Campaigning of the Emerging Democracy in Indonesia." In: *Social Media in Politics. Public Administration and Information Technology*, vol 13, edited by Bogdan Pătruț, and Monica Pătruț, 97-125. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04666-2_7.
- Ahva, Laura. 2011. "What is "public" in public journalism?" *Estudos em Comunicação -Communication Studies* 9:119-142.
- Ahva, Laura. 2013. "Public journalism and professional reflexivity." *Journalism* 14 (6): 790-806. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884912455895>.
- Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31 (2): 211-236. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211>.
- Barnes, Corinne. 2012. "Citizen journalism vs. traditional journalism: A case for collaboration." *Caribbean Quarterly* 58 (2-3): 16-27.
- Bayer, Judit, Natalija Bitiukova, Petra Bárd, Judit Szakács, Alberto Alemanno, and Erik Uszkiewicz. 2019. *Disinformation and propaganda - impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States*. Brussels: Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union. Accessed July 2, 2022. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU\(2019\)608864_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608864/IPOL_STU(2019)608864_EN.pdf).
- Bentley, Clyde H. 2011. "Citizen journalism: Back to the future?" *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 3 (1): 103-118.
- Campbell, Vincent. 2015. "Theorizing citizenship in citizen journalism." *Digital Journalism* 3 (5): 704-719.
- Haciyakupoglu, Gulizar, Jennifer Yang Hui, V. S. Suguna, Dymples Leong, and Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman. 2018. Policy Report: Countering fake news: a survey of recent global initiatives. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyan. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/8063/PR180307_Countering-Fake-News.pdf?sequence=1.
- Kulesza, Joanna. 2014. "Social Media Censorship vs. State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations." In: *Social Media in Politics. Public Administration and Information Technology*, vol 13, edited by Bogdan Pătruț, and Monica Pătruț, 259-280. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04666-2_15.
- Macharashvili, Nino. 2012. "Citizen Journalism and Traditional Media: 5Ws & H." MA thesis. University of Warwick. <https://pdfslide.net/documents/citizen-journalism-and-traditional-media-5ws-h.html?page=2>.
- McGonagle, Tarlach. 2017. "'Fake news': False fears or real concerns?" *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 35 (4): 203-209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0924051917738685>.
- McNair, Brian. 2018. *Fake News: Falsehood, Fabrication and Fantasy in Journalism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Miller, Michael. 2019. *Fake News: Separating Truth From Fiction*. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books.

- Mutsvairo, Bruce, and Susana Salgado. 2022. "Is citizen journalism dead? An examination of recent developments in the field." *Journalism* 23 (2): 354-371.
- Noor, Rabia. 2017. "Citizen journalism vs. mainstream journalism: A study on challenges posed by amateurs." *Athens Journal of Mass Media and Communications* 3 (1): 55-76.
- Nuernbergk, Christian. 2022. "Public Sphere Conceptions: Public Sphere Theory." In: *Handbook of Media and Communication Economics: A European Perspective*, 1-24. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
- Örnebring, Henrik. 2013. "Anything you can do, I can do better? Professional journalists on citizen journalism in six European countries." *International Communication Gazette* 75 (1): 35-53.
- Posetti, Julie, Cherilyn Ireton, Claire Wardle, Hossein Derakhshan, Alice Matthews, Magda Abu-Fadil, Tom Trewinnard, Fergus Bell, and Alexios Mantzarlis. 2018. *Journalism, Fake News and Disinformation: Handbook for Journalism Education and Training*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Predmerská, Anna K. 2019. "On the Highway to Multiplatform Journalism." *Communication Today* 10 (1): 158-160.
- Romero, Leocadia D. (2014). On the Web and Contemporary Social Movements. In: *Social Media in Politics. Public Administration and Information Technology*, vol 13, edited by Bogdan Pătruț, and Monica Pătruț, 19-33. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04666-2_2.
- Ruusunoksa, Laura. 2006. "Public journalism and professional culture: Local, regional and national public spheres as contexts of professionalism." *Javnost-The Public* 13 (4): 81-98.
- Simons, Greg. 2016. "The impact of social media and citizen journalism on mainstream Russian news." *Russian Journal of Communication* 8 (1): 33-51.
- Tworek, Heidi. 2017. "Political Communications in the Fake News Era: Six Lessons for Europe." *Policy Brief: Transatlantic Academy* (February): 1-10.
- Vargo, J. Chris, Lei Guo, and Michelle A. Amazeen. 2018. "The agenda-setting power of fake news: A big data analysis of the online media landscape from 2014 to 2016." *New media & Society* 20 (5): 2028-2049. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448177120>.
- Walters, Kendle. 2011. "Comparative and critical analysis: The roles of civic and traditional journalism." UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 1377. <http://doi.org/10.34917/3275266>.
- Wardle, Claire, and Hossein Derakhshan. 2017. "Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making. Strasbourg: Council of Europe." Accessed April 10, 2022. <https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-research/168076277c>.
- Wu, Yan, and Matthew Wall. 2019. "Prosumers in a digital multiverse: An investigation of how WeChat is affecting Chinese citizen journalism." *Global Media and China* 4 (1): 36-51.

HOW TO RECONCILE EQUALITY WITH FREEDOM? ON THE TWO WAYS IN LIBERALISM

NAIRA MKRTCHYAN 

Abstract

The article examines the relationship between the two central political ideas and values, equality and freedom, and its implications within the theories of two liberal thinkers Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls. The current debate around basic income and COVID-19 around the world, alarmist predictions about the future of humanity, and possible other issues, both global and local, provide enough incentive to reconsider this issue. While making some general remarks on both theories, and especially highlighting the rival nature of the relationship of equality with freedom, the article uses the method of comparative analysis to explore how these liberal thinkers reconcile these two central political ideas in their own way. Two different ways of reconciliation, developed by Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls, show a discrepancy with the initial attitudes of the authors. And, finally, equality and freedom demonstrate paradoxical relationships, both contradictory and mutually supportive.

Keywords: *freedom, equality, liberalism, value monism, value pluralism, social justice, tension, reconciliation, paradoxical nature of relation.*

Introduction

There are issues in political theory and philosophy on which debates are renewed as practical concerns enforce to revisit them. As a result, new dimensions and aspects are gained. In its turn, conceptual frameworks already developed take a chance to be viewed from a new angle and opened from a new perspective and to provide guidelines in tackling of those practical matters. The current debates on the basic income and COVID-19¹ all over the world, alarmistic predictions about the future of humanity and possible other issues of both global and local nature create enough incentives to reconsider the

* Naira Mkrtchyan is an Associate Professor, PhD in Philosophy of the Chair of Social Philosophy, Ethics and Aesthetics of the Faculty of Philosophy and Psychology at Yerevan State University.

Email: naira.mkrtyan@ysu.am

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 121-138



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

¹ COVID-19 pandemic which has brought to restrictions on freedoms (for instance, the freedom of movement and freedom of occupation) and probably even equality requires to ask: if there are limits in medical care and infrastructure, then whose life matters more? And the latter is not only a question of right or freedom but also of equality in treatment.

Received: 25.06.2022

Revised: 04.07.2022

Accepted: 11.07.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

relation between the two central political values and ideas, between freedom and equality, in particular the nature of their relation and its aspects. As is widely known, the latter has been at the focus of political thought since the 17-18th centuries, namely, the rise and development of modern nation-states. And the nature as well as the aspects of that relation have forced political thinkers, actors, parties to define their ideological preferences and positions within political spectrum.

It is of special interest to consider how the issue was tackled during the Cold War period by the two influential representatives of liberal scholarship, I. Berlin and J. Rawls and consequences that arise from it. As liberal-oriented thinkers they view the relation of equality with freedom in tension, in rivalry but proposing two different ways of conceiving and resolving it and, in effect revealing its paradoxical nature. It is the latter that should be examined here as important insights can be got from it for solving current complex issues.

General Remarks

In order to come close to I. Berlin's and Rawls' enterprise and its insightful aspects a couple of questions are to be raised. First of all, they concern the title of the article. Why is the formulation "How to reconcile equality with freedom?" chosen? What assumptions as well as beliefs are behind it? First of all, it is inspired by the ways how Berlin and Rawls view the relation of equality and freedom though these ways are themselves grounded in traditions of Western political thought. So, the title's first part follows them and presumes that there is some tension, conflict, rivalry between political values of equality and freedom. Moreover, this way of viewing is much more typical to right-wing, liberal-oriented than to left-wing thinkers². Simultaneously, it is quite natural that I. Berlin and J. Rawls who are not at the far end of right-wing aim at finding some sort of reconciliation and seek a possibility to meet their requirements at the same time, so to speak, in the same world. If all these presumptions are true and a reconciliation is possible, then we could ask: "how and at what cost?" The latter will be answered gradually while the article progresses in its topic.

Some important remarks are to be made in order to delineate the scope of comparison between I. Berlin's and J. Rawls' theories. *Firstly*, the historical context matters a lot about which it has been already mentioned above. After the French Revolution the debate on equality and freedom evolved with a renewed interest after the second World War,

² With regard to the leftist position on the conflicting ideals of equality and freedom an analytic Marxist thinker Gerald A. Cohen writes: "Most leftists reply either that there is no real conflict between equality and freedom, when both are properly conceived, or that, to the extent that there indeed is one, freedom should give way to equality, since justice demands equality, and justice comes before all other political values" (Cohen 2006, 416). But actually, he considers the socio-economic aspect of equality and freedom. A post-Marxist political theorist Ch. Mouffe who represents a leftist position tackles the issue from the other angle, namely, the relation between the political aspect of equality and freedom. And for her there is a tension between them given their rootedness in the democratic tradition and the liberal tradition respectively (Mouffe 2000, 3-5). Hence, the left-wing scholarship is not completely secure from tension and conflict between freedom and equality.

strictly to say, as a result of the Cold War between the Euro-Atlantic Bloc and the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact countries in the second half of the 20th century.

Secondly, here both terms - equality and freedom - are taken widely. But for certainty their two aspects - the political as well as the social and economic - and their relations are especially at the focus. Perhaps not with the same extent but both I. Berlin and J. Rawls consider them and provide important insights.

Thirdly, no difference is traced between freedom and liberty, freedom and right as these political thinkers are not, in effect, interested to draw these distinctions. In his *Two Concepts of Liberty* Berlin mentions about the first one - freedom and liberty (Berlin 2002, 169). Actually, one can find interchangeable use of these concepts in *A Theory of Justice* by Rawls (Rawls 2005, 201-205). With this respect Th. Pogge points out: "Rawls never distinguishes precisely between basic rights and basic liberties, and for the sake of brevity, he often refers only to basic liberties or only to basic rights" (Pogge 2007, 82).

Fourthly, J. Rawls tackles the topic in the frame of his theory of justice as his primary concern is to develop a theory of justice. Yet he puts that topic at the heart of his theory. In case of I. Berlin, it has not to do with a theory or a conception of social justice but with different values, their relations - especially, their conflictual relations, where due to some circumstances the author ruminates mostly on liberty and equality but not on justice itself³.

Fifthly, needless to say that both I. Berlin and J. Rawls explicitly position themselves as liberal thinkers, namely, thinkers whose ideological preferences are strongly directed by the idea of individual freedom or liberty⁴. It is because of the latter that the value of freedom or liberty plays such a role in their theories respectively. It does not mean that their liberalisms are identical⁵. There are principal differences between them. In a nutshell, Rawls stresses upon the egalitarian nature of his liberalism and aims at hierarchizing principles in order to escape the pitfalls of pluralism as he views them. Berlin takes the way of so to speak situative normativity putting at the heart of it the negative concept of liberty etc. But with all of this together these thinkers have managed to enhance the debate on equality and freedom to a new conceptual level providing sophisticated starting points for others in their own quests and findings.

It is of no less importance to note that both thinkers conceptualize against the background of and for pluralist societies facing the reality of different moral, aesthetical, religious or metaphysical views that which J. Rawls calls 'reasonable pluralism'.

And last but not least. A strong opposition to all kinds of anti-democratic political regimes motivate them to initiate their own intellectual ventures. And this motivation 'feels' across their theories. Surely, there are other aspects worth to be mentioned here as well. But it is better to stop here and start again this time considering the title of the article from the other angle.

³ But though no one can find an explicit, well-elaborated theory or conception of justice in Berlin's views, nevertheless, in an interesting way, it is possible to discern some, as if it existed in an implicit, latent way.

⁴ On a certain occasion political thinker J. Shklar notices the amorphous nature of the word "liberalism" due to some circumstances. In order to resolve it she insists: "Liberalism has only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom" (Shklar 1989, 21).

⁵ The overview of liberal thinkers by A. Ryan justifies the usage of liberalism in the plural and not in the single (Ryan 2007, 360).

Discerning the Roots of Tension

The tension or rivalry between freedom and equality has strong ontological grounds and is based on the relation between difference and similarity. Both are inscribed in various aspects of being and of general importance and given rise as a result of comparison turned into an opposition. In the case of political ideas and values, of course, this generality is staged in its own way. Hence, the examination of relation of freedom and equality enables us to view it from a certain angle and in a certain manifestation.

Equality is a political value the logic of which is homogeneity. So, it strongly tends to sameness or similarity, uniformity the price of which is the erasures of differences. In his essay on equality, Berlin has a passage which brilliantly illustrates the latter with respect to society and human being. He writes: "Only in a society where the greatest degree of similarity between members occurs - where physical characteristics, mental endowment, emotional disposition, and conduct are as uniform as possible - where people differ as little as possible from each other in any respect whatever, will true equality be attainable. Only in such a society will it be possible to reduce to a minimum those differences of treatment, or of power, or of position, or of natural or acquired characteristics, that are liable to lead people to complain that they have not what others have, and to ask for reasons why this should be so" (Berlin 1979, 92).

On the contrary, freedom's logic is heterogeneity. Not only does it tend to differences but it is actually based on them and takes all attempts of their erasures as restrictions imposed on itself, as its violations. And it is differences that give rise to inequalities. Berlin resumes it in this way: "[...] So long as there are differences between men, some degree of inequality may occur [...]. I do not suppose that extreme equality of this type - the maximum similarity of a body of all but indiscernible human beings - has ever been consciously put forward as an ideal by any serious thinker" (Berlin 1979, 92-93).

As far as Rawls' approach is concerned, then he better expresses it in his critique of utilitarianism in which denying "the loss of freedom" for the sake of "the welfare of society" he characterizes utilitarianism as a doctrine which "does not take seriously the distinction between persons" (Rawls 2005, 3-27). Reflecting on the view of social cooperation in utilitarianism he notices: "This view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending to society the principle of choice for one man and then [...] conflating all persons into one [...]" (Rawls 2005, 27).

Obviously, because of their ideological preferences both political thinkers are to be sensitive to differences and plurality as well. And they fundamentally incorporate it through the idea of freedom though, as we'll see, not completely and making some compromises. Therefore, they are unable conceptually to ignore the tension, conflict between equality and freedom and not to face it. In this respect, probably, Berlin is much more sensitive as on one occasion he declares: "If you have maximum liberty, then the strong can destroy the weak, and if you have absolute equality, you cannot have absolute liberty, because you have to coerce the powerful" (Jahanbegloo 2007, 145). In this way, Berlin sets up a kind of measure for equality and liberty: they can be absolute or not, probably, relative, or to some extent. At the same time, they are viewed within asymmetric power relationships, within the relationships between the strong and the weak. Perhaps, that is because equality and freedom are political through and through,

either. But according to Berlin, in their absolute measures they are destructive in case of freedom or coercive in case of equality. And these statements, if accepted, could deprive one of any incentive to idealize or romanticize equality and freedom, especially in their absolute forms. And perhaps they serve as warnings against any efforts to idealize and romanticize in particular with regard to political values and their implementations in practice.

Two Senses of Liberty and Value Monism (I. Berlin)

In general, Berlin is interested in political ideas, in their roles played in history. So, one can often find a historical perspective in his examination of political ideas. He has reflected on liberty and equality on different occasions. The systematic account of liberty appears in his *Two Concepts of Liberty*, the inaugural lecture delivered by Berlin before the university of Oxford in 1958 and later republished in collections of his writings. Two years earlier in 1956 he already published an essay called *Equality* in the *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*. But ruminating both on liberty and equality he aims at criticizing that which he calls value monism and justifying that which on the contrary to it he calls value pluralism. Hence, these topics - liberty vs. equality and value monism vs. value pluralism - are largely intertwined with each other though the latter, value monism vs. value pluralism is closely examined and well-elaborated in *Two Concepts of Liberty*. In this respect, the essay *Equality* is a kind of preliminary reflections on the topic.

Berlin begins an examination of basic values of freedom and equality by putting forward questions and definitions which reveal what they are simultaneously distinguishing their forms and aspects. On the course of examination, he gradually demonstrates why value monism, as he conceives it, is impossible and even harmful and what makes value pluralism preferable and attractive. For instance, in *Two Concepts of Liberty* he proposes two concepts of liberty – the negative one and the positive one. He raises two questions concerning these concepts respectively. The question for the negative concept of liberty is: “What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” (Berlin 2002, 169). His answer is shaped by the Western tradition of political thought, therefore, it states: “I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved” (Berlin 2002, 169-70).

So, it turns out that: a) there are degrees of freedom, namely, one can be more or less free; b) but there is a minimum under which freedom transforms into coercion or enslavement; c) that which is in opposition to liberty in the negative sense. For him “coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area” (Berlin 2002, 169-70) in which one could otherwise act.

This configuration between freedom in the negative sense and coercion reminds a scale where at some point one of them can prevail. Meanwhile, the area of freedom

directly depends on this configuration. The wider area of non-interference means the wider area of freedom. If the negative concept of liberty is adopted, then in practice, the whole matter is where to draw the line of minimum, how to measure freedom. On what grounds? Are there universal criteria for all societies and persons in this respect or on the contrary they are always context-based? Berlin does not have answers to these questions. "The sense of freedom in which I use this term entails not simply the absence of frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities – absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities – absence of obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk. Such freedom ultimately depends not on whether I wish to walk at all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, how open they are, upon their relative importance in my life, even though it may be impossible literally to measure this in any quantitative fashion. The extent of my social or political freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not merely to my actual, but to my potential, choices – to my acting in this or that way if I choose to do so" (Berlin 2002, 32).

He traces back this understanding of freedom to the classical English political philosophers especially to Hobbes. But Locke, Bentham and Mill are also among those who are concerned to secure some area of non-interference though disagreements arise on how wide the area should be. It turns out that this area of non-interference is generated from the limits imposed on so to speak natural or unrestricted freedom. And this is the condition to obtain other highly valued goals such as justice, happiness, culture or security, varying degrees of equality in human association. The alternative to this state of affairs is social chaos.

So, it seems from one side there are natural or unrestricted freedom, the absence of non-interference, social chaos, impossibility of justice, of some form of equality, insecurity, asymmetric power relationships, from the other side, the area of non-interference, frontiers of which encircle an area of this non-interference, a possibility to achieve other highly-valued goals and more or less harmonic human association. For Berlin these alternatives have been already revealed and grasped by classical political philosophers. He points out that there can't be universal maxims or rules which once and for all regulate how restrictions must be imposed on freedom of some in order to secure freedom of others. It is a matter of practical compromise. A minimum area of personal freedom is prerequisite for human nature otherwise it degrades.

The positive sense of liberty is to answer the question: "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" (Berlin 2002, 169). With respect to the latter Berlin writes: "The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them" (Berlin 2002, 178).

The positive concept of liberty as it is formulated does not seem dangerous, destructive, hence, unacceptable. It stresses on agency, autonomy of person, something which brings to the fulfillment of human capabilities and potentialities. As all conceptions of freedom imply a view what is a self, a person, a man Berlin finds that manipulations of the definition of man can result in whatever end one wishes. At the same time, the positive concept of freedom has historically taken two forms. The first one, that of self-abnegation is the case when a man chooses to refrain from getting ends or from all of those ends which are unattainable. The price of not being subjected to empirical fears and desires is the elimination not only of ends, but also desires, natural affections. And this is the way often chosen by ascetics, sages, quietists who prefer to escape the empirical world. This form of the positive concept of freedom has personal as well collective-political form, such as political isolationism or economical autarky (Berlin 2002, 181-87).

The second form of the positive concept of freedom is self-realisation, a total self-identification with a specific principle or idea. According to Berlin one finds the latter in the philosophies of Spinoza, disciples of Hegel and of many other thinkers between them. It believes that if there are obstacles imposed on freedom then the right thing to do is to know and understand them. This knowledge enables to conduct actions or follow a path which does not lead to collisions, for instance with rules, laws, external forces etc. whatever is at stake. At first glance, freedom is in opposition to necessity. But this form of positive sense of freedom believes that freedom is nothing else than to know and understand necessity. It is the latter that is closely related to value monism: "Thinkers of this type argued that if moral and political problems were genuine - as surely they were - they must in principle be soluble; that is to say, there must exist one and only one true solution to any problem. All truths could in principle be discovered by any rational thinker, and demonstrated so clearly that all other rational men could not but accept them [...]. [...] The rational solution of one problem cannot collide with the equally true solution of another, for two truths cannot logically be incompatible; therefore, a just order must in principle be discoverable - an order of which the rules make possible correct solutions to all possible problems that could arise in it" (Berlin 2002, 191-92).

This is what he actually calls value monism, the Platonic ideal, which has its roots in the Ancient Times. If to reconstruct the sequence of ideas here, then one finds the following order: 1) if a problem is genuine, then it is possible to solve; 2) every problem has only *one* true solution; 3) in principle, truth is discoverable; 4) rationality or reason enables to discover the truth; 5) all truths are compatible; 6) a proper demonstration of truth ensures its acceptability; 7) there is a just order where possible problems are solvable in accordance with rules (Berlin 2002, 192-93). It is a harmonious state of affairs where dilemmas, such as either equality or freedom, either justice or benevolence etc., do not arise, where ends do not collide with each other if they are defined by rationality or reason. In this respect, his main argument is that that this way of thinking, conceiving freedom and social order in general brings to disasters, such as brutal tyranny. And this is something against which he fights intellectually within his own programme.

Equality and the Defense of Value Pluralism (I. Berlin)

What is remarkable in Berlin's account of equality? How does it help in solving complicated issues? First of all, Berlin is completely aware that equality as an idea, end or value has a central position among other terminal values, such as virtue, happiness, progress etc. by the way not only in political thought. It is deeply rooted in mind and different doctrines, metaphysical and non-metaphysical, religious and political. And these doctrines construct sometimes radically different accounts of social and political order. For instance, equality is one of the oldest and deepest elements in liberal and democratic thought with their emphasis on *equal* rights or on equality. And the absence of any specific connection to any philosophical doctrine opens space for its different understandings and interpretations. He believes that like all human ends it cannot itself be defended or justified, for it is itself that which justifies other acts.

He provides a formulation of the principle of equality which is, in his view, is vague and ambiguous: "every man to count for one and no one to count for more than one" (Berlin 1979, 81). According to Berlin this principle has changed in connotation from one thinker and society to another and can be applied in many aspects of social life – the distribution of property or the vote in assembly, or the opportunities for education or pleasure etc. But this egalitarian formula is itself a specific application of another principle: "similar cases call for, i. e. should be accorded, similar treatment" (Berlin 1979, 82). Important aspects are discriminated to apply the principle of equality. Namely, the egalitarian formula presupposes an answer to the question which aspects of human life, a life in society, are important, those that deeply affect it or make a great difference to it, frustrate human desires or interests in a significant degree. Probably all aspects are important. But is it possible to achieve a similarity or uniformity of treatment for all in all aspects of life? At what cost is it achievable? These are the questions considered and answered by Berlin.

Inspired by Wollheim, another British philosopher, he suggests to tackle the issue of equality in terms of two conceptions, of rules and of equality proper. "All rules, by definition, entail a measure of equality. In so far as rules are general instructions to act or refrain from acting in certain ways, in specified circumstances, enjoined upon persons of a specified kind, they enjoin uniform behaviour in identical cases. [...] To enforce a rule is to promote equality of behaviour or treatment. This applies whether the rules take the form of moral principles and laws, or codes of positive law, or the rules of games or of conduct adopted by professional associations, religious organizations, political parties, wherever patterns of behaviour can be codified in a more or less systematic manner" (Berlin 1979, 84-85).

In other words, to set out a rule or a law means patterning human behaviour or conduct and this supposes itself a sort of unification. He takes this type of equality, which in its turn supposes obedience to rules, as a necessary condition for the existence of human societies, one of the deepest needs and convictions of mankind. In other words, equality presupposed by a rule or a law etc. is at first glance functional with regard to human being and human coexistence. Taken in this sense equality is coextensive with social morality. And the opposites, as he notices, would be the *ad hoc* orders of an inspired leader, or arbitrary desires. "In this sense, [...] to say that inequality is wrong

is, in effect, to say that it is wrong to obey no rules in a given situation, or to accept a rule and break it" (Berlin 1979, 85).

What makes worth Berlin's examination of equality is that here he actually identifies equality with fairness and respectively inequality with unfairness. One finds the latter in different passages of the essay but the followings is illustrative: "[...] A situation in which some men, for no stated reason, and in accordance with no rule, consistently obtain more than other men with the same, or sufficiently similar, relevant characteristics (however this is determined) is then described as being unfair. [...] The notions of equality and fairness are closely bound up: if as a result of breaking a rule a man derives benefits which he can obtain only so long as other man do not break but keep the rule, then no matter what other needs are being served by such a breach, the result is an offence against a principle best described as that of fairness, which is a form of desire for equality for its own sake" (Berlin 1979, 85-97).

With respect to what he calls equality proper, Berlin actually answers the two questions:

a) Is it possible to achieve a similarity or uniformity of treatment for all in all aspects of life?

b) If yes, then at what cost is it achievable?

Regarding this aspect of equality, he writes: "In its simplest form the ideal of complete social equality embodies the wish that everything and everybody should be as similar as possible to everything and everybody else. [...] I doubt whether anyone has ever seriously desired to bring such a society into being, or even supposed such a society to be capable of being created. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the demands for human equality which have been expressed both by philosophers and by men of action [...] can best be represented as modifications of this absolute and perhaps absurd ideal. [...] It may be that the creation of so uniform a society, whether or not it is intrinsically desirable, may not, in fact, be feasible. It may also be that even the attempt to approach it as closely as it humanly possible requires a degree of radical reorganization which cannot be carried out without a highly centralized and despotic authority – itself the cause of maximum of inequality" (Berlin 1979, 90-92).

So, Berlin rejects the ideal of complete social equality arguing that its leads to the erasure of differences, in terms of our interests, namely, to the erasure of individual characteristics. Actually, it would mean dealing with a body of indiscernible human beings. In addition to the latter, it is not practically possible to achieve such an end. And even if it were, a case of radical reorganization of society, it would create a great inequality in authority. In fact, the latter reveals not only the impossibility of complete equality but also a chance of generating a despotism. Practically, the maintenance of complete social equality requires permanent interventions of authorities in all spheres of life. And Berlin cannot not to call the ideal of complete social equality an absurd. In theory as well as in practice, the whole matter is to define the area or areas over which the principle of equality rules or equal treatment is to operate. He examines the case of the liberal doctrine of the 20th century which states the equality of political and juridical rights while demanding no interference in other regions of activity (say, the economic). Though the latter brings to social and economic inequalities, the school of liberals

assures that this is the price paid for ensuring political and legal equality (Berlin 1979, 93).

At this point his value pluralism gradually “enters the game” though in this essay he does not use this term yet: it appears later in his *Two Concepts of Liberty*. But a ground is already for it. “[...] In considering what kind of society is desirable, or what are ‘sufficient reasons’ for either demanding equality or, on the contrary, modifying it or infringing it in specific cases, ideals other than equality conspicuously play a vital role. [...] Certain other ends must be striven for, such as happiness, virtue, justice, progress in the arts and sciences, the satisfaction of various moral and spiritual wants, of which equality, of whatever kind, is only one. [...] Equality is one value among many: the degree to which it is compatible with other ends depends on the concrete situation, and cannot be deduced from general laws of any kind; it is neither more nor less rational than any other ultimate principle” (Berlin 1979, 95-96).

The latter leads him to think that there is no single formula whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized. Some of them are incompatible, so the possibility of conflict cannot be eliminated from human life at all. But he is aware that there are values on which sacrifices cannot be put. He tries to figure out a way from this impasse and finds it in compromise. “[...] We cannot sacrifice either freedom or the organization needed for its defense, or a minimum standard of welfare. The way out must therefore lie in some logically, untidy, flexible, and ever ambiguous compromise. Every situation calls for its own specific policy [...]. [...] No solution can be guaranteed against error, no disposition is final. And therefore, a loose texture and toleration of a minimum of inefficiency, even a degree of indulgence in idle talk, idle curiosity [...] allow more spontaneous, individual variation [...] and will always be worth more than the neatest and most directly fashioned imposed pattern” (Berlin 2002, 92-93).

So, what Berlin states: *firstly*, a room must be made not only for equality but also for the other ends or values. No end can be privileged and pursued completely and it is impossible to achieve all of these ends completely at once. But as ends equality, justice, happiness, freedom etc. all of them are important for human beings and are worth to be pursued. *Secondly*, in his view, all these ends are achievable to a certain degree. But there are not any general rules for regulating to which degree these ends must be pursued or realized. It is always a matter of compromise and context-bound. With this respect, combination of ends in various degrees will vary from society to society from one period to the other. Here a question can be raised, how is it decided which combination is the right one for implementation? Berlin suggests practical reasoning as the proper procedure for it (?). He advocates value pluralism which is actually in the spirit of British Empiricism but has to provide a basis for value pluralism, a kind of axis. It is at this point that he privileges the negative sense of liberty vis-a-vis the positive sense of it. It is the negative sense of freedom enables value pluralism to come true, the only acceptable and humane way of dealing with matter in comparison to other possibilities: “Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. To assume that all

values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation which a slide rule could, in principle, perform" (Berlin 2002, 216).

Recapitulating what has been presented so far and answering the question of how Berlin reconciles equality with freedom it can be stated that for him both equality and freedom are ends, terminal values pursuing of which is out of question. At the same time, they are mutually incompatible or destructive in their extreme forms. So, a kind of compromise is needed in order to make a room for both. And in Berlin's theory, the negative sense of liberty functions as a sort of axis which opens a space for realizing and functioning of other ends or values among which is equality as well.

Does, in effect, Berlin achieve his desirable goal consistently to justify value pluralism? Is he consistent with regard to his own methodological commitments? Doesn't his value pluralism bring to value relativism, a moral approach which makes any choice or decision in these matters voluntary or arbitrary, contingent on subjective preferences? In fact, the latter means resetting a social and political order from time to time. And in that case, doesn't it destroy any foundation of stability. Last but not least: if the measure of 'negative' liberty is needed for value pluralism does it not mean that the 'negative' liberty is already privileged in comparison to other ends or values? Therefore, can we regard his value pluralism as a consistent doctrine or doesn't it bend toward value monism? Given the aforementioned his value pluralism tends toward values monism and in that sense his doctrine has inconsistencies which poorly provide foundations of stability for social-political order. It is here that Rawls' approach on the topic should be introduced and analyzed as Berlin's reflections lead to some inconsistencies which Rawls tries to escape.

Creating Compatibility (J. Rawls)

With respect to the issue some reflections on Rawls' approach are briefly presented above. But in this section of the article, they will be expanded and presented in detail. Surely, Rawls knows all arguments on the topic given the years of his engagement with moral and political issues. Before tracing his path of reconciliation, a couple of remarks are worth to be taken into account: a) Rawls is interested in the institutional aspect of the topic; his main concern is public rules operating in societies and not human actions; these rules structure human relations and frame human actions; hence, equality and freedom, their possible reconciliation are perceived with regard to rules, institutions and not actions; b) as his primary aim is to develop a theory of justice then he is to find for these two rival ideas proper places in it; roughly speaking, he makes equality and freedom the components of justice; justice becomes the 'place' of their reconciliation and equality and freedom are core values in relations between state and citizen and among citizens; in contrast to it, Berlin tries to set up horizontal relations between the fundamental political values making room for one partly at expense of the other; of course, first of all it is of great importance how these thinkers define the basic political ideas or values; but the way of conceiving their relations is itself already symptomatic; Rawls takes a

radically different path, a path of creating compatibility; c) though there are many aspects of equality, however, the two of them are especially important to consider in relation to freedom: the political and the socio-economic aspects. Historically, the tension between equality and freedom has emerged and discussed in political thought in these respects. Berlin does know very well about it. But he is not so much interested in dealing with the political and the socio-economic aspects separately. Therefore, he discusses the topic generally but always insists on finding a compromise in the political as well as in the socio-economic aspects contingent on a situation.

In the case of political aspect, the rivalry between equality and freedom evolves between the liberal tradition and the democratic tradition. The liberal tradition emphasizes the rule of law, the defense of human rights and the respect of individual liberty. The democratic tradition's main ideas are equality, identity between governing and governed and popular sovereignty. Some political thinkers, among which is post-Marxist thinker Ch. Mouffe, but not only she, insist that politically equality and freedom are in tension. In this respect, Mouffe writes: "There is no necessary relations between those two distinct traditions but only a contingent historical articulation. [...] Liberal democracy results from the articulation of two logics which are incompatible in the last instance and that there is no way in which they could be perfectly reconciled" (Mouffe 2000, 3-5).

Rawls advocates liberal democracy and he is well aware of this tension between equality and freedom but tries to manage a kind of reconciliation criticized by Ch. Mouffe. As far as the socio-economic aspect is concerned, the debate is on the jurisdiction of state and its possible redistributive functions⁶. It is a matter of hot debates between the right and the left within the political spectrum. Rawls discusses the matter in the end formulating principles of social justice. In his theory, there is a certain distinction between the two aspects of equality and a unity at the same time. And in both cases, he aims at reconciliation and compatibility. Therefore, he puts: "[...] Justice as fairness tries to adjudicate between these contending traditions, first by proposing two principles of justice to serve as guidelines for how basic institutions are to realize the values of liberty and equality; and second, by specifying a point of view from which these principles can be seen as more appropriate than other familiar principles of justice to the idea of democratic citizens viewed as free and equal persons" (Rawls 1996, 5). In his theory, the adequate procedures of deliberation serve to reach forms of agreement that would satisfy claims derived both from the liberal and democratic traditions. Hence, the political aspect of the issue finds its solution in that way.

It is well-known that following the Ancient tradition by Plato and Aristotle Rawls states the primacy of justice over the other possible virtues. At the same time, he stresses on the impossibility to make rights a subject of political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests prioritizing the legal-political component in the institutional design of a polity (Rawls 2005, 3-4). In his *Political Liberalism* he raises a question "[...] How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines" (Rawls 1996, 4). What the question assumes: from one side there is a goal to

⁶ The question 'Should a state be more than a night-watchman carrying out redistributive functions for its citizens or be restricted to the defensive functions?' expresses the issue in the interrogative way.

attain a just and stable society of free and equal citizens over time, hence, the institutions are to be designed in a way that it provides not only justice but also stability. From the other side, plurality of doctrines divides citizens and members of society, so makes a cooperation of citizens and members of society vulnerable to instabilities and probably to injustices. Actually, there is a tension between the goal of attaining justice/stability and reasonable pluralism. Here Rawls chooses a way radically different from Berlin's way. Berlin prefers to maintain and nourish value pluralism rejecting any general rules and finding solutions within the situative normativity and temporary compromises.

Rawls takes a way close to Locke's and Kant's liberalisms: the private sphere is separated from the public one, reasonable pluralism is located in the private sphere, namely, different philosophical, religious or moral views and doctrines are allowed to be expressed within it. But the public sphere needs a conception of justice shared by citizens and members of society. So, he also proposes the concept of well-ordered society. It is a society effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. That is (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these principles (Rawls 2005, 5).

Not only does Rawls rule out the private sphere from the scope of operation of a conception of justice but also specifies which aspect is covered in his theory. "Many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust: not only laws, institutions, and social systems, but also particular actions of many kinds, including decisions, judgments, and imputations. [...] Our topic, however, is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (Rawls 2005, 7). So, not only the institutional aspect but also the distributive aspect is of major concern here. The main social institutions among which are political, economic institutions (for example, political constitution, market etc.) form a scheme which highly affect people's life prospects. From the other side, there are always rights and duties in a society, advantages, benefits and burdens from social cooperation. At the same time, the social structure of a society contains different social positions and inevitably brings to inequalities. And men born into different positions have not only different life prospects, let's say, unequal prospects, but also expectations of life. Therefore, it is of vital importance how these institutions distribute rights and duties and advantages from social cooperation between men from different social positions. It is here that a society needs principles of justice in order to regulate these matters and these principles, as Rawls believes, must in the first instance be applied to the inequalities.

Hence, Rawls develops his theory of justice not primarily for stating the priority of justice, uncompromising value of freedom and liberties of equal citizenship but first of all for dealing with inevitable inequalities. His theory of justice is an effort to answer the questions concerning inequalities, inequalities that are dysfunctional or bring to negative consequences. There are both political and socio-economic inequalities as rights and duties, benefits and burdens as well as advantages from social cooperation, the way how all of them are distributed create those inequalities.

His emphasis on the benefits and burdens of social cooperation is the key to his understanding of society, to why men prefer to live together and not separately, why it is important to adopt a public conception of justice and respectively principles of justice etc. And relying on the contractarian doctrine Rawls foresees destructive consequences of conflicts of individual interests, ends and claims if a shared, public conception of justice, if a certain measure of agreement on what is just and unjust are not defined and accepted. "Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. [...] In the absence of a certain measure of agreement on what is just and unjust, it is clearly more difficult for individuals to coordinate their plans efficiently in order to insure that mutually beneficial arrangements are maintained. Distrust and resentment corrode the ties of civility, and suspicion and hostility tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise avoid" (Rawls 2005, 5-6).

As is stated the procedures of deliberation play a central role in ensuring a reconciliation between equality and freedom in Rawls' theory of justice. Hence, it is not useless to touch on the procedural part of his theory and to find out how equality and liberty emerge in it and later institutionalized in principles of justice. Rawls notes that justice as fairness consists of two parts: (1) what he calls an interpretation of the initial situation and of the problem of choice posed there, and (2) a set of principles which would be agreed to. He insists that the principles of justice are thought of as arising from an original agreement in a situation of equality. Then it is of vital importance to understand what he means by saying a situation of equality. For him the initial situation which includes the original position is a hypothetical situation of equal liberty in which the parties would choose principles of justice in a joint act. As he puts the original position of *equality* corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. He invokes the idea of the veil of ignorance which implies that "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like" (Rawls 2005, 12). The veil of ignorance deprives the parties of knowledge on their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. And this is the condition of securing fairness of the procedural part and of principles of justice chosen. "It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on. Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of justice. The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects. Systems of ends are not ranked in value; and each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon whatever principles are adopted. Together with the veil of ignorance, these conditions define the principles of justice as those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies" (Rawls 2005, 19).

In the first part of this passage Rawls clarifies his understanding of equality in the procedure of choosing principles. In the latter, equality means having the same rights of making proposals and submitting reasons. Actually, there are tacitly operating

regulations which not only accept the legitimacy of these rights but also enable their exercising. But Rawls does not talk and even mention about them in this or that way. At the same time, he grounds them in moral equality of persons, in their having a conception of good and a sense of justice. In other words, the two moral powers, having a conception of good and a sense of justice secure equality of moral beings, hence, their rights to make proposals and submit reasons. The result is principles of justice agreed upon. In case of freedom or liberty, he insists that the parties are not only equal but also free. And here 'free' means being "a self-originating source of claims", "recognition of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good", "responsibility for ends" - capability to adjust their aims and ambitions in the light of what persons can reasonably expect and of restricting their claims in matters of justice to certain kinds of things (Rawls 1999, 330-32).

Reflecting in this way consistently and going back and forth within it it turns out that as moral beings, persons or parties of an agreement objectify, embody their personal equality and freedom in institutions, they objectify and embody their capacities in institutions. And this process of objectification and embodiment supposes a kind of transformation. Hence, the principles of social justice, that are agreed upon, are both the result of this transformative act and embodiment of equality and freedom. But without rationality, an ability of person to seek his/her own advantage and reflection it would be impossible to agree on a scheme enabling fair terms of cooperation between free and equal citizens: "[...] We are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits. Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society. Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for the present that this choice problem has a solution, determines the principles of justice" (Rawls 2005, 11-12).

Now it is time to turn into the second part of the theory, into the principles of justice adopted and to find in them institutionalized equality and freedom. As is known, Rawls proposes two principles of justice; the second principle itself consists of two principles:

"a. Each person has an equal claim to fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value" (Rawls 1996, 5).

"b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (Rawls 1996, 6).

The two principles express an egalitarian form of liberalism:

- The guarantee of the fair values of the political liberties,
- Fair equality of opportunity,

- The difference principle, the social and economic inequalities attached to offices and positions are to be adjusted so that, whatever the level of those inequalities, whether great or small, they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society,

He adds to this list the fourth aspect either, where “[...] The first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties” (Rawls 2005, 7). What does the latter mean? In an interesting way, some sort of equality, equality which is established when basic needs are met, equality that is social and economic by nature is the condition for fruitfully exercising the basic rights and liberties. Therefore, at this point and in this sense, equality turns out to be not the rival of or in tension with freedom but the condition of its effective functioning. At first glance, it is a surprising outcome given the fact that the liberal thought mainly insists on equality of rights and liberties and tolerates social and economic inequalities. And as central political values equality in its two aspects and freedom have to cooperate as well as conflict with each other.

Why is it so important to turn into this specific issue which, at first glance, does not concern the relation between equality and freedom and their reconciliation? The examination of his theory allows to state that his principles of justice institutionalize the values of equality and freedom. Setting a priority between his principles of justice Rawls aims at prioritizing freedom over equality in the social and economic sense. But as it is found out his effort is partly failed because the satisfaction of basic needs at least in *Political Liberalism* emerges as a necessary condition for the enactment of the first principle, the principle concerning basic rights and liberties. Needless to say, that he tries to reconcile freedom of the liberal tradition with equality of the democratic tradition. Hence, his liberalism is one of the best examples of a theory of social justice in which equality and freedom demonstrate paradoxical relations: from one side they ensure each other, from the other, they are in tension. And the latter, this paradoxical side of their relations, manifests complexity of social reality and in particular of political matters.

Conclusion and discussion

Resuming the aforementioned it is evident that both equality and freedom are central political ideas and values for Berlin as well as Rawls. Being aware of their rival relationship, of a deep tension between them, nevertheless, they find their own ways for their reconciliation. In this or that way, both liberal thinkers actually aim at finding a frame in which they can coexist. Berlin seeks a kind of compromise in order to make a room for both within his idea of value pluralism though in the end he has to privilege the negative sense of liberty. The latter functions as a sort of axis which opens a space for realizing and functioning of other ends or values among which is equality as well. But his value pluralism tends toward values monism and in that sense his doctrine has inconsistencies which poorly provide foundations of stability for social and political order.

The examination of Rawls' theory of justice allows to state that his principles of social justice institutionalize the values of equality and freedom. Actually, Rawls tackles the issue in the two aspects: the political and the social and economic. In the case of political aspect, he tries to reconcile freedom of the liberal tradition with equality of the democratic tradition via deliberation. Setting a priority between his principles of social justice Rawls aims at prioritizing freedom over equality in the social and economic sense. But as it is found out that his effort is partly failed. The social and economic aspect of the issue reveals that though freedom is privileged, however, the equality in satisfaction of basic needs is a prerequisite for achieving freedom. Hence, in his theory of social justice equality and freedom demonstrate paradoxical relations: from one side they ensure each other, from the other, they are in tension. And the latter, this paradoxical side of their relations, manifests complexity of social reality and in particular of political matters.

Summing up the results of this article, it should be noted that the tasks that contributed to the disclosure of the main characteristics of the concept of pluralism of values as one of the most debatable concepts of Western political philosophy were solved.

The solution of the first task involved the consideration of value pluralism as a methodological principle of political philosophy. For this, the concept of pluralism of values in the works of Isaiah Berlin was analyzed and its importance as a methodological component of political philosophy was shown. Based on the analysis, it was concluded that the concept of pluralism of values is an integral part of political philosophy in general and one of the criteria for its definition, as it allows you to work with problems that are based on a value component.

The solution of the second research task implied the disclosure of the specifics of the concept of pluralism of values in the political philosophy of Berlin. Here, special attention was paid to the idea of a minimum set of values. It is this idea that becomes, according to most researchers, the key to distinguishing between the concept of value pluralism and relativism. As a result, it was shown that Berlin's idea of a minimum set is not the only possible theoretical construct to explain communication between cultures and societies in conditions of pluralism of values.

References

- Berlin, Isaiah. 2002. "Introduction." In *Liberty*, edited by Henry Hardy, 3-54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 2002. "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century." In: *Liberty*, edited by Henry Hardy, 55-93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 2002. "Two Concepts of Liberty." In: *Liberty*, edited by Henry Hardy, 166-217. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berlin, Isaiah. 1979. "Equality." In: *Concepts and Categories*, edited by Henry Hardy, 81-102. New York: The Viking Press.
- Cohen, Gerald. 2006. "Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?" In: *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, 416-423. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

- Jahanbegloo, Ramin. 2007. *Conversations with Isaiah Berlin*. London: Halban.
- Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. *The Democratic Paradox*. London: Verso.
- Pogge, Thomas. 2007. *John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice*. Translated by Michelle Kosch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John. 2005. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, John. 1996. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rawls, John. 1999. "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory." In: *Collected Papers*, edited by Samuel Freeman, 303-358. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ryan, Alan. 2007. "Liberalism." In: *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, edited by Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit and Thomas Pogge, 360-382. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Shklar, Judith N. 1989. "The Liberalism of Fear." In: *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, edited by Nancy L. Rosenblum, 21-38. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

LEBANIDZE, BIDZINA. 2020. RUSSIA, EU AND THE POST-SOVIET
DEMOCRATIC FAILURE. VERGLEICHENDE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT.

WIESBADEN: SPRINGER VS. XV, 329 PP.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8>

REVIEW BY: HAYARPI DRMEYAN 

Abstract

This book is devoted to a comparative study of the democratization of the political regimes of the post-Soviet countries, as well as the main factors in the failure of post-Soviet democracy. In different chapters of the book, special attention is paid to the integration and democratization political processes, based on the results of which the author uses the concept of the post-Soviet puzzle. The problem of formation of democratic institutions, promotion of EU democratic strategies in the post-Soviet states, protracted conflicts in this region continue to pose complex questions for the researcher about the instruments of effective influence on these countries. The main task of the author of this study was to analyze the new and transforming old tools used by the EU and the Russian Federation, to identify the main reasons for the failure of post-Soviet democracy. The author comparatively analyzes the role of Russia and the EU in resolving ethnic and political conflicts in the post-Soviet space, exercising economic incentives, as well as other domestic and external factors which leads to the post-Soviet puzzle and the failure of post-Soviet democracy.

Keywords: *post-Soviet puzzle, democratic failure, post-Soviet states, enlargement, EU denied membership, liberalization, negative influence, pro-Russian opposition, shared neighborhood, pro-European elites.*

After the collapse of the political system of the USSR, a need had emerged for the scientific circles to outline a relevant characterization for the new geopolitical reality. The concepts that define the wholeness of new independent states proclaimed on the territory of the USSR and are used in the science of international relations first appeared in journalistic discussions and political circles during the development of the first foreign

* Hayarpi Drmeyer is a PhD candidate of the Chair of International Relations and Diplomacy at Yerevan State University. She is a Diplomat and currently is posted as Second Secretary at the Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to the Nordic countries - Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway, with residence in Stockholm.

Email: h.drmeyan@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 139-143



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 12.08.2022

Revised: 19.08.2022

Accepted: 22.08.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

policy doctrines and strategies of those newly independent states. The emergence of the post-Soviet puzzle terminology in political discourse reflected a different semantic field. At the same time, this referred to the fact of common political, economic, social, cultural and civilizational problems of this space or not-so-distant common past. In this context, the concept of the post-Soviet puzzle has quickly found its reflection in the scientific space and in the lexicon of scientific literature, analyzing the situation in the countries of the post-Soviet space. The author's personal contribution to obtaining the scientific results are presented in this book through the analysis and forecasting based on the study of analytical and statistical materials, research papers on the prospects for democratization and European integration in the post-Soviet space, identifying the most significant factors that determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the integration processes. The author conduct comparative analyzes of the democratic process of four post-Soviet countries-Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, and in a detailed manner demonstrated the leverages and methods used by Russia and EU to impact it during the period from 1999 to 2014.

Participation in different and even competing integration processes has been one of the hallmarks of self-identification of the post-Soviet countries. The vector of the integration process has a considerable influence on both the foreign policy strategy and the economic model of the states of the region under consideration.

As author noted the European integration in the post-Soviet space meets the national interests of the majority of EaP countries, allowing them to increase their competitiveness in the globalizing world. However, the success of the implementation of the "European project" largely depends on the internal political processes in the above-mentioned countries, the stability of the commitment of their political elites to choosing this particular vector of integration. The collapse of the USSR led to the destruction of the former geopolitical order. According to author, an attempt to revive it on the basis of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) did not lead to the creation of any effective integration process, which is associated with the dominance of centrifugal forces of a predominantly political nature. Under these conditions, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the EaP, being the first of its kind, turned out to be the most promising long-term comprehensive perspective for the given countries, embracing economic, social and political dimensions. It is no coincidence that the EU has become the center for the creation of resilient integration mechanisms.

Author further notes that since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has had difficult times in becoming the main initiator of effective integration processes in the post-Soviet space. Officially defining relations and integration with the countries of the region as priority directions of its foreign policy and initiating the majority of integration projects in the region, Russia aims to display its dominance, which, in turn, has escalated situation in some parts of the post-Soviet space. This and other factors have discouraged some post-Soviet countries to seek closer ties with Russia. The growth of economic costs and political risks on the part of the EU associated with its integration processes in the post-Soviet area actualizes the understanding of the European integration policy, its tasks and tools, as well as the factors that hinder and facilitate its implementation.

Based on the formulated goal of the study in this book, the main tasks are as follows:

- a comparative analysis of the regime outcomes and degree of democracy in the post-Soviet states, the main approaches to the study and development of European integration in the post-Soviet space in the conflicting interests of the EU and Russia (Lebanidze 2020, 71-84);
- to identify domestic prerequisites for democratization, economic and political factors, both facilitating and hindering the implementation of the integration direction of the post-Soviet states (Lebanidze 2020, 85-109);
- determine the dimension of external leverage in the post-Soviet states, the place and the role of the post-Soviet countries in the development strategies of the EU (Lebanidze 2020, 111-124);
- to compare the European and Russian strategies in the post-Soviet space, highlight the experience and stages of the formation of the integration policy of the EU and Russia, linking them with real integration processes in the region, as well as with social and economic problems (Lebanidze 2020, 125-190).
- to show direct external influence in the context of elections in the post-Soviet states, to substantiate the need and importance of a full-fledged EU integration strategy in foreign policy in the post-Soviet space (Lebanidze 2020, 191-245).

The author was able to study the assessments given by scientists, the characteristic features and instruments of the policy of Russia and the EU towards the the post-Soviet states, and also analyze their views on the development of relations of Russia and the EU with various states of the post-Soviet region and key events for the region. As a result, the tasks that the author set for himself in this study were fulfilled, and the main goal of the work was achieved.

In this book, the author studied a large array of different sources, which made it possible to create a comprehensive work that presents a holistic picture of the views of representatives of the research communities on the relations of Russia and the EU with the states of the post-Soviet space.

Further analyzing Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space in 2000-2008, the author notes that under the President Putin, the post-Soviet space continued to retain its importance for Russia. At the same time, it was emphasized that by the end of the year 2003, the presence of foreign powers, especially the United States, began to grow and moreover it was followed by further expansion for the period of 2004-2008, including 'color revolutions' in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. This trend caused fears and suspicions in Russia regarding the involvement of the West in this events. There has been a general deterioration in relations between Russia and the West. It was noted that Russia's tough response to the policy of the United States and its European allies on the democratization of the post-Soviet space was aimed at defending its interests in the region and pursuing an active, offensive line. Despite the existing contradictions, in general, relations between Russia and Armenia, according to a number of experts, were of a close, strategic nature, and the political elites of Armenia pursued a policy of active participation in Russia's integration initiatives. Therefore, Russian economic and military assistance, among other factors, was critical to maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Russia's actions to defend its interests in the strategically important region were strongly criticized. Its peak fell on the period 2004-2008. This was largely due to the fact

that at that time Russia's line of upholding national interests was increasingly at odds with the policy of the United States and its European allies, including in the post-Soviet space. However, the Western European academic community was following the concept, according to which the interests of the West favor the strengthening of sovereignty of the former Soviet Republics and their integration into the Western community rather than strengthening Russia's position in the region. The assessments expressed regarding the Russian initiatives in the region by experts from the countries of the former Eastern Bloc and the newly independent states often suffered. Since 2000, Russia has had a significant arsenal of means to carry out its policy in the region, but the emphasis has been on the economic instruments of influence, especially playing the energy card. At the same time, the tradition of critical interpretation of Russia's use of these factors has been upheld in the majority of research works.

The author also refers to the opinions of those researchers who noted with pragmatism, the presence, if not the dominance of the economic factor, the desire to strengthen influence, develop integration processes and gain dominant positions in the region, including for regaining the status of a great power, as well as the rigidity shown over time by Russia in defending its interests. At the same time, many researchers believed that Russia, pursuing its policy, often interferes in the internal affairs of its neighbors and infringes on their sovereignty. It was pointed out that in Russian politics there were both continuity compared to the 1990s (attention to the region, the desire to restore influence), as well as new moments of pragmatism and attention to the economic component. According to the author, the necessary conditions that allowed Russia to actively implement its foreign policy course were not only natural factors (geographical proximity, common historical and cultural heritage with many countries of the region, economic ties, etc.), but also domestic political stability and economic growth. With regard to Russia's relations with the post-Soviet states, researchers noted the role of the Russian influence for all states in the region. The author also noted the role of the unresolved armed conflicts in the post-Soviet states, particularly in Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine as a tool by both Russia and the EU in expanding their influence on the leaderships of those countries and elaborated how it impacted the process of democratization.

Another important aspect of this book is that author comprehensively researched the role of the EU's democratic conditionality tool, as a tool do enhance democratization process in the above-mentioned countries. The various examples underline that it can't operate successfully as a stand-alone mechanism but should be implemented along with other criteria, such as strong domestic pro-democratization movements or consistency of exercising the mentioned tool even after democratic elections, as the latter not always guarantee that a state is following the path of sustainable democracy.

Altogether, it should be noted that the academic community will benefit from such a complex new work, due to the lack of such research in modern historiography. It is obvious that in the context of growing attention to the post-Soviet space, this work will be of significant interest to those dealing with issues in this region.

References

- Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Direct external influence: Elections in the post-Soviet states. In: *Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure*, 191-245. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8_9.
- Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Domestic prerequisites for democratization. In: *Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure*, 85-109. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8_6.
- Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. European and Russian strategies in the post-Soviet space. In: *Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure*, 125-190. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8_8.
- Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Measuring the external leverage in the post-Soviet states. In: *Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure*, 111-124. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8_7.
- Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Regime outcomes and degree of democracy in the post-Soviet states. In: *Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure*, 71-84. *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-26446-8_5.

ARMENIA'S VELVET REVOLUTION: AUTHORITARIAN DECLINE AND CIVIL RESISTANCE IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD, EDITED BY BROERS LAURENCE, AND ANNA OHANYAN.

LONDON: I.B. TAURIS, 2021. XVI, 271 PP.

<http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214>

REVIEW BY: VIKTORYA MELKONYAN *

Abstract

The collection was written originally in English and published in 2021. It analyzes the problems of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia in terms of the decline of authoritarianism and civil resistance in the transformation of a multipolar world. The authors of the collection comparatively analyze the internal and external political problems of modern Armenia, the policy of democratization of the political regime, the cycles of political power, the transit of the elite and the leadership of the parties in power, certain aspects of its economic and social development.

The team of authors prepared this collection and a comprehensive study of the entire system of public regulation of the political life of Armenia, the nature and forms of relations between the public authorities and civil society organizations. The main trends in the foreign policy development of post-Soviet Armenia, primarily in the regional conflict environment and in the European direction, and in connection with the Velvet Revolution, are explored.

The authors of the chapters highlight the main stages and tasks of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia and civil resistance: when, how and how it was built and with what degree of effectiveness the system of public regulation operated, how its main administrative institutions operated in the center and locally.

The appeal to this problem is caused by the relevance of studying the subject of the Velvet Revolution in the modern life of Armenia, the need to more fully comprehend the processes taking place in the Armenian environment inside and outside the country.

The book contains many interesting facts and points of view. Therefore, it will be interesting and useful not only for scientists, but also for everyone interested in the problems of revolution, democratization and civil resistance. It may serve as practical handbook for political scientists, sociologists, journalists as well as students and specialists from the field of human rights, democratization and international relations, interested in modern revolutions, political technologies, diaspora and civil society studies, etc.

Keywords: *Velvet Revolution, democratic transition, civic protests, competitive authoritarian system, Armenian civil society, non-violent resistance, political patriarchy, diaspora, democratic state.*

* Viktorya Melkonyan is a PhD candidate of the Chair of Political Science of the Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University

Email: melkonyanviktorya@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 144-149



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 05.08.2022

Revised: 12.08.2022

Accepted: 16.08.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

The South Caucasus is a region that has been in the center of attention of the entire world community for many decades. And not only because it is restless and conflicting, but because here it constantly presents such turns that are tangibly reflected in the whole world. This is not surprising, because the geopolitical interests of world and regional powers are closely intertwined here. If we add to this unresolved conflicts, questions of the creation of nation-states, unformed nations, the diversity of the ethnic and religious composition of the population, then the picture appears even more alarming.

Obviously, this book will be indispensable for those who are engaged in a comparative analysis of the prospects for democratic transformations in the post-Soviet space, and are also interested in the development of the prerequisites for civil society, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. Although this book analyzes the democratic transition of Armenia in a global context, the transit and drastic changes that have taken place in the post-Soviet space in recent years, it is nevertheless worth dwelling on some more issues, especially since many of them confirm the concept we have put forward that the events of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, as well as the events that followed it, are the beginning of the reconfiguration of the World-System (Wallerstein 2004, 23-24).

The victory of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia was made possible thanks to a large-scale civil movement and a popular protest movement calling for democratic reforms. This collection analyzes the civil protest movement in April-May 2018 in Armenia, under the influence of which the protest leader Nikol Pashinyan was elected Prime Minister by the National Assembly of Armenia. In this context, a comparative analysis of the national, regional and global dimensions of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia is of great importance. Therefore, the collection assesses the main reasons for the democratic turn of the Armenian regime, as well as the reasons for the vulnerability of the political order and the factors for reforming the political system.

The structure of the book is determined by the goals and objectives of the study of the Velvet Revolution in Armenia and is as follows: Foreword, Introduction, 9 Chapters and Conclusion, each of which contains an interesting list of sources and literature.

The first chapter of the work is devoted to the analysis of the democratic transition of Armenia in a global context (Ohanyan 2021, 25-49), as well as to the definition of the place and role of Armenia in the region, the historical patterns of the formation and development of Armenia as a special political actor in the international relations of the Caucasus region. The analysis of these problems allows us to analyze the dynamics and features of the process of the formation of Armenia's national interests.

The second chapter is devoted to the Armenian legacy of political and civic protests, as well as the specifics of the Velvet Revolution (Zolayan 2021, 51-71). This information allows us to highlight the characteristic features of the civic culture and the problems of the protest movement that exist today, as well as put forward paradigms for their resolution.

The third chapter contains information about the competitive authoritarian system, focusing on how Serzh Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia lost control of a competitive authoritarian system (Laurence 2021, 73-99).

The fourth chapter tells about the achievements and problem areas of the Armenian civil society (Paturyan 2021, 101-118). More and more attention is being paid to the

issues of civil society in the political life of our days. This topic is relevant both in the post-Soviet space and in modern Armenia, where since the early 1990s there has been a rise in civic activity, hundreds of thousands of NGOs have been created. The multilateral activity of NGOs awakens a natural desire to better understand the nature of civil society, to understand the relationship between civil society and public authorities. The relevance of the study of the role and place of the Armenian civil society is also related to the fact that not only the EU as one of the largest regional integration associations, but also leading international organizations link the issues of improving governance in the modern world with the participation of civil society in this process. At the same time, international structures agree that in order to increase the effectiveness of their activities, it is extremely important to pay significant attention to establishing and expanding dialogue with civil society.

The fifth chapter analyzes the non-violent resistance to the 2018 Armenian Revolution (Pinckney 2021, 119-139). The relevance of the problem of non-violence is determined not only by the expansion of the space of conflict, the fierce conflicts of our time, but also by the eternal dilemma that every person who thinks about violence and non-violence faces. The analysis carried out proved that it was the non-violence in the Velvet Revolution in Armenia and various social relations that contributed to the unification of the protesting people and led to dialogue and cooperation.

The sixth chapter outlines Armenia's transition in terms of the challenges of geography, geopolitics, and multipolarity, as well as US and Russian geopolitical interests in the Caucasus and Armenia (Giragosian 2021, 141-159). Of particular interest to the author is the prospects for the development of relations between the US and Armenia in the context of globalization. In this regard, the author analyzed the features of the strategic partnership between Russia and Armenia in the military, political and economic spheres, and also considered the possibility of Armenia pursuing a truly pro-Western foreign policy. The relationship between post-revolutionary Armenia and the United States, post-revolutionary Armenia and Russia is one of the urgent and complex problems of modern geopolitics, national and political processes. In view of the dynamic development of geostrategic realities and the gradual change in the geopolitical position of the key political players in the South Caucasus, it becomes necessary to study national, geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic processes.

The seventh chapter analyzes the tasks of maintaining the alliance, taking into account that the Velvet Revolution in Armenia is a challenge to Russia (Baev 2021, 161-180). In the post-revolutionary period of Armenia, in scientific publications devoted to the region, many new directions for its development, possible scenarios, and factors that determine the nature of relations between the countries of the South Caucasus appeared. There was an urgent need for a deep rethinking of the situation, conducting a comprehensive analysis, studying the political mechanisms and means of struggle of the countries of the South Caucasus when taking domestic and foreign political steps. Russia is one of the Caucasian countries, and, of course, the South Caucasus is an important area of its strategic military, political and economic interests. The existence of zones of military conflicts in the region makes political and social issues particularly acute. The South Caucasus has always been at the center of the dominant geopolitical currents. In addition, the ethnic and religious pluralism of the region created favorable conditions for

the activities of major powers. Because of this, spontaneous wars often broke out in the South Caucasus region, and large-scale wars were often caused by small local conflicts. In this context, it is important to analyze the evolution of the foreign policy and national interests of the United States and Russia in the post-Soviet space, taking into account the interests not only of the countries of the South Caucasus, but also of new geopolitical players.

The eighth chapter analyzes the issues of political patriarchy, gender hierarchies and public space in the Velvet Revolution in Armenia (Shirinian 2021, 181-199). Under the conditions of gender inequality, relations turn out to be due to the differentiation of people according to the gender hierarchy. Gender hierarchy relations form a system of patriarchal gender control over reproductive behavior and reproduction.

Public authority as a system of discursive practices is the key to understanding gender equality, which allows us to consider gender identity as a constructed product of power relations. During and after the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, women play an increasingly important role in political practice. They are the dominant segment in the system of the modern Armenian electorate. This requires researchers to take into account the influence of the gender factor on the political perception of Armenian power. The main gender factor that influences the process of hierarchization of political actors by women and men is the intensity of their conformity to the male stereotype. Ideas about masculinity or femininity in the images of political parties, leaders are associated with ideas about their strength or weakness, and, accordingly, with the conviction of what place they should occupy in the hierarchy of power.

The ninth chapter analyzes comparatively the relationship between democratization and the diaspora, taking into account the support of the Velvet Revolution by the Armenian people abroad (Cavoukian 2021, 201-230). The study of the relationship between democratization and the diaspora contributes to the development of target directions for the state national policy of Armenia, regional paradigms of national relations. Consideration of the Armenian diaspora in the social and political space and time of democratization, in the system of internal and external relations of the Armenian statehood determines a certain level of consolidation. Considering the Armenian diaspora with democratic interests and goals contributes to the development of diaspora management strategies and tactics at the national and local levels. In this context, the information support of the interaction of the Armenian diaspora and relevant associations with the authorities, local government, other public organizations and movements is of civilizational importance. At the same time, it is important to understand the mechanism of the impact of the Armenian diasporas on the democratization of political structures, which has a very complex structure.

The Velvet Revolution in Armenia was an attempt to democratize public authority and society. There is every reason to believe that all attempts will not be entirely successful and will not lead to the results that the democratic reformers thought. The Velvet Revolution was a response precisely to the fact that, compared with the early 1990s, our elections to government bodies are becoming less free and fair, the rights and freedoms of the individual are provided to a much lesser extent, the courts have become significantly more dependent, the system of separation of powers dominated by the executive power becomes illusory. With such results of the modernization of Armenia,

it becomes important to analyze the events that have taken place. In this context, the discussion of problems regarding authoritarian reserves and risks in a democratic state is very reasonable (Ohanyan 2021b, 231-252). At the same time, asking and trying to answer the question: What's next? (Ohanyan 2021b, 231). As Ohanyan stated in the chapter, "Armenia's Velvet, with its geographical location in a fractured region, signals the need for fresh thinking in Western capitals at a time of strategic uncertainty and rising power of illiberal actors in world politics. It underlines the importance of understanding how competitive authoritarian/hybrid regimes evolve or decline in order to devise constructive strategies for engaging with them." (Ohanyan 2021b, 248).

To understand the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, the processes characteristic of the Armenian society, it will be useful to refer to the transit/consolidation paradigm. Modern transitology has accumulated experience in studying the transition from authoritarian rule to democracies on the example of the countries of Southern Europe and South America. With all the existing disagreements, which are based on Eastern European exceptionalism and the difficulties of transition from totalitarianism to democracy than, in comparison, from authoritarianism, agreement can be found on some dimensions. Democratic transition is not a single evolutionary process, but a multitude of alternative and indirect paths, fraught with difficulties. A comparative study of issues of civil resistance, revolution and regime transformation faces the problem of identifying individual phases of transition and ways or forms of transit.

References

- Baev, Pavel K. 2021. "Preserving the alliance against tall odds: Armenia's Velvet Revolution as a challenge to Russia." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 161-180. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0014>.
- Broers, Laurence. 2021. "How Serzh Sargsyan and the Republican Party of Armenia lost control of a competitive authoritarian system." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 73-99. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0010>.
- Cavoukian, Kristin. 2021. "Democratization and diaspora: The Velvet Revolution and the Armenian nation abroad." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 201-230. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0016>.
- Giragosian, Richard. 2021. "Armenia's transition: The challenges of geography, geopolitics and multipolarity." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 141-159. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0013>.

- Ohanyan, Anna. 2021b. "Conclusion: What's next for Armenia? Authoritarian reserves and risks in a democratic state." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 231-252. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0017>.
- Ohanyan, Anna. 2021a. "Velvet is not a colour: Armenia's democratic transition in a global context." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 25-49. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0008>.
- Paturyan, Yevgenya Jenny. 2021. "Armenian civil society: Growing pains, honing skills and possible pitfalls." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 101-118. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0011>.
- Pinckney, Jonathan. 2021. "Donning the Velvet: Non-violent resistance in the 2018 Armenian Revolution." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 119-139. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0012>.
- Shirinian, Tamar. 2021. "Political patriarchy: Gendered hierarchies, paternalism, and public space in Armenia's 'Velvet Revolution'." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 181-199. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0015>.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004. *World-systems analysis: An introduction*. Duke University Press.
- Zolyan, Mikayel. 2021. "Thirty years of protest: How Armenia's legacy of political and civic protests prepared the Velvet Revolution." In: *Armenia's Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World*, edited by Laurence Broers, and Anna Ohanyan, 51-71. London: I.B. TAURIS. <http://doi.org/10.5040/9781788317214.0009>.

WOMEN'S EVERYDAY LIVES IN WAR AND PEACE IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, EDITED BY ULRIKE ZIEMER. CHAM: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2020. X, 281 PP. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_8.

REVIEW BY: SVETLANA JILAVYAN 

Abstract

This edited volume provides a comparative analysis of the everyday problems of women in the South Caucasus. The authors of this collection pay special attention to the geopolitical analysis in the region in the context of social changes and civilizational challenges of women. The authors discuss the everyday problems of women during periods of transformation of political systems, regimes and conflicts, thereby explaining the various dimensions of these transits of power and institutions of public authority.

The role of women in the South Caucasus is steadily growing even in conditions of instability, neither war nor peace. Women are actively employed in almost all spheres of life: in the economy, politics, culture, public life. However, in the South Caucasus, although the idea of protecting women's rights and gender equality has been enshrined at the constitutional level, the problem of how the actual status of women in society complies with constitutional provisions still persists.

The democratization of the life of the South Caucasian society, the expansion of the information space and the variety of types of communications led to the involvement of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in global processes, in particular, in the implementation of the modernist project to protect the rights and freedoms of women.

Keywords: *the South Caucasus, women, gender studies, war, peace, feminism, political protest, forced displacement.*

The formation of new independent states in the South Caucasus began in the turbulent conditions of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet South Caucasian countries that emerged as a result of these events, literally the day after they gained national sovereignty, faced urgent tasks to ensure their development and security. An

* Svetlana Jilavyan is a PhD candidate of the Chair of World Politics and International Relations at Russian-Armenian University.

Email: svetlana.jilavyan@gmail.com

Journal of Political Science: Bulletin of Yerevan University, Vol. 1 (2), September 2022, Pp. 150-154



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Received: 30.07.2022

Revised: 06.08.2022

Accepted: 10.08.2022

© The Author(s) 2022

important role in their solution, along with the mobilization of internal resources, was called upon to play an active foreign policy, while setting, based on national interests, its most important tasks and priorities and creating the necessary mechanisms to achieve them. The post-Soviet South Caucasian countries had to determine their place in international relations, the nature of relations with other countries, both with the largest and most influential, and with immediate neighbors. Taking into account the limited or acute shortage of their own resources for national development, as well as the lack of internationally recognized and equipped external borders, the post-Soviet South Caucasian countries needed to ensure their sovereignty by effective methods and avoid falling into political or economic dependence on more developed and powerful states.

The emergence of new opportunities in educational and scientific activities, intensive internationalization, which contributes to the growth of scientific results due to the exchange of information and the concentration of research efforts on the most complex problems of various branches of scientific knowledge, are changing the parameters of the modern academic environment. Reconstruction of the role of women in the social and cultural space of the South Caucasus is one of the topical areas of modern research (Ziemer 2018). At first glance, this sharpness of perception is associated with political, legal, social and economic transformations in the South Caucasus and, logically, should have softened as life destabilized in this region. However, in reality this does not happen. The everyday problems of women in the South Caucasus have traditionally been studied by many scientists, but a separate and special comparative study of women's activity has been thematized only recently. This new problem in the social sciences turned out to be part of the gender studies of the social past. This direction does not consider gender in itself and not the relationship of the sexes in different cultural contexts, which traditional ethnography was engaged in, but precisely the plurality of social ties in different cultures, not missing the gender factor when considering them and attaching special importance to gender interactions as a model of social relations. Women's rights in the system of constitutional human rights refer to human rights of the third generation, to the so-called collective rights, which are addressed not so much to the individual as to certain social groups that need additional guarantees to protect their rights.

Comparative study of women's history and gender anthropology by modern ethnologists and researchers of the past forces us to pay close attention to the special and separate study of women's daily practices in bygone eras, their features and distinctive features, the mechanisms for transferring the traditional and adapting to the new. Anthropology of women's everyday life is a separate area of research that requires special empirical material, the use of special techniques and methods of analysis. But with all the multiplicity of publications on this topic, anthropology obviously lacks interdisciplinary research on the women's everyday life of the peoples of the South Caucasus. In this regard, the appeal to the political anthropology of everyday life, in the difficult conditions of the social and political crisis of the region, war and reforms, allows the authors to identify the specifics of the everyday life of the female part of the South Caucasian society, outlining the general features and trends in the development of women's communities among the peoples of the South Caucasus, penetrating into social moods half of the population of this ethnic group.

The first part of the collection includes three articles and discusses issues relating to women, tradition and social change. The second part of the collection is devoted to the experience of women who survived wars and displacement. The authors of four articles analyze the experience of women who survived wars and conflicts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as displacement from Abkhazia and Azerbaijan. The third part of the collection looks at various issues faced by sexual minorities in Georgia and feminist activism in Azerbaijan.

It is important to note that the authors of this collection discuss the following issues: 1) Women as Bearers of Modernity and Tradition (Krebs 2020); 2) 'Supra Is Not for Women': Hospitality Practices as a Lens on Gender and Social Change in Georgia (Curro 2020); 3) Women Against Authoritarianism: Agency and Political Protest in Armenia (Ziemer 2020); 4) Between Love, Pain and Identity: Armenian Women After World War I (Aleksanyan 2020); 5) 'We Are Strangers Among Our Own People': Displaced Armenian Women (Ghazaryan 2020); 6) Vulnerability and Resilience: Women's Narratives of Forced Displacement from Abkhazia (Arjevanidze 2020); 7) The Politics of Widowhood in Nagorny Karabakh (Shahnazarian and Ziemer 2020); 8) Invisible Battlefield: How the Politicization of LGBT Issues Affects the Visibility of LBT Women in Georgia (Gvianishvili 2020); 9) Exploring Two Generations of Women Activists in Azerbaijan: Between Feminism and a Post-Soviet Locality (Aliyeva 2020); 10) Feminism in Azerbaijan: Gender, Community and Nation-Building (Walsh 2020).

Obviously, when there are conflicting views on the war itself in the South Caucasus and the Caucasian war, and the transformation processes are interpreted ambiguously in the difficult conditions of the social and political crisis in the region, the past is being rethought. On the one hand, not wanting to dissolve into another culture, the society closed itself in its ethnic group, trying to preserve its traditions, and tightened social norms, especially for women. The second trend inevitably occurred European integration or rapprochement in the post-Soviet space. Such interest of the authors of the collection is justified, since these studies allow us to analyze how, under the influence of the military factor, political and administrative changes, the habits and social behavior, personal and social status of women, the content of their daily life, intra-family and social relations were transformed during and after the wars. Without such an assessment, it is impossible to assess the current processes of changing the way of life of people of different sexes in extreme circumstances, as well as to understand the place and role of the women's issue in modern public discussions in the South Caucasus.

New labor practices arose, new areas of application of women's skills and craftsmanship, along with this, exploitation also grew. This collection reveals that, on the one hand, this was facilitated by the traditional patriarchal relations that developed in the traditional South Caucasian society, and on the other hand, it was also caused by the lack of male population due to the war. Under the influence of the military factor, there were changes in the extra-family everyday life and social behavior of South Caucasian women. Social support for women and their families from public and local authorities was also a new phenomenon for the South Caucasus region. The mechanisms of social support for women and their families depended on the political situation and were appointed upon recognition of need.

The study of the gender factor in the South Caucasian wars allows us to conclude that new models of women's behavior appeared, which were expressed in protest behavior against cruelty and humility, child sacrifice, etc. Such qualities of women as patriotism, fearlessness and self-sacrifice, which have evolved over the centuries, remained traditional. The change in women's mentality was due to social and cultural realities. In the realities of everyday military life, contrary to established traditions, women often had to violate moral and ethical norms and cross gender boundaries. Despite the fact that the behavior of women did not correspond to generally accepted patriarchal norms, but, under certain circumstances, it turned out to be very effective. In the specific conditions of wartime, the atypical model of women's behavior did not cause condemnation in society. Attempts to regulate the extra-family life of the population were in conflict with established cultural traditions. It was revealed that the nature of the South Caucasian war contributed to the formation in women of a complex of special mental characteristics, pronounced masculine traits. Examples of the emancipation of women, the participation of disguised and armed women in the defensive battles of the South Caucasian War are revealed.

The principle of equality of men and women underlies the construction of a state of law and civil society, in which the main duty of the state is the recognition, observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, which are the highest value. It is no coincidence that the world community, represented by the UN, considers gender equality as an integral part of the general concept of equality. Modern democratic states consider equality and freedom to be basic social values and provide them with constitutional and legislative guarantees at the national level.

The resilience of the rights and freedoms of women in the South Caucasus can only be ensured by recognizing the value of each person, creating a favorable environment for his development, the fullest realization of his creative potential and creative abilities, the full disclosure of the essential forces and talents, which will allow everyone to make a full contribution to sustainable development. Acting as a kind of indicator of equality in the South Caucasian society, the principle of equality of rights and freedoms of men and women, gender equality, reveals very characteristic gender relationships, which, in the future, may become a determining factor in the development of public authorities and civil society.

References

- Aleksanyan, Anna. 2020. "Between Love, Pain and Identity: Armenian Women After World War I." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 103-127. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_5.
- Aliyeva, Yuliya Gureyeva. 2020. "Exploring Two Generations of Women Activists in Azerbaijan: Between Feminism and a Post-Soviet Locality." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 225-252. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_10.

- Arjevanidze, Nargiza. 2020. "Vulnerability and Resilience: Women's Narratives of Forced Displacement from Abkhazia." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 155-177. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_7.
- Curro, Costanza. 2020. "'Supra Is Not for Women': Hospitality Practices as a Lens on Gender and Social Change in Georgia." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 43-70. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_3.
- Ghazaryan, Shushanik. 2020. "'We Are Strangers Among Our Own People': Displaced Armenian Women." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 129-153. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_6.
- Gvianishvili, Natia. 2020. "Invisible Battlefield: How the Politicization of LGBT Issues Affects the Visibility of LBT Women in Georgia." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 205-224. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_9.
- Krebs, Melanie. 2020. "Women as Bearers of Modernity and Tradition." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 23-42. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_2.
- Shahnazarian, Nona, and Ulrike Ziemer. 2020. "The Politics of Widowhood in Nagorny Karabakh." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 179-201. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_8.
- Walsh, Sinead. 2020. "Feminism in Azerbaijan: Gender, Community and Nation-Building." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 253-275. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_11.
- Ziemer, Ulrike. 2018. "Opportunities for Self-Realisation?: Young Women's Experiences of Higher Education in Russia." In: *The Palgrave Handbook of Women and Gender in Twentieth-Century Russia and the Soviet Union*, edited by Melanie Ilic, 479-494. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54905-1_31.
- Ziemer, Ulrike. 2020. "Women Against Authoritarianism: Agency and Political Protest in Armenia." In: *Women's Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus*, edited by Ulrike Ziemer, 71-100. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25517-6_4.

About the Publishing House of Yerevan State University

The Publishing House of Yerevan State University works closely with the academic community to publish high quality academic journals, monographs and textbooks, and provides services to promote teaching and research. Our main mission is to internationalize, make open, accessible and transparent the scientific work of the Armenian scientific community.

Our publications include digital, print and open access content spanning the humanities and social sciences, natural sciences and technology. In cooperation with authors, we distribute the best academic materials in the region and in the world.

Publish your journal and book with The Publishing House of Yerevan State University and you will join the scientific community of distinguished authors whose published work has helped shape and influence learning in the region and around the world.

- If you need information on how to apply to publish a book, you can read our guide [here](#).
- For information on how to write for a scientific journal, please visit our journal author page [here](#).

Open research

As a university press and not-for-profit publisher, we are committed to the advancement of open research, exploring and innovating new models that will ensure sustainability and quality, while maximising the benefits that openness can offer.

Author Services

In order to continue to publish the best local, regional and international researchers, it is important that we support researchers preparing their research for publication in our journals. In order to help prospective authors to prepare for submission and to reach their publication goals, we offer a range of high-quality manuscript preparation services - including language editing and video abstract creation.

Director of the Publishing House of Yerevan State University is Dr. Karen Grigoryan
E-mail: publishing@ysu.am



**[YEREVAN STATE
UNIVERSITY]**
PUBLISHING HOUSE

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| In this issue | 6 |
| <i>Regional policy</i> | |
| Armenian Statehood in Foreign Policy Realities: the First Steps of the First Republic <i>Gegham Petrosyan</i> | 12 |
| Erdogan against Turkey: Stalemate of “Patriot-F-35-S-400” triangle <i>Hayk Gabrielyan</i> | 49 |
| <i>Comparative politics</i> | |
| Mapping Political Populism in the European Post-Transitional Periphery.. <i>Nane Aleksanyan</i> | 73 |
| Reflections on the Transformation of the World Order: Emerging Trends and Impending Perspectives <i>Karine Khojayan</i> | 92 |
| <i>Public policy</i> | |
| Civic Journalism as a Phenomenon of Digital Civilization <i>Greta Gevorgyan</i> | 106 |
| <i>Political philosophy</i> | |
| How to Reconcile Equality with Freedom? On the Two Ways in Liberalism <i>Naira Mkrtchyan</i> | 121 |
| <i>Book Review</i> | |
| Lebanidze, Bidzina. 2020. Russia, EU and the Post-Soviet Democratic Failure. Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. XV, 329 pp. <i>Review by: Hayarpi Drmeyan</i> | 139 |
| Armenia’s Velvet Revolution: Authoritarian Decline and Civil Resistance in a Multipolar World, edited by Broers Laurence, and Anna Ohanyan. London: I.B. TAURIS, 2021. XVI, 271 pp. <i>Review by: Viktorya Melkonyan</i> | 144 |
| Women’s Everyday Lives in War and Peace in the South Caucasus, edited by Ulrike Ziemer. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. X, 281 pp. <i>Review by: Svetlana Jilavyan</i> | 150 |

